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ABSTRACT 
WAITMAN W. BEORN: NEGOTIATING MURDER: WEHRMACHT SOLDIERS 
AND PARTICIPATION IN ATROCITIES, 1941-1942 
 (Under the direction of Christopher Browning) 
 
How did ordinary German soldiers confront atrocities and their complicity in 
them?  This study investigates the complexities of participation and non-participation in 
spontaneous acts of violence in one unit on the eastern Front.  It begins by examining 
what kinds of propaganda soldiers were exposed to and what kinds of beliefs and 
worldviews they expressed in letters home. In September 1942, the  4th Panzer Signal 
company murdered thirty to forty Jews in the tiny Soviet town of Peregruznoje, 
apparently on the initiative of the unit commander. A case study of this unit illuminates a 
twisted terrain of choices, pressures, norms, and organizational culture that helps explain 
why some men (and units) killed and others did not. This work argues that the kinds of 
“perpetrators” among Wehrmacht soldiers fall along a continuum of response: an activist 
core led by the commander, followers who went along, and others who evaded 
participation. 
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I. Introduction: One Day in September 
 
I believed it would be better for the victims as well as the participants, not to see the 
others lying at that place, that a mass shooting was taking place.  Those were 
thoughts at the time, to my recollection. 
- Statement of Sergeant Fritz Puls1 
 
The war in the East was carried out with reckless cruelty by the Russian side. My 
endeavor was always with the leadership of the company, to spare the blood of my 
men.  For this reason, I had to treat the members of the Russian civil population 
harshly. I had to presume of them, that they could become dangerous to the unit and 
especially my men.  
- Statement of First Lieutenant Fritz Fischer2 
 
 
 Sometime in September, 1942, a small formation took place just outside the tiny town 
of Peregruznoje, in the Soviet Union.  In the pre-dawn hours, a group of German soldiers 
congregated in the dusty unit motor pool.  Sergeant Puls, an officer candidate and leader of 
this group, nodded to the roving sentries who had been guarding the unit’s vehicles overnight 
and they moved back to their quarters.  Puls looked at one truck in particular, a cargo truck, 
with its tarp tightly closed.  The thirty to forty inhabitants were quieter now after almost half 
a day crammed together in the truck, but soft cries and moans still emanated from the stifling 
interior.  After checking their weapons, the twelve to fifteen soldiers, led by Puls, climbed 
                                                 
1 "Statement of Fritz Puls, 11-27-62," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 356. [ Ich glaubte, es wäre 
für die zu Erschießenden besser und auch für die Ausführenden, dass an der Stelle nicht sehen andere lägen, dass also eine 
Massenerschießung stattfinde.  Das waren meiner Erinnerung nach damals so meine Gedanken.] 
2 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 12-6-62," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl.341. [Der Krieg im Osten 
von Seiten des Russen mit rücksichtlosen Grausamkeit geführt.  Mein Bestreben ist es immer bei der Führung der Kompanie 
gewesen, das Blut meiner Männer zu schonen.  Aus dieser Grunde musste ich die Angehörigen der russischen 
Zivilbevölkerung hart anfassen, von denen ich annehmen musste, sie könnten der Truppe und insbesondere meinem 
Männern gefährlich werden] 
into a few vehicles and slowly pulled out of town, as the steppe landscape of Russia was 
illuminated by the rising sun. 
 The small convoy drove only a kilometer or so outside of the town and then pulled off 
the dirt path into the steppe.  Puls and his men opened the flaps and the tailgate and forced a 
group of approximately ten women, children, and elderly out of the back of the truck.  These 
people were forced to stumble away from the vehicles while the German soldiers walked 
behind them, shooting with a combination of rifles and submachine guns.  When no one was 
left standing, another soldier walked among the victims, shooting any still alive.  As the men 
walked back to the trucks, the remaining Jews screamed in fright and pleaded, knowing what 
fate awaited them.  The soldiers mounted up, drove several hundred meters farther and 
repeated the process.  When all were dead, the small convoy returned to the motor pool.  It 
was likely finished before breakfast.  As the men cleaned out the back of the truck and started 
weapons maintenance, Sergeant Puls walked off to report the successful completion of his 
mission to the company commander, First Lieutenant Fritz Fischer.  In this manner, the entire 
Jewish population of Peregruznoje was exterminated by a small group of signal soldiers 
whose military mission was laying and maintaining communication wires between 
headquarters. 
 Yet, out of almost two hundred men, only a small minority of the 4th Panzer Signal 
Company actively participated in this execution and the other atrocities for which it was 
responsible.  Some men actively refused, others made themselves scarce, others followed 
orders when given, and some volunteered.  Why did some men choose to participate or avoid 
participation in atrocities in the ways they did?  To what extent did earlier and contemporary 
2 
efforts at indoctrination influence the mindsets of these soldiers?  These are the principal 
questions that this study seeks to answer. 
 What follows is an examination of the forces at play within German Army units as 
they experienced combat on the Eastern Front and engaged in a variety of atrocities.  This 
case study will illustrate the complex interaction between leadership and unit dynamics on 
the one hand, and indoctrination, propaganda, and training on the other.  Judicial 
interrogations of the 4th Panzer Signal Company will illustrate the complicated pressures at 
work inside one such unit such as peer pressure, dysfunctional leadership, and role-playing.  
An examination of soldier letters, wartime propaganda directed at the troops, and internal 
military documents will help us understand some of the preexisting mindsets and lenses 
through which these soldiers viewed the situations in which they found themselves. 
 
Destroying a Myth: The “Clean” Wehrmacht 
 Investigating the complicity of German soldiers in atrocities during World 
War II requires a descent into the murky realm of obscuration, memory, myth, and guilt.  
Fortunately, many historians have done exhaustive research in debunking the Mythos der 
Sauberen Wehrmacht3 (The Myth of the Clean Wehrmacht). Immediately following the war, 
the Nuremburg Tribunal promoted the “clean hands” myth by specifically terming the SS, 
and not the Wehrmacht, a criminal organization and, by implication, blaming senior 
leadership, not ordinary soldiers both legally and morally for atrocities and the Holocaust.  
                                                 
3 The term Wehrmacht technically refers to all fighting arms of the German military during World War II.  
When discussing the general complicity of the military, especially from a historiographical standpoint, in 
atrocities committed during the war, I will use the term “Wehrmacht” though the discussion of such atrocities 
generally centers on land forces, specifically the Army. While other formations such as Luftwaffe Field 
Divisions, Waffen-SS, Einsatzgruppen, Reserve Police, and a host of others were often attached to the Army in 
varying forms, they are special enough in their organization and characteristics that they should not be included 
as “representative” units. 
3 
Contributing to this myth that the Wehrmacht was a purely military organization that fought 
bravely for the Reich were the flurry of clearly self-serving memoirs written by German 
generals and senior military officials, portraying themselves as unwilling participants and as 
ignorant of the crimes committed by “others” within the regime.4 In addition, the specter of 
Communism and the Cold War made rearmament (and the participation of former 
Wehrmacht members in facing the new threat) a vital component of post-war German life. 
Historical treatment of the Wehrmacht began with “pure” military histories, 
concentrating on tactical prowess and operational history, but generally eschewing any 
discussion of political involvement or complicity.  Indeed, these works generally claimed a 
“vast distance” between the officer corps and the Nazi political organs, implying the 
Wehrmacht did not condone, let alone participate in atrocity and genocide. Examples of this 
genre include a number of works, especially those by British historians such as Liddell-Hart 
which often legitimized the alibis of the German generals.5 Donald Bloxham states that he 
played “Cold War politics while [he] was purportedly working in support of the apolitical 
figures, who happened to be the standard-bearers of the Vernichtungskrieg.”6 Indeed, 
evidence of Liddell-Hart’s disturbing myopia can be seen in his own conclusion that “'60 
percent [of the generals] are apolitical vacuum-men who have hitherto concentrated upon 
                                                 
4 See Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Washington: Zenger Pub. Co., 1979), Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories 
(Chicago,: H. Regnery Co., 1958). , and F. W. von Mellenthin, German Generals of World War Ii : As I Saw 
Them, 1st ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977)..  
5  Omer Bartov, "German Soldiers and the Holocaust: Historiography, Research, and Implications," History & 
Memory 9, no. 1-2 (1997): 165. Also, see Liddell-Hart’s myopic work.  Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The German 
Generals Talk, Apollo Editions ; a-41. (New York,: W. Morrow, 1948). 
6  Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial : The War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and 
Memory (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 177-78. 
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their professional work and have never thought about wider questions'.”7  He made this 
conclusion after beginning his intimate relationship with the German generals during their 
imprisonment in England in 1945.  In short, the historical material produced after the war and 
into the 1960s did little to recognize or investigate the crimes of the Wehrmacht at any level.  
Also, complicating any investigation of Wehrmacht complicity in this period were the 
political exigencies of the immediate post-war era, which tended to favor a rapid re-
integration of former Wehrmacht soldiers into the Bundeswehr to face the new Soviet threat. 
Liddell-Hart appears in this context as well, aiding people like imprisoned Waffen-SS 
General Wilhelm Bittrich.  These same German generals used Liddell-Hart to connect 
“rehabilitation” for Nazi crimes with the need for rearmament against the Soviet threat.8  
Strategies such as these both reflected and impacted German public opinion; Germans sought 
honor and heroism in the Wehrmacht and were more than willing to ignore the possibility 
that their husbands, fathers, and sons had committed the basest of Nazi crimes. As Donald 
Bloxham notes in his work on the subject, the “trials were conceptually flawed as didactic 
tools and…their shortcomings were magnified by the political discourses of the post-war 
years.”  Between 1945 and 1953, Allied policy shifted rapidly from enforcing the idea of 
collective German guilt to differentiation between Germans, then, somewhat more gradually, 
to appeasement of German indignation at the earlier punishment of war criminals.”9  Indeed, 
in 1953, when asked if they thought “German soldiers could be reproached for their actions 
                                                 
7 Alaric Searle, "A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West 
German Rearmament, 1945-1953," 1998, 332. 
8 For more on Liddell-Hart’s involvement with rearmament, see Alaric Searle, "A Very Special Relationship: 
Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953," 1998 
9 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial : The War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory, 
11-12. 
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in the occupied countries”, 55% of Germans said “no”, 21% said “in some cases,” and only 
6% answered with an unequivocal “yes.”10  As Bloxham concludes, “the reputation of the 
Wehrmacht was preserved in Germany by the perpetuation of one myth of its ‘unpoliticized’ 
nature and of another of the German ‘bulwark’ against the Communist east.”11 
 Gradually, however, scholars began revising this interpretation.  They unearthed the 
ubiquitous implementation of the Kommissarbefehl, collaboration with the Einsatzgruppen, 
and the mass murder of Soviet prisoners of war.12  Indeed, while the Army had no 
jurisdiction in the operational employment of the Einsatzgruppen, it did have operational 
control of them for movement and logistics and had liaison officers attached to its 
headquarters at all levels.  In Belorussia, Army units established and ran ghettos for two 
months before handing them over to civil administration.13 Nor were these actions limited to 
                                                 
10  Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Erich Peter Neumann, and author joint, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 
1947-1966 (Allensbach: Bonn, Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), 202. 
11 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial : The War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory, 
178. 
12  Bartov, "German Soldiers and the Holocaust: Historiography, Research, and Implications," 166.  The 
Kommisarbefehl or Commissar Order dictated that Army units summarily execute any Communist political 
apparatchiks captured during combat operations.  The Einsatzgruppen were tactical units specially formed for 
the purpose of carrying out the mass executions of “potential enemies behind the lines on the Eastern front. By 
the summer of 1941, this had evolved into essentially the mass murder of Jews. Finally, as Streit shows, a 
precedent for neglect toward Soviet POWs existed in the Army command and resulted in large numbers of 
deaths.  Some controversial literature suggests that the extermination of POWs was an intentional design.  For 
analysis of the Commissar Order (and other directives from both OKW and OKH) see Hans Buchheim and 
Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich Germany), Anatomie Des Ss-Staates, 2 vols., Dtv Dokumente. (München: 
Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 1967)..  For Wehrmacht collaboration with the Einsatzgruppen, see Helmut 
Krausnick, Helmut Krausnick, and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges : die 
Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 1938-1942, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte ; 
Bd. 22. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981). For Wehrmacht genocidal policies toward Soviet POWs, 
see Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden : die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, 
Neuausg. ed. (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1991). 
13  Hannes Heer, "Killing Fields: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia, 1941-1942," Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 11, no. 1 (1997): 81. 
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the Eastern Front or to a period of increasing violence after 1941, as some have argued.14 
Soldiers carried out atrocities and abetted the precursor to the Final Solution in Poland and 
France. 15   In partisan wars in both Greece and Serbia, Wehrmacht soldiers committed 
atrocities that in many ways prefigured those committed during Barbarossa. 16  Thus, the 
German Army had demonstrated a proclivity for complicity and atrocity before stepping foot 
into the Soviet Union. The final result of this research has been to show that the Wehrmacht 
in general and the German Army in particular, were far from “clean” in their roles in war 
crimes during the period.  Indeed, members of the military participated willingly at all levels.  
Soldiers rounded up Jews and handed them over to Einsatzgruppen.  Soldiers shot Soviet 
POWs who could not work and guarded POW cages where they died from starvation and 
exposure by the hundreds of thousands.  Soldiers conducted reprisals both spontaneously and 
systematically. Soldiers guarded execution sites.  The illumination of the actual participation 
of all levels of the Wehrmacht in the crimes of the Nazi state can be said to constitute the first 
“generation” of work in this area. 
 
                                                 
14 Omer Bartov claims that the barbarization of the war in the east led to more and more violence against 
civilians and more complicity by the Army.  While this is not an unrealistic argument, recent scholarship 
suggests that such proclivities existed and were executed much earlier, before the influence of the Russian 
campaign. See Omer Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich," The Journal of Modern History 63, 
no. 1 (1991). 
15 For Poland, see Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity, Modern War 
Studies. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003).  For France, see Raffael. Scheck, ""They Are Just 
Savages": German Massacres of Black Soldiers from the French Army in 1940," The Journal of Modern 
History, no. 77 (2005), Christopher Neumaier, "The Escalation of German Reprisal Policy in Occupied France, 
1941-42," Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 1 (2006). 
16 For Greece, see Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece : The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), Mark Mazower, "Military Violence and National Socialist Values: The 
Wehrmacht in Greece, 1941-1944," Past and Present, no. 134 (1992).  For Serbia, see Walter Manoschek, 
"Serbien Ist Judenfrei" : Militärische Besatzungspolitik Und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42, Beiträge 
Zur Militärgeschichte ; Bd. 38. (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1993), Christopher R. Browning, "Wehrmacht 
Reprisal Policy and the Murder of the Male Jews in Serbia," in Fateful Months : Essays on the Emergence of 
the Final Solution (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991). 
7 
The Kaleidoscope of Perpetrator Motivation 
 Even as the crimes of the Wehrmacht were being uncovered and documented, 
historians and other researchers began asking why and how these men, especially at the 
lowest levels, participated in these crimes.  While one could perhaps ascribe the horrific 
actions of particular individuals to a sadistic or abnormal mental pathology on the one hand 
or intense ideological commitment to Nazism on the other, such a charge became untenable 
for the majority of those involved, in light of the fact that over 20 million Germans served in 
the Wehrmacht during the course of the war.17  A more complex explanation was needed.  
This “new” group of perpetrators was not a collection of sadists, ideologues, and 
psychopaths; it was made up of ordinary men from all walks of life.   
 The investigation of the “mentality” of the Wehrmacht began, in some sense, as an 
attempt to explain the remarkable battle cohesion of the German army, especially when it 
was clear that the war was a losing endeavor against extraordinary odds.  How and why did 
these men, outnumbered, outgunned, and undersupplied, continue to fight so effectively?  
American sociologist and political scientist Morris Janowitz conducted a study of captured 
German soldiers in 1944-45 in an attempt to understand their mindset.  He found that “the 
ideology of the ‘average’ German soldier remained singularly steadfast.”18  Indeed, even in 
January 1945, 62% of captured German soldiers on the Western Front reported that they 
“trusted the Führer.”19 Yet, even given these seemingly powerful results, Janowitz added the 
disclaimer that “these polls must be viewed in conjunction with the more important mass of 
                                                 
17 Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht : History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 202. 
18 Morris Janowitz and M. I.  Gurfein, "Trends in Wehrmacht Morale," The Public Opinion Quarterly 10, no. 1 
(1946): 78. 
19 Ibid.: 81. 
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documents collected and prepared on the Wehrmacht as an integral fighting organization and 
as a social and psychological entity.”20  Indeed, two years later, Janowitz and his fellow 
researcher Edward Shils, focused on the “primary group” as the essential factor behind 
soldier motivation and combat effectiveness. Retreating from earlier assertions, the two 
sociologists argued that  
it appears that a soldier’s ability to resist [to fight] is a function of the 
capacity of his immediate primary group…to avoid social 
disintegration...The capacity of the primary group to resist disintegration was 
dependent on the acceptance of political, ideological, and cultural symbols 
(all secondary symbols) only to the extent that these secondary symbols 
became directly associated with primary gratifications.21 
 
In other words, social-psychological and peer influences were responsible for what was seen 
as a remarkable degree of unit cohesion. 
 The work of Omer Bartov challenges this explanation.22  He claims that the original 
primary groups were quickly destroyed in the first two years of the war and that, as a source 
of cohesion, primary group loyalty was replaced by an almost blind reliance on belief in 
Hitler and the propaganda of the Third Reich.  In a later work, Bartov explains his position, 
saying 
It is quite possible, of course, to stake out a third position, one which stresses 
a crucial factor neglected both by Browning’s circumstantial interpretation 
and by Goldhagen’s essentialist view, namely the powerful impact of 
ideology and indoctrination on the perpetrators.23 
                                                 
20 Ibid.: 79. 
21 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War Ii," The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1948): 281. 
22 While I disagree with some of Bartov’s conclusions, his research is exceptional and useful. Most notably: 
Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army : Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45 : German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 2nd ed., 
St. Antony's Series. (New York: Palgrave in association with St. Antony's College Oxford, 2001). 
23 Omer Bartov, Germany's War and the Holocaust : Disputed Histories (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 130. 
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Indeed, Bartov argues that the “widely accepted sociological theory of Shils and 
Janowitz…is thus shown to be largely irrelevant to conditions particularly on the Eastern 
Front.”24  He also discusses the “extent to which years of premilitary and army indoctrination 
distorted the soldiers’ perception of reality.”25 
For the most extreme explanation, one must look to the work of political scientist 
Daniel Goldhagen.  He argued that the German people possessed an especially virulent strain 
of anti-Semitism that “marked their departure from civilized peoples.”26  Essentially, for 
Goldhagen, Hitler merely provided the opportunity for the German people to carry out an 
extermination they had been yearning to realize for centuries.  When applied to Wehrmacht 
perpetrators, such a doctrine would explain their participation as a logical step for an entire 
people who wanted to kill the Jews anyway.  No other factors were especially important 
given this powerful drive to kill.  Goldhagen argues that the Reserve Policemen he studied 
“wanted to be genocidal executioners.”27  
 In his book, Ordinary Men, Christopher Browning arrived at a much different 
conclusion than Bartov or Goldhagen as to why soldiers participated in atrocities. He argues 
convincingly that social psychological factors within the context of group dynamics played a 
pivotal role in motivating middle-aged reserve policemen to commit atrocities and that, at 
                                                 
24 Bartov, Hitler's Army : Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, 5. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners : Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, 1st ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 4. 
27 Ibid., 279. 
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least in these cases, ideology was not the primary motivating factor. 28  The men of Reserve 
Police Battalion 101 were neither specially indoctrinated troops nor men young enough to 
have been targeted by Nazi propaganda.  They were middle-aged men, with families, who 
killed more often due to peer pressure and obligation to duty than out of malice. 
 Such an interpretation has substantial support from the realm of social psychology.  
Stanley Milgram’s groundbreaking experiment on obedience demonstrated how strong a 
factor deference to authority is in shaping human behavior. 
Philip Zimbardo’s disturbing “Stanford Prison Experiment” demonstrated that 1) peer 
pressure can form quickly and have a decisive impact on behavior and the decision to stand 
up to perceived wrongdoing, and 2) that individuals quickly adapt to assigned roles, and seek 
to demonstrate the skills and characteristics they believe define these roles.  His experiment 
was so “successful” that it had to be stopped after six days as it became too violent and 
degrading for the participants.  Zimbardo argues that the social groups in which we find 
ourselves “define what is right, socially appropriate, or ‘in,’ and produce adherence to these 
ideas through such techniques as social rewards, threats of punishment or ostracism, and 
various other pressures toward conformity.”29  In addition, the theory of cognitive dissonance 
holds that most individuals are distressed by discrepancies between their beliefs and action  , 
and often alleviate this distress by altering their beliefs.  In the end, all this social 
psychological research indicates that human beings are profoundly influenced by the social 
                                                 
28 See Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men : Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in 
Poland, 1st Harper Perennial , Reissued [with a new afterword by the author]. ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 
1998). 
29 Philip G. Zimbardo, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Christina Maslach, Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior : 
An Introduction to Method, Theory, and Applications of Social Control and Personal Power, 2nd ed., Topics in 
Social Psychology. (New York: Random House, 1977), 42. 
11 
pressures within groups.  Such recognition is a valuable starting point for the investigation of 
Wehrmacht atrocities committed in the context of deeply social military units. 
 Harald Welzer, in his book on perpetrators, draws heavily on this methodology.  He 
writes “even when we examine ourselves, substantial discrepancies appear between our 
moral demands and actions; depending on the situation, we are capable of extremely different 
ways of thinking, acting and speaking.”30  In his study of Einsatzgruppen and concentration 
camp personnel, Welzer identifies a Nazi morality that guided the actions of these men.  He 
leaves us with an insightful thought that, in some ways, underlies much of this present study: 
A social-psychology of mass-murder must also come analytically from three 
questions, namely, how the perpetrators perceived and interpreted the 
situation in which they killed, which internal rationality (which can be 
irrational when regarded from the outside) allowed their actions to appear 
meaningful, and how the social and psychological processes and situational 
dynamics were, that preceded their decision to kill. 31 
 
In Search of the “Ordinary” Soldier 
 Complicity in crimes by the Wehrmacht can be likened, metaphorically, to a field 
prior to planting, where the field represents the army and the crops atrocities.  Some portions 
of the field have been plowed and prepared for planting, by propaganda and internal beliefs 
of a myriad of origins; others have not.  The seeds of violence are spread evenly over the 
area.  Some fall in areas less fertile and do not bloom.  Some even bloom in inhospitable 
locations.  Some seeds, however, fall in prepared ground.  They are carefully tended and 
                                                 
30 Harald Welzer and Michaela Christ, Täter : wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden, 2. 
Auflage. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2005), 22.[ Auch wenn wir uns selbst betrachten, zeigen sich 
gelegentlich erhebliche Diskrepanzen zwischen unseren moralischen Ansprüchen und Handlungen; wir sind je nach 
Situation zu höchst unterschiedlichen Deutungs-, Handlungs- und Redeweisen in der Lage] 
31 Ibid., 43. [Eine Sozialpsychologie des Massenmords muss also analytisch von drei Fragen ausgehen, nämlich wie die 
Täter die Situation wahrgenommen und interpretiert haben, in denen sie töteten, welche Binnenrationalität (die von außen 
betrachtet ganz und gar irrational sein kann) ihnen ihr Handeln als sinnvoll erscheinen ließ, und wie die sozialen und 
psychischen Prozesse und situativen Dynamiken waren, die ihrer Entscheidung zum Töten vorausgegangen sind.] 
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fertilized by such things as battle experience, conditions at the front, peer pressure, and 
directed propaganda.  These seeds may bloom in much larger numbers as a result of both 
prior preparation of the ground and continued cultivation. 
  The brief historiography of Wehrmacht complicity in the crimes of the Third Reich 
reveals that important work has been done in explaining the behavior of German soldiers and 
their relation to atrocity.  However, much work remains to be done.   While the crimes of the 
German Army have in many ways been laid bare, the experience and mindset of the German 
soldier in relation to these crimes remains in shadow. 
 While Browning’s work on reserve police battalions and Shepherd’s work on security 
regiments have told us much about the internal workings of such types of units, we still lack 
an understanding of what participation in atrocities meant for members of more conventional 
units, who experienced killing in an ad hoc rather than organized manner.32  Hannes Heer, 
creator of the controversial “Wehrmacht Exhibition,” writes that “one seeks in vain a history 
of the mentality of the Wehrmacht.”33  Truman Anderson notes that “it is clear that German 
soldiers followed the ideological orders given to them…, even when these orders demanded 
the killing of women and children, but questions remain about their motivation and about the 
extent of their own initiative.”34  
                                                 
32 For Security Regiments and their participation in atrocities and the Holocaust see, Ben Shepherd, War in the 
Wild East : The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), Ben 
Shepherd, "Wehrmacht Security Regiments in the Soviet Partisan War, 1943," European History Quarterly 33, 
no. 4 (2003). 
33 The Wehrmacht Austellung (exhibition) was a pivotal cultural event for Germans and the historical 
community.  For perhaps the first time, the public at large was confronted with incontrovertible evidence of the 
crimes of the Wehrmacht. Heer, "Killing Fields: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia, 1941-1942," 
97. 
34 Truman Anderson, "Incident at Baranivka: German Reprisals and the Soviet Partisan Movement in Ukraine, 
October-December 1941," The Journal of Modern History 71, no. 3 (1999): 590. 
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 This study seeks to illuminate some of these questions.  As James Waller warns in his 
work on genocide, “ultimately, a contest between dispositional and situational explanations is 
not productive…Instead, what we should be concerned with is the relative importance of 
dispositional and situational factors in explaining extraordinary human evil.”35  I begin with 
an examination of the propaganda vehicles and messages transmitted to the soldiers.  This 
discussion is limited primarily to materials that likely were read by the soldiers. Next, a 
survey of themes present in German Feldpostbriefe indicates some agreement and parroting 
of these propaganda messages.  One cannot, perhaps, tie this concurrence directly to 
propaganda, but it may well indicate that these messages did not fall on unapproving ears. 
Finally, I investigate one specific unit, the 4th Armored Signal Company.  This unit 
committed increasingly violent atrocities from 1941 to 1942.  In this case study, one can 
perhaps see the confluence of situation and disposition, of ideology, organization, and 
environment and its effect on the participation in atrocities by a unit which was conventional 
in most senses.  This investigation forcefully argues that ideological beliefs could create a 
fertile ground for a predisposition to atrocity, but that leadership and peer forces at the lowest 
level were essential for the actual commission of violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 James Waller, Becoming Evil : How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 175. 
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II. Fertile Fields and the Seeds of Killing 
 
During the shooting of the inhabitants, bad things happened. 
- Letter from Karl Bühler to his parents, 2 December 1941, Kraljevo, 
Yugoslavia36 
 
 In mid-October 1941, significant partisan forces in western Serbia engaged the 
German 717th Infantry Division, which was stationed in the town of Kraljevo.37 After these 
attacks were repelled, the 717th IN DIV rounded up all the male inhabitants of the town of 
Kraljevo in the yard of the local railway car factory and shot them. Killed in this reprisal 
were 1736 men and 19 “communist women.”38 
 On November 14th, Karl Bühler’s division, the 113th IN, arrived from service on the 
Eastern Front to assist in anti-partisan warfare in the region.39 Clearly, Bühler is referring, 
above, to the mass execution of civilians that had occurred a little over a month prior.  
However, barely two weeks after his unit arrived, Bühler’s division took part in another 
“anti-partisan” action that resulted in 1,415 “enemy” casualties at a cost of 11 German 
                                                 
36 Karl Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
unserer Heimat (Spaichingen: M. Hohner, 1982), 46. [Bei der Erschießung der Einwohner sind schlimme Dinge 
passiert] 
37 Along with the Ukraine, Serbia witnessed perhaps the most egregious examples of Wehrmacht participation 
in atrocities. 
38 Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months : Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution, Rev. ed. (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), 52. 
39 Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer 
Heimat, 44. 
soldiers dead and 35 wounded.40 The sheer disparity in casualty figures suggests the nature 
of this “action.” Also interesting, and revealing of his reaction to the Kraljevo atrocity 
perhaps, is Bühler’s complaint in the sentence preceding his euphemistic revelation of “bad
things” having happened: he complains of the local availability of only poor Schnapps and no
 
 
eer.  
e 
 
t, 
ake 
                                                
b
 Soldier letters provide a glimpse into the minds of German soldiers, and, as such, ar
a valuable resource in attempting to identify the motivations and beliefs of these men.   In
their innermost moments, these writers portray a different kind of “honesty” than that of 
other sources. While much work has been done documenting the crimes of the Wehrmach
comparatively little has been done in analyzing how the “ordinary” soldier conceived of 
himself in relation to these crimes, especially through an analysis of letters.41  Messages 
transmitted from soldiers on the Eastern Front home are important as windows into their 
mindset and their identity. As Stephen Fritz points out, “no one forced a soldier to m
positive comments about the Nazi regime.”42 While censorship could play a role in 
repressing negative statements (at which it was often ineffective), no one forced these 
soldiers to relate ideological concepts.  Thus, the choice, conscious or not, to include these 
 
40 Manoschek, "Serbien Ist Judenfrei" : Militärische Besatzungspolitik Und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 
1941/42, 150. 
41 Some work has been done in this area.  Almost exclusively, it is in German.  In addition, these works tend to 
focus on smaller case studies of individual collections of letters rather than a more global approach to soldier 
identity. See Alexandre Proskouriakov, Das soziale Bewusstsein und die Wahrnehmung des Krieges der 
deutschen und russischen Soldaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg im Vergleich: Am Beispiel der Schlacht um Stalingrad 
(Konstanz: Universität Konstanz, 2003), Alf Lüdtke, "The Appeal of Exterminating "Others": German Workers 
and the Limits of Resistance," The Journal of Modern History 64, no. Supplement: Resistance Against the Third 
Reich (1992), Thilo Stenzel, Das Russlandbild des "kleinen Mannes" : Gesellschaftliche Prägung und 
Fremdwahrnehmung in Feldpostbriefen aus dem Ostfeldzug, 1941-1944/45 (München: Osteuropa-Institut, 
1998). 
42 Stephen G. Fritz, "We Are Trying..To Change the Face of the World"-- Ideology and Motivation in the 
Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below," The Journal of Military History 60, no. 4 (1996): 
687. 
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statements and descriptions in the valuable free time taken to write a letter is significant. T
Nazis themselves certainly recognized that letters were powerful indications of soldiers’ 
feelings, for they attempted to harness these letters for propaganda purposes.  A brochure 
issued in 1943 to officers in charge of training new army recruits emphasized the importance 
of letters, asking “how do we make each one [soldier] an active propagandist for the Ge
people’s st
he 
rman 
ruggle for freedom in their letters to home and their conversations while on 
leave?”
e propaganda 
 
expressed by letter writers and the publications they were exposed to on the Eastern 
ont. 
 
Wofür ier 
 
olshevism.  We soldiers know best, what it would mean if their 
hordes , our blooming towns and 
ities. 
 
Good night, if the Russians were to win this war. 
                                                
43  
Indeed, propaganda directed at the troops was clearly designed to reinforce the belief 
systems that made murder and atrocity possible.  An investigation of some of th
documents aimed directly at the troops reveals themes that are often echoed in 
Feldpostbriefe, indicating that some important commonalities existed between attitudes and
views 
fr
 Kämpfen Wir? Propaganda Messages Directed at the German Sold
 
Our fight has saved our Heimat44, our wives and children and our way of life
from B
and commissars were to fall upon our land
c
- Article in Unser Heer, 3 March 194245 
 
43 Ellenbeck, Der Offizier als Führer im Kampf gegen die feindliche Propaganda, trans. Randall  Bytwerk 
(OKW, 1943). 
44 The German word Heimat is difficult to translate.  It means one’s country and homeland, but is far more 
emotionally charged than the same words in English.  It implies a loved locality and a tie to the land. Therefore, 
I will use the original word Heimat where it appears. 
45 Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, "Wofür Kämpfen Wir? Der Deutsche Soldat Im Kampf Für Reich Und 
Heimat," Unser Heer 1, no. 5 (1942): 7. [Unser Kampf hat die Heimat, unsere Frauen und Kinder und Lebenskreise vor 
dem Bolschewismus bewahrt.  Wir Soldaten wissen am besten, was es bedeutet hätte, wenn seine Horden und Kommissare 
über unser Land, unsere blühenden Dörfer und Städte gekommen wären.] 
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- Letter from Karl Bühler, 28 March 194246 
 
There was a broad agreement among military officials that “the failure of German 
propaganda in World War I had had a decisive impact on the collapse of the German rear and 
had led to the German defeat.”47 German soldiers were, therefore, exposed to all kinds of 
propaganda messages before and during their service in the army.  Indeed, the myriad of 
influences that a soldier could have been exposed to is mind-boggling.  Experiences in the 
Hitler Youth, Reich Labor Service, school, and at home all likely had an impact on future 
soldiers. As Omer Bartov notes, German soldiers were “increasingly molded in accordance 
with the new National Socialist ideal of the political warrior…because they came to the army 
not tabula rasa but from a system of schooling and paramilitary youth training that had made 
this new type of soldiering seem quite natural to them.”48  This section, however, will focus 
on propaganda that was directed at the troops and read by them.  The Military High 
Command (OKW) published a series of “knapsack books” which were short pamphlets 
designed to be read and passed on to other soldiers by men at the front.  In addition, two 
magazines directed at the troops were published and disseminated: Unser Heer, published by 
the Army High Command (OKH), and Die Wehrmacht, published by the Military High 
Command, (OKW).  These magazines were accessible to the average soldier, full of 
illustrations as well as articles replete with propaganda messages. The 694th Propaganda 
Company, working for the 4th Panzer Army, reported in March 1942 that it had sent the 
following forward to the troops: 
                                                 
46 Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1
Heimat, 58. [ ] 
. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer 
Gute Nacht, wenn Russland den Krieg gewinnen würde
aganda Troops and the Jews," Shoah Resource Center, The International 
48 Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich," 54. 
47 Daniel Uziel, "Wehrmacht Prop
School for Holocaust Studies: 2. 
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110 Cases of books  
 71 Cases of NSV materials49 
 20,530 Pamphlets  
 20, 470 Soldier pamphlets for leisure activities (Soldatenblätter für Freizeitgestaltung) 
 4000 Calendars 
 5 Bundles of Magazines50 
 
Thus, this would be a war in which the soldier would be actively targeted by 
propaganda to a greater extent than ever before.  Previous scholarship has shown that 
German soldiers were “exposed to a massive indoctrination effort by the military 
authorities.”51 The need for a concerted propaganda organ led to the development of the 
Wehrmacht propaganda branch. 
The Wehrmacht propaganda branch, established in 1935-36, was created to 
orchestrate the propaganda efforts of the military (in this case all branches). Initially, this 
organization had 11 companies (5 in the Heer, 4 in the Luftwaffe and two in the 
Kriegsmarine).  By mid-1942, the Wehrmacht propaganda branch had grown to division 
strength, approximately 15,000 troops. 52 The army Propaganda Kompanien(PKs) came 
under the control of the OKW, but received their directions from the Ministry of 
Propaganda.53 The tasks of these units were: 1) collection of news material from military 
sectors, 2) dissemination of propaganda to the enemy military and population, and most 
                                                 
49 Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt. (NSV) National Socialist Peoples’Welfare.This charitable 
organization reflected Nazi racial doctrine, discriminating against so-called asocials, inferior races, genetic 
defectives, and Jews. It aided German mothers and children by fighting serious diseases, by promoting school 
health and welfare, and by sending to Germans the valuables of people murdered by the Third Reich. 
(Definition from Robert Michael and Karin Doerr, Nazi-Deutsch/Nazi German : An English Lexicon of the 
Language of the Third Reich (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002), 289. 
50 "Photo #47619," Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives, 862033-34. 
51 Bartov, "German Soldiers and the Holocaust: Historiography, Research, and Implications," 169. 
52 Uziel, "Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops and the Jews," 2-3. 
53 OKW [Oberkommando des Wehrmacht] functioned as the military high command, controlling all branches of 
the German military. 
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importantly for this study, 3) organization of educational and recreational activities for the 
German troops.54 While this last mission may seem innocuous, it was essential (and 
effective) at providing German soldiers with an ideological framework in which to view the 
war.  
The propaganda effort directed at the German soldiers fell into two major categories: 
1) mass media, and 2) instruction by military leadership.  In many ways, the Second World 
War was the first in which mass media was mobilized (on both sides) for the purposes of 
propaganda.  Because of their isolation on fighting fronts, especially in the East, German 
soldiers were completely reliant on the Nazi apparatus to supply them with information.  
Printed material was the first medium employed.  Soldiers during all wars crave information 
from the outside world.  In the case of German soldiers on the Eastern Front, this news was 
supplied solely through Nazi-managed newspapers and magazines, circulated among the 
troops. This “softer” approach of propaganda-laden newspaper was probably much more 
effective than more direct and overt measures that soldiers could more quickly recognize as 
propagandistic. 
The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch recognized that propaganda needed to be 
uncomplicated for the troops and, for example, ensured that material given to field 
commanders “was so organized that it could be passed on by them to the troops without 
requiring any special skill.” It also acknowledged that “too much propaganda could be 
deadening.”55 In addition, special publications like the Mitteilungen für die Truppe were 
                                                 
54 Uziel, "Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops and the Jews," 3. 
55 Jeffrey Robert Willis, The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch. German Military Propaganda And Censorship 
During World War II ([Charlottesville: Va.], 1964), 82. 
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distributed down to the company level.56 For the first time, film and radio were also 
mobilized to impart ideology to the troops.  Throughout the Eastern Front, film vans brought 
“recreational” films containing propaganda messages to the soldiers, often screening them in 
local movie theaters or creating theaters where they did not already exist.  Often these films 
contained anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik material.57 A monthly for Nazi party 
propagandists stated with pride that in 1941 about 30,000,000 soldiers had attended films 
arranged by the district film offices for the military.58 In its activity report, Section Ic 
(Security) of the 4th Panzer Army listed how these movies were provided to its troops: 
For movie screens, 12 projectors were available.  These were supplied to the 
divisions with 2 in the Army rear areas.  Screening rooms were built out of 
farmhouses or barns, in which approximately 3 showings took place a day. Thus, for 
example, such a Front cinema that was placed in a farmhouse with about 80 seats 
was visited by 9,000 soldiers in a month. 
 29 feature films were available, which were exchanged weekly.  In addition, 
newsreels and documentaries were shown.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
organize showings for all combat troops, owing to a lack of power..  All was done 
however, so that those troops at Division or Corps headquarters could participate in 
such showings from time to time.59 
 
Radio became an even more important method of communicating propaganda to the troops. 
Indeed, the same party monthly reported more than 60,000 radios supplied to the troops 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 85. These Mitteilungen contained news pieces as well as propanda messages and ideology. 
57 Uziel, "Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops and the Jews," 20. 
58 This number is most likely an exaggeration of the actual numbers of soldiers and must include the same 
soldier seeing multiple films. "Die Arbeit der Partei-Propaganda im Kriege," Unser Wille und Weg 1941. 
59"Photo #47619," 8632034. [Für Filmvorführungen standen 12 Apparaturen zur Verfügung.  Davon waren Ic bei den 
Divisionen und 2 im rückwärtigen Armeegebiet eingesetzt.  Aus Bauernhütten oder Scheunen wurden Vorführungsräume 
gebaut, in denen täglich rund 3 Vorstellungen stattfanden.  So wurde z.B. ein solches Frontkino, das in einem Bauernhaus 
untergebracht war und 80 Sitzplätze aufwies, in einem Monat von 9.000 Soldaten besucht.29 Spielfilme waren vorhanden, 
die wöchentlich ausgetauscht wurden.  Dazu wurden Wochenschauen und Kulturfilme gezeigt.  Leider war es nicht möglich, 
bei allen kämpfenden Truppenteilen Filmvorführungen zu veranstalten, da es an Aggregaten fehlte.  Es wurde aber alles 
getan, dass diese Truppenteile ab und zu bei den Div.- oder Korps-Gefechtsständen an einer solchen Veranstaltung 
teilnehmen konnten] 
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(10,000 of these radios came from Poland, confiscated from Jews.)60 The importance of these 
radios to the troops appears in their letters home. For example, letter writer Karl Bühler 
wrote on Christmas Eve, 1942, “we enjoyed first of all the program from 7-8 pm up to the 
beginning of Goebbels’ speech.  Then, we listened with deeply moved hearts to the speech of 
Dr. Goebbels.”61 Another soldier noted that he listened daily to the Wehrmachtbericht, a 
propaganda radio program managed by the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch.62  
Finally, and perhaps most effective, were the impromptu discussions by small unit 
leaders, promulgated by the Propaganda Branch. A special Mitteilungen für das Offizierkorps 
was published, directed specifically at supplying officers with propaganda messages to give 
to their troops and stressing the importance of this indoctrination.63 The importance of these 
meetings with the company commander cannot be underestimated. For example, already in 
1940, the 12th Infantry Division stated in an order to its officers: “the company commander is 
the central personality still retaining a direct influence upon the education, instruction and 
leading of the individual man…thereby the ideological education of the troops is also his 
task.”64 The OKW, in fact, intended that the pamphlets and “knapsack books” that it 
published be also used as material for this ideological indoctrination.  A pamphlet entitled 
“Organization of Free Time for the Troops: Suggestions and Proposals” indicated how these 
discussion periods could be used to propagate ideological messages.  It stated  
                                                 
60 "Die Arbeit der Partei-Propaganda im Kriege." 
61 Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer 
Heimat, 106. [Am Radio erfreuten wir uns zunächst der Ringsendung von 19 Uhr 20 bis zum Beginn der 
Goebbelsrede…Ergriffenen Herzens lauschten wir dann der Ansprache von Dr. Goebbels.] 
62 Franz Schober, Leopold Schober, and Michael Hans Salvesberger, Briefe von der Front : Feldpostbriefe, 
1939-1945, 1. Aufl. ed., Reihe Lokalgeschichte. (Gösing am Wagram: Weinviertel, 1997), 201. 
63 Bartov, Hitler's Army : Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, 123-24. 
64 Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45 : German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 74. 
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Also, free time must be given a meaning and an importance that has its roots in a 
soldierly view of life and lifestyle, perpetuates comradeship, has been proven in war, 
and is perfected during the monotony of day to day life.65  
 
The pamphlet went on to suggest that “the literature published by OKW can serve as 
stimulus and  
material for lecture hours far more than it has been.”66 
Indeed, Feldpostbriefe  show a high level of respect for officers, making this task 
even more important. In conclusion, in his case study of several German units, Omer Bartov 
concludes that “the troops at the front actually asked for and were glad to receive, radio, film, 
written, and verbal propaganda.”67  
What were the messages transmitted to the troops through this media?  First and 
foremost, the Russians (and all things Soviet) were dehumanized and vilified at every turn. 
Secondly, subtle and not-so-subtle racial messages entered in.  The most important of these 
was the conflation of Jew and Bolshevik.  Finally,  soldiers were told that they were engaged 
in self-defense, protecting the fatherland from certain destruction, that their enemy did not 
fight fairly and, thus,  his destruction deserved no remorse.  Taken together with the 
brutalizing environment of the Eastern Front, these messages certainly helped to pave the 
way for the commission of atrocities.  Indeed, some of these messages can even be seen 
echoing in the letters that follow. 
 
                                                 
65 Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Freizeitgestaltung der Truppe. Vorschläge und Anregungen, vol. Heft 63, 
Tornisterschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Berlin: W. Limpert, Druck- und Verlagshaus, 1942), 1. 
[Auch der Freizeit muss ein Sinn und eine Bedeutung gegeben werden, die ihre Wurzeln in soldatischer Lebensauffassung 
und Lebensführung hat und die im Krieg erprobte und bewährte Kameradschaft fortsetzt und in der Eintonigkeit der 
Alltäglichen vollendet.] 
66 Ibid., 3. [Das vom Oberkommando der Wehrmacht herausgegebene Schrifttum…kann als Anregung und Material für 
Vortragsstunden vielmehr ausgewertet werden, als es bisher geschehen ist.] 
67 Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45 : German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 89. 
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Anti-Bolshevik Messages and the Judeo-Bolshevik connection 
 
The work that the German people performed as farmers, merchants, engineers and 
officials in service for the order and  prosperity of the Russian state seemed to have 
given way to destruction under Bolshevism. 
- Die Volker des Ostraumes, 194268 
   
Not surprisingly, one of the most important messages that propaganda transmitted to 
the troops was that the Soviet Union was cruel, ineffective, and controlled by the Jews. These 
messages first ridiculed the Bolshevik system as a complete failure. As one article in Unser 
Heer notes, “[Russia] was on the margins of Europe, sick and insane in mind and body.”69  A 
“knapsack book” on the Baltic and Ukraine lamented, 
One year of Bolshevism! What a change the country has gone through in this short 
time, how much misery and destruction must it have suffered!  Terror, shootings, and 
depression prevail again.  The result of Bolshevization is economic decline, 
impoverishment, and hunger.70 
 
The anti-religious nature of the Soviet system was also used to arouse outrage in the German 
soldier. 
A small book published in 1934 entitled, “The Red Army Brings This,” stated that 
“the terrible frustration that Soviet rulers feel is understandable, as Adolf Hitler built the 
                                                 
68 Die Völker des Ostraumes, Die Bücherei des Ostraumes (Berlin: O. Stollberg, 1942), 17. [Die Arbeit, die der 
deutsche Mensch als Bauer, Köther, Ingenieur, Beamter im Dienst für die Ordnung und den Wohlstand des russischen 
Staates in langer Zeit geleistet hatte, schien unter dem Bolschewismus der Vernichtung preisgegeben] 
69 Kurt Ziesel, "Maske Und Gesicht Des Ostens—Gedanken Um Den Härtesten Kampf," Unser Heer 1, no. 2 
(1942): 4. [Er war der Rand Europas, krank und irr an Seele und Körper] 
70 Robert Stupperich, Die Ukraine und das Baltenland, vol. Heft 49, Tornisterschrift Des Oberkommando 
(1941), 14-15. [Ein Jahr Bolschewismus! Welchen Wandel hat das Land in dieser kurzen Zeit durchgemacht, wie viel 
Elend und Zerstörung hat es erdulden müssen!...Es herrschen wieder Terror, Erschießung, und Bedrücking.  Die Folge der 
Bolschewisierung ist wirtschaftlicher Niedergang, Verarmung, und Hunger.] 
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national state in Germany, thus the inextinguishable hate with which they persecute National 
Socialism.”71  
Geopolitical racial terminology then turns to one of the more dangerous themes of 
propaganda directed at the troops: the conflation of Jews and Bolsheviks.  For example, 
consider the following discussion of historical development in Lithuania, from the guidebook 
on the Ukraine and the Baltic: “here, Polish not German influence was foremost since the 
Middle Ages. So, apart from a few remnants in previously German cities such as Kovno, 
Lithuanian towns have the appearance of a Polish provincial town: haphazardly built, dirty, 
inhabited by a completely proletarianzed Jewish majority.”72  Indeed, there was little direct 
anti-Semitism in the propaganda, but much that was combined with anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda. Das bringt Der Rote Armee was typical, stating that, “there, however, the people 
are the exploited slave of the Jewish caste, who set up the Soviet program and organized the 
state accordingly.”73 A more direct formulation came from a soldier pamphlet on the 
conditions in the Soviet Union.  It told readers that, “out of this racial conglomeration came a 
type of people, whose essence aimed at the control and exploitation of other peoples. The 
strongest of these adopted the unnatural idea of Judaism, and became its special carriers in 
the course of European history.”74 Finally, a pamphlet on the people of the Eastern territory 
                                                 
71 Neils Närk, Das bringt die Rote Armee (Berlin: Nibelungen-Verlag, 1936), 16-19. [So ist die furchtbare 
Enttäuschung zu verstehen die die Sowjetmachthaber fühlten, als Adolf Hitler in Deutschland den völkischen Staat 
errichtete, so der unauslösichliche Haß, mit dem sie den Nationalsozialismus verfolgen] 
72 Stupperich, Die Ukraine und das Baltenland, 11. [Hier war nicht der deutsche, sondern der polnische Einfluss seit 
dem Mittelalter führend…So hatte, abgesehen von geringen Resten in den ehemals deutschen Städten wie Kauen (=Kaunas), 
die litausiche Stadt das Aussehen der polnischen Provinzstädte: planlos gebaut, schmutzig, von einer völlig proletarisierten 
jüdischen Mehrheit bewohnt.] 
73 Närk, Das bringt die Rote Armee, 15. [Dort aber ist das Volk ausgebeuteter Sklave der jüdischen Kaste, welche das 
Sowjetprogramm aufgestellt und den Staat dementsprechend organisiert hat] 
74 Abteilung Inland Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Die Sowjetunion Gegebenheiten und Möglichkeiten des 
Ostraumes, vol. Heft 72, Tornisterschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Berlin: O. Stollberg, 1943), 29. 
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stated that “the extraordinary position of the Jews in the USSR led to the opposition of all 
peoples against them.”75 
 
Racial Awareness and German superiority 
Its name and design is owed to the Marxist doctrine of the Jew Maier-Merdochai, 
whose list of ancestors features a number of rabbis.  Disguised as a new social order, 
it is neither that nor a new economic theory but a clever attempt at the control and 
exploitation of humanity. 
- Die Sowjetunion: Gegebenheiten and Möglichkeiten des Ostraumes, 194376  
 
 Racial and purely anti-Semitic messages were much more subtle and muted, 
especially in the magazines. But they were there.  The end result of all these messages was 
the creation in many German soldiers of an awareness of the importance of race both as a 
method of evaluating individual worth and as the basis of their own superiority. An article on 
the people of the Soviet Union begins by saying, “anyone, who has intently observed a 
platoon of Bolshevik POWs will have recognized that there are men of many different races 
in it.”77 The piece goes on to discuss in detail the many different “races” of the Soviet Union. 
Racial prejudice and stereotyping are rampant throughout, though, as these races are 
essentialized.  For example, one ethnic group is  “through their Mongolian influence devious 
                                                                                                                                                       
[Aus jenem Völkerkonglomerat ist ein Menschtyp hervorgegangen, dessen wesentliche Charaktereigenschaft auf die 
Beherrschung und Ausnutzung der Andersstämmigen abzielte. Am stärksten eignete sich diese natürwidrige Idee das 
Judentum an, das zu ihrem besondern Träger im Laufe der europäischen Geschichte wurde] 
75 Die Völker des Ostraumes, 91. [Die außerordentliche Stellung des Judentums in der UdSSR hat zu einer Gegnerschaft 
aller Völker gegen dieses geführt.] 
76 Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Die Sowjetunion Gegebenheiten und Möglichkeiten des Ostraumes, 31. 
[Ihren Namen und ihre Ausgestaltung verdankt die marxistische Doktrin dem Juden Maier-Merdochai, dessen Vöfahrenliste 
eine Reihe von Rabbinern aufweist.  Als seine neue Gesellschaftsordnung getarnt ist sie in Wirklichkeit weder dies noch eine 
neue Wirtschaftstheorie, sondern ein raffiniertes Werk zur Beherrschung und Ausnutzung der Menschheit] 
77 Kurt Gloger, "Völker Der Sowjetunion," Unser Heer 1, no. 13 (1942): 8. [Jeder, der einem Zug bolschewistischer 
Gefangener aufmerksam beobachtet hat, wird festgestellt haben, dass in ihm Menschen der verschiedensten Rassen waren. ] 
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, unfeeling, and can be very cruel” but “with good leadership, they are useable soldiers.“78 A 
pamphlet instructing soldiers how to behave in foreign lands told German soldiers that their 
membership “in a racial community must be apparent.”79 
 This conception of German superiority to the peoples of occupied territories was a 
major theme throughout. The same instructional pamphlet on soldierly behavior began by 
stating that, “the most important thing that you must know in foreign lands is that the people 
and the land arose under different laws and were shaped by a different past than your people 
and your Fatherland.”80  Another article in Unser Heer referred to the higher requirements 
arising from the “increase in people of our blood.”81 
Other propaganda messages portray the Russian himself as a backward, inhuman 
fighter.  A discussion of the close-quarters combat techniques of the Soviet soldier noted that 
“their leadership was certain, that these combat techniques were especially suitable for the 
primitive thinking and totally uneducated Russian soldier and corresponded with the instinct 
for self-preservation as a part of their nature and in part as a measure of the soulless 
individuals produced by the scourge of Bolshevism.”82 The Russian soldier was a primitive, 
                                                 
78 Ibid. [Sie [Indogermanen] kommt vor allem in ihren Liedern und in ihrer Stellung zur Familie zum Ausdruck, aber 
andererseits sind sie durch ihren mongolischen Einschlag verschlagen und gefühlsroh und können sehr grausam sein.  Bei 
guter Führung sind sie brauchbare Soldaten.] 
79 Bruno Brehm, Deutsche Haltung vor Fremden: Ein Kameradenwort an Unsere Soldaten, vol. Heft 16, 
Tornisterschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Berlin: W. Limpert, 1941), 27. [die Zugehörigkeit zu einer 
Volksgemeinschaft…muss man euch Soldaten in der Fremde auch ansehen.] 
80 Ibid., 1. [Das Wichstige, was du in der Fremde wissen muss, ist, daß das Volk und und das fremde Land nach anderen 
Gesetzen gewachsen und von einer anderen Vergangenheit geformt sind als dein Volk und dein Vaterland.] 
81 Franz Hayler, "Was Wird Aus Mir? Berufsfragen Der Kriegsteilnehmer: 3. Der Einzelhandelskaufmann," 
Unser Heer 1, no. 12 (1942): 11. [Mit dem Zuwachsen der Menschen unseres Blutes werden höhere Bedürfnisse 
entstehen] 
82 "Nahkampf Der Sowjets—Aus Sowjetrussischen Beutefilmen Und Instruktionsbüchern," Unser Heer 1, no. 3 
(1942): 8-9. [Seine [Red Army] Führung war sich im klaren darüber, dass diese Kampfweise dem primitiv denkenden, 
jeglicher Bildung baren russischen Soldaten besonders gut liegt und auch dem Selbsterhaltungstrieb der zu einem Teile aus 
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undeveloped creature, without sophistication. Die Wehrmacht reported that, “wherever the 
eye reaches, a gruesome picture of devastation and senseless destruction presents itself, 
typical for the Soviet way of war.”83 
However, these messages also contained dehumanizing, almost racial depictions of 
the people of the Soviet Union. The land was portrayed as strange and backward.  A caption 
to a sketch of the landscape, related that, “for hours, one can ride through the vast Russian 
plains, through the unendingly bleak land, without a change in the landscape.  From time to 
time, one encounters a couple of abandoned and decaying wooden huts, a dead horse along 
the way.”84 The Russian land, according to one article, “does not offer the slightest 
possibility for the provision of the simplest necessities of a civilized people.”85 German war 
correspondent, Kurt Ziesel, wrote derisively, that, “we threw hardly a glance at these ragged 
forms near the ruins of their houses, who called themselves human.”86  Another article stated 
that the Soviet soldier is “on average, nothing more than a piece of Russian earth come to 
life.”87 Further, “the Russian, in contrast, is as a creature, simply a function of its earth and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Naturmenschen, zum anderen Teile aus einer unter der Knute des Bolschewismus zum seelenlosen Individuum gewordenen 
Masse am besten entspricht] 
83 "Brandfackel Im Osten," Die Wehrmacht 4, no. 15 (1941): 2. [Wohin das Auge reichte, bot sich ein grauenvolles 
Bild der Verwüstung und sinnlosen Vernichtung, typisch für die sowjetische Kriegführung] 
84 "Mit Dem Skizzenbuch an Der Ostfront," Die Wehrmacht 4, no. 19 (1941). [Stundenlang kann man durch die 
weite russische Ebene reiten, durch das unendliche trostlose Land, ohne dass sich die Landschaft ändert.  Hin und wieder 
trifft man auf ein paar verlassene und zerfallene Holzhütten, ein totes Pferd am Wege.] 
85 George Soldan, "Kämpfer Im Osten—Die Leistungen Des Deutschen Soldaten- Ein Beitrag Zu Ihrer 
Würdigung," Unser Heer 1, no. 1 (1942): 5. […das auch nicht die geringste Möglichkeit zur Ergänzung einfachsten 
Lebensdarfes eines Kulturmenschen bietet…] 
86 Ziesel, "Maske Und Gesicht Des Ostens—Gedanken Um Den Härtesten Kampf," 4. [Wir warfen kaum noch 
einen Blick auf diese zerlumpten Gestalten neben den Ruinen ihrer Häuser, die sich Menschen nannten] 
87 V.F.W. von Oertzen, "Warüm Kämpfen Viele Sowjets So Stur? Ein Beitrag Zur Wertung Des Kampfes 
Gegen Die Sowjetarmee," Unser Heer 1, no. 6 (1942): 5. [Viele Sowjetsoldaten sind im Durchschnitt nichts anderes 
als ein Stückchen lebendig gewordener russischer Erde] 
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space, whose vastness has often something absolutely depressing.”88  Such depictions of the 
enemy could not help but inspire a disdain for and devaluation of the enemy that could easily 
lead to atrocity.  
 
Defensive War and Dirty Fighting 
We are lined up in earnest to protect our Heimat and for the protection of our Heimat 
our comrades have built a wall in the icy East, which has again and again held back 
the soviet masses. 
- “Wofür Kämpfen Wir?,” Unser Heer, 3 March 194289 
 
National Socialist Germany created no so-called Women Battalions, did not place its 
women in uniform, which stands in such glaring opposition to a woman’s nature as 
such. 
- Neue Wirtschaftsfragen, 194190 
 
 The final major message that these propaganda materials transmitted to the troops 
was two-fold.  First, the Germans were participating in a defensive war, to protect the 
homeland from the ravages of the Soviet invader.  Secondly, the Soviet enemy was an 
animalistic, dirty fighter to whom the laws of war and decency did not apply. 
 The view of the war on the Eastern front as a defensive one for the Germans was 
certainly ahistorical but seems to have been a powerful motivator throughout the propaganda 
examined.  One “knapsack book” claimed that “the battle in the East arose from the harshest 
necessity, it was the counterattack, which in the last hours prevented Moscow’s premeditated 
                                                 
88 Ibid. [Der Russe dagegen ist als Lebewesen einfach eine Funktion seiner Erde und seines Raumes, dessen Weite für uns 
ja oftmals etwas absolut Bedrückendes hat] 
89 Schramm, "Wofür Kämpfen Wir? Der Deutsche Soldat Im Kampf Für Reich Und Heimat," 7. [Zum Schutz der 
Heimat sind wir ernst angetreten, und für den Schutz unserer Heimat haben die Kameraden im eisigen Osten den Wall 
gebildet, der immer und immer wieder die sowjetischen Massen aufgehalten hat.] 
90 Karlheinz Backhaus, Neue Wirtschaftsfragen : die dich angehen!, vol. Heft 36, Tornisterschrift des 
Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Berlin: Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Abt. Inland, 1941), 23. [Das 
nationalsozialistische Deutschland schuf keine sogenannten Frauenbattaillone, steckte seine Frauen nicht in Uniformen, die 
in einem krassen Gegensatz zum fraulichen Wesen als solchem stehen] 
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and truly monstrous blow of annihilation against National Socialist Germany.”91 Unser Heer 
proclaimed, “there is no social justice if we are not masters of our own lands and cannot lead 
our life according to our own ways and our own laws.  We need space, bread for our family, 
freedom of development for our children.”92  In other words, the war itself was a struggle for 
the future of the German people;  the message for the German soldier was that the very lives 
of his family and children were threatened by the war in the East. 
The final component of this dangerous cocktail of inflammatory messages was the 
recurring discussion of the “dirty” and “unlawful” combat methods of the Soviets.  Such 
characterizations of the enemy as beyond the pale of accepted warfare implicitly justified 
methods of dealing with him that were also beyond the pale. On 6 January 1942, the 
following appeared in Unser Heer: “the Bolshevik is an uncommonly hard and devious 
enemy and his often seemingly animal instinct not only gives the struggle a repugnant 
character, but at the same time poses a task, whose solution often requires the highest 
overcoming of self.”93  Such a phrase as “overcoming of self” has ominous connotations 
when one thinks of the atrocities committed on the Eastern front against civilians as well as 
POWs.  Germans were especially outraged by the Soviet use of female soldiers. Women 
combatants were clearly outside the traditional bounds of warfare.  A caption in Die 
                                                 
91 Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Die Sowjetunion Gegebenheiten und Möglichkeiten des Ostraumes, 4. [Der 
Kampf in Osten entsprang dem hartesten Muss, es war der Gegenangriff, der in lezter Stunde einem wahrhaft 
ungeheuerlichen von Moskau geplanten Vernichtungsschlag gegen das nationalsozialistischen Deutschland zuvorkam.] 
92 Schramm, "Wofür Kämpfen Wir? Der Deutsche Soldat Im Kampf Für Reich Und Heimat," 7. [Es gibt keine 
soziale Gerechtigkeit, wenn wir nicht Herren im eigenen Lande sind und unser Leben nach unserer eigenen art und nach 
unseren eigenen Gesetzen führen können. Wir brauchen Raum, Brot für unsere Familie, Entwicklungsfreiheit für unsere 
Kinder.] 
93 Soldan, "Kämpfer Im Osten—Die Leistungen Des Deutschen Soldaten- Ein Beitrag Zu Ihrer Würdigung," 5. 
[[…der Bolschewik ein ungemein harter und verschlagener Gegner ist, und dass sein oft geradezu tierisch anmutender 
Instinkt dem Ringen nicht nur ein widerliches Gepräge gibt, sondern zugleich vor Aufgaben stellt, deren Lösung oft höchste 
Selbstüberwindung verlangt.] 
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Wehrmacht read: “these degenerate gunwomen participated with particular stubbornness in 
the enemy sniper war against our soldiers.  They were, however, soon discovered and 
disarmed.”94  The real German fear of and anger toward the partisan war can be seen in the 
propaganda treatment of snipers, particularly those in the forest (Baumschützen). An entire 
article in Die Wehrmacht was devoted to this topic.  It told readers,  
Our soldiers got to know the fight against tree snipers in the campaign against Poland 
and France.  In the West it was usually negros who acted as tree snipers.  The Soviets 
have now developed this way of fighting into a regular battle tactic.  In baskets and 
bags specially designed for this purpose, with camouflaged helmets, they squat in the 
branches, mostly near roads to treacherously ambush supply columns and isolated 
vehicles. As a result, the woods flanking our advance must always be cleaned of tree 
snipers.95 
 
The message here was that snipers hanging in trees and ambushing supply columns 
constituted a cowardly, degenerate form of combat. Particularly interesting here is the 
conflation of this type of fighting with racial and gender inferiority.  Lastly, the treatment 
that captured partisans or suspected partisans could hope to receive was clearly laid out in a 
1942 article in Die Wehrmacht.  The message from this caption is clear. 
 What were the fruits of the German propaganda effort?  One can clearly identify the 
intent of these publications.  The ideal outcome of this propaganda offensive was a soldier, 
who hated and feared the Soviet Union, who thought in racial terms where he saw himself 
superior to his enemy, and who was angry and afraid enough of the partisans that he was 
prepared to “overcome himself” to deal with them in the most brutal manner. Like any 
attempt at measuring reception, identifying the actual effect on the ground of these materials 
is not an exact science.  However, in both letters and the behavior of the soldiers of 4th 
                                                 
94 "Kampf Um Die Zitadelle," Die Wehrmacht 4, no. 15 (1941): 8. [Diese verkommenen Flintenweiber beteiligten 
sich mit besonderer Verbissenheit an dem von den Feinden geübten Heckenschützenkrieg gegen unsere Soldaten, wurden 
aber bald entdeckt und unschädlich gemacht.] 
95 "Achtung Baumschützen! Die Kampfmethoden Der Sowjetsoldaten," Die Wehrmacht 4, no. 15 (1941): 6. 
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Company, one can see clear commonalities of belief and action that may be associated with 
these propaganda themes.  This may indicate influence by propaganda, existing agreement 
with the themes presented, or a combination of the two.  Because they are such an internal, 
personal medium, German letters from the Eastern Front offer us a useful window into the 
beliefs and concerns of soldiers in the German Army. 
  
“We all want to set fire to this nest:” Ideology, the East, and Feldpostbriefe, 1939-1943 
 
 Letters home from the Eastern front demonstrate several congruencies with themes 
prevalent in the propaganda.  Soldiers writing home from Russia encountered a frighteningly 
large and foreign land, that many interpreted as barbaric and backward. They also held quite 
negative views of Bolshevism, and though the racial context was muted, it was present. Like 
the propaganda to which they were exposed, many German soldiers reacted indignantly to 
the battle tactics of their enemy and viewed them as outside the accepted norms of combat.  
Finally, as time continued, these letters indicated an increasingly stark realization of the real 
life or death struggle on the Eastern front.  This fatalistic realization led to an increased 
dehumanization of enemy soldiers and civilians and a recognition of the need to be hard. 
Surprisingly, these letters do not indicate a shift to an increased reliance on overt Nazi 
propaganda as a motivating factor. 
This study examined 157 letters from the Eastern Front written between 1939 and 
1943, with the overwhelming majority written in 1941-42. The sample contains 65 different 
letter writers. Of the 31 authors whose ages are known, the average age in 1939 was 22. The 
sample used here cannot be said to be representative in the traditional sense of representing 
all possible variations in the subject proportionally.   Published between 1941 and 2003, 
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these collections come from a very wide array of backgrounds.  Some, such as Deutsche 
Soldaten sehen die Sowjet-Union were published by the Nazis themselves to demonstrate the 
“truth” of the situation on the front as seen through soldier letters. Indeed, this collection was 
a companion-piece to a traveling exhibition of the crimes of the Soviet Union. Others are 
family collections, such as the collection of letters from Ernst Guicking to his wife.  Some 
are topical based on commonalities of writer or location, such as a collection of letters from 
German students (Kriegsbriefe des Gefallener Studenten)  and letters from Stalingrad 
(Feldpostbriefe aus Stalingrad.) Some, such as the letters of Karl Fuchs, are collections 
published by historians with no emotional or familial ties to the writer.  The variety of 
publication and sources of documents imposes a sort of representativeness. It is the 
motivations behind publishing that matter here.  For example, Nazi collections would seek to 
find those letters most reflective of Nazi beliefs, family collections would likely include more 
innocuous letters, while collections published by historians would include all letters of 
various types.  Thus, while not a random sample, these sources do provide an idea of the 
spectrum of responses. Finally, and most importantly, choosing to investigate soldiers’ views 
of the East rather than direct participation in atrocities greatly increases the pool of data to be 
gleaned from these letters, as anti-Communist comments were much more acceptable 
throughout the period during which these were published. Moreover, one of the 
elements of the “clean” Wehrmacht myth was the Army’s contribution in 
saving Europe from Communism, making it much more likely that those 
publishing these letters would see little problem in pejorative views of the East. 
Methodologically, these letters were closely read and elements falling into any one of 
72 different thematic categories were counted as well as annotated. The result is both a 
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quantitative catalog that allows us to look at changes over time and general trends in themes 
as well as a qualitative record that shows the actual words and images used by the letter 
writers in context. This study relies most heavily upon the latter, using the former only to 
place themes in a comparative environment, most often chronological.  
 
Russia As A Desolate, Primitive Land 
And it is not only German soldiers to whom art is to give something. A second 
mission of culture [Kulturmission] must yet be fulfilled here….Here we finally 
have the opportunity to show by deed that we are capable of bringing salvation 
to other peoples, to be leaders for them out of the darkness of un-culture 
[Unkultur] and un-education [Unbildung] to the light of an ideal existence truly 
worthy of humans. 
-  Das Land Ober Ost. Deutsche Arbeit in den Verwaltungsbezirken 
Kurland, Litauen und Bialystok-Grodno, 191796 
 
We are not bringing these people civilization. I can only repeat to you word for 
word what the Führer wishes. It will be enough if (1) the children learn to read 
the traffic signs so that they do not run under vehicles (2) if they learn their 2 x 
2 so they can count up to 25, and (3) if they can write their own names; no 
more is necessary. 
- Heinrich Himmler to a group of senior SS leaders, Zhitomir, 
USSR, September 194197 
 
 As Vejas Liulevicius notes in his study of the German encounter with the East during 
World War I, “the eastern-front experience of the First World War was an indispensable 
cultural and psychological background for what came later in the violent twentieth century, a 
preexisting mentality.”98  In this sense, for the Wehrmacht soldier, the Eastern front 
represented both a continuity and a break from previous German experiences in the East.  
                                                 
96 Vejas G. Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front : Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in 
World War I, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare 9 (Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 140. 
97 Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards : A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge 
England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6. 
98 Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front : Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World 
War I, 1. 
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Feldpostbriefe carried similar depictions.  Descriptions of the physical landscape tended to 
blend with descriptions of the people in a bleak, frightening environment. 
Karl Fuchs wrote, “the land here is bleak and desolate.”99 Another soldier lamented 
the “foot deep dust in a bleak landscape.”100 At times the sheer size of the East becomes 
monotonous, as one soldier related, “not much to write about, you can drive 100km and only 
see forests and swamp.”101 A former philosophy student felt that he had been “thrown into 
this violently chaotic endless gray expanse of the East, that men have hardly touched.”102 
The oppressive heat, biting cold, and endless mud also occupy prominent and frequent 
positions in these World War II letters.  There was an unspoken feeling of emptiness, 
isolation, and fear throughout these depictions.  Such feelings were vital in binding a soldi
to his peer group and in creating the conditions for the overwhelming fear of partisans and 
inhabitants that one sees later in the actions of units such as 4th Com
er 
pany. 
                                                
Soldiers writing from the Eastern Front found the native population equally strange 
and, perhaps, forbidding. One soldier described  the “strange, captivating harmony of a 
Russian folksong in all its cruelty and ferocity.”103 Another mentioned in a long discussion 
the customs of the “Mohammedan” population and that the women were veiled.104 Simon 
 
99 Karl Fuchs, Horst Fuchs Richardson, and Dennis E. Showalter, Sieg Heil! : War Letters of Tank Gunner Karl 
Fuchs, 1937-1941 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1987), 145. 
100 Walter Bähr and Hans Walter Bähr, Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten, 1939-1945 (Tübingen: R. 
Wunderlich, 1952), 135. 
101 Schober, Schober, and Salvesberger, Briefe von der Front : Feldpostbriefe, 1939-1945, 127. 
102 Bähr and Bähr, Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten, 1939-1945, 241. 
103 Ibid., 134.[doch in einer fremden fesselnden Harmonie zusammen zu einem russischen Volkslied in all seiner 
Schwere und Wildheit] 
104 Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer 
Heimat, 47. 
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Krings told his mother, “our men can’t eat any Russian bread. It is made also with a primitive 
way of baking.”105 Descriptions of poverty and dirt were common reactions to both war 
experiences. A Wehrmacht soldier wrote, “the villages are horrible (grauenhaft), houses like 
pigsties (Schweineställe).”106 
Unlike their forefathers in the First World War, these descriptions take a racial turn as 
well. While during the First World War, the occupiers were interested in bringing culture and 
civilization to the land, admittedly in a paternalistic sense, such an impulse had been 
eliminated by the Second World War.  Instead of viewing the natives of the East as “simple-
minded, good-hearted primitives,” they are viewed as swine, dogs, vermin, and pests. 107 One 
soldier proclaimed, “alright, let’s take this exertion upon ourselves, so that these pests of the 
world will be exterminated.”108 Another soldier compared the “mice, lice, and flies” 
favorably to the Russians.109 In their letters, German soldiers in Poland saw the Poles as “a 
herd of living things,” “decrepit and degenerate,” “with vengeful, brutal features.”110 
Echoing Nazi propaganda, these letter writers were no longer interested in bringing cult
and civilization to the East in the role of paternal ruler.  They now came as a cleansing fire to 
rid the East of its subhuman inhabitants
ure 
.   
                                                 
105 Jens Ebert, Feldpostbriefe aus Stalingrad (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 19. 
106 Schober, Schober, and Salvesberger, Briefe von der Front : Feldpostbriefe, 1939-1945, 127. 
107 Dennis Showalter, ""The East Gives Nothing Back": The Great War and the German Army in Russia," The 
Journal of the Historical Society 2, no. 1 (2002): 10. 
108 Wolfgang Diewerge, Deutsche Soldaten Sehen Die Sowjet-Union (Berlin: W. Limpert 1941), 15. [Na, so 
wollen wir alle Anstrengungen auf uns nehmen, damit diese Weltpest ausgerottet wird.] 
109 Hans-Albert Giese, Herbert Giese, Konrad Elmshäuser, and Jan Lokers, Man muss hier nur hart sein : 
Kriegsbriefe und Bilder einer Familie (1934-1945) (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1999), 196. 
110 Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity, 204. 
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That the people of the East were seen in fundamentally different terms from those in 
the West is evident in a propaganda leaflet disseminated to the Waffen-SS in 1944 saying 
that “the American soldier is racially related to us, but he does not carry the same spirit.”111 
This lukewarm criticism is a far cry from the steady diet of racist and anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda fed to German troops.  What these letters show is that “the German soldier on the 
Eastern Front of the Second World War was, however, much better prepared for…myths, 
superstitions, and legends,” and that he embraced them to a large extent.112 
 
Bolshevism and Racial Awareness 
 Apart from offering the above descriptions of a backward, primitive people which 
was naturally associated with Bolshevism, the letters also demonstrate a more than passing 
animosity to “Bolshevism” as a pathological concept.  This was a concept given much 
attention in the homeland as well. An exhibition of what life was “really” like in the East, 
appearing in 1941, included the dire warning that “either the German people will win and 
ensure the survival of the world and its culture or it will perish and all the peoples of the 
world will fall into the barbarism of the Soviet State.”113 
 This was not a message lost on soldiers writing home from the front.  For example, an 
Army captain wrote, “if some perhaps assumed ‘propaganda’… then truth becomes clear to 
him here.  There is no clever propaganda able to portray what horrifying things happened 
                                                 
111 James Weingartner, "War against Subhumans: Comparisons between the German War against the Soviet 
Union and the American War against Japan, 1941-1945," Historian 58, no. 3 (1996). 
112 Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45 : German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 103. 
113 "Nahkampf Der Sowjets—Aus Sowjetrussischen Beutefilmen Und Instruktionsbüchern." 
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here.”114 Another said, “our propaganda still says too little about the true face of 
Bolshevism.”115 Finally, many of these soldiers offered sarcastic comments as to the reality 
of the “Soviet Paradise” that Nazi propaganda so often referred to. As Bartov rightly 
remarks, “one measure of the extent to which Nazi images permeated the soldiers was their 
manner to resolve the contradiction between abstract image and actual appearance.”116 
Referring to the assumed threat that Bolshevism posed to Germany, Karl Bühler wrote, 
“good night, if the Russians were to win this war.”117 
 Depictions of the enemy took on a racist tint as well. Most prevalent are the images of 
the Eastern peoples as distinct, racially different, and devalued.  One soldier remarked that 
“obedience becomes them, like their naked feet and fur coats.”118 Karl Bühler spoke of the 
“final victory over the Russian beast.”119 Terms like “beast,” “swine,” “pigs,” “bandits,” 
were used in such a way as to equate meanings with “Bolshevik” and “Communist.” 
Widespread dehumanization is the precursor to the mistreatment and mass killing of 
others.120When anti-Semitism was apparent in these letters, most often it was in the form of 
                                                 
114 Diewerge, Deutsche Soldaten Sehen Die Sowjet-Union, 41. [Wenn dieser oder jener vielleicht in 
Schilderungen und Romanen (Dwinger etwa) etwas Propaganda vermutet hat, so wurde imstande ist, das zu 
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115 Ibid., 45. 
116 Bartov, Hitler's Army : Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, 127. 
117 Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer 
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120 For more on this See LTC Grossman’s book, below.  He describes the importance of “cultural distance” in 
conditioning soldiers to kill.  This concept works just as well for killing non-combatants. Dave Grossman, On 
Killing : The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 1st ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1995). 
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the Judeo-Bolshevik conflation. Karl Fuchs referred to “these subhumans, who’ve been 
whipped into a frenzy by the Jews.”121  Another remarked that “if there are any decent 
dwellings, they hold functionaries [Communist] or Jews, who hold a prominent position.”122 
This image of Jews and Communists holding power and privileged positions recurs not 
infrequently in these letters.  Such stereotyping evident in these observations likely would 
help to further reinforce existing racial biases and Nazi propaganda that would enable 
commission of atrocities. 
 
Bandits and Swine: On the Underhanded Tactics of the Enemy 
Here and there are the partisans, who we have beaten off, but who wait until we are 
engaged to the front and then attack us from behind.” 
- Robert Hocke, 26 August 1944123 
 
 Many German soldiers expressed anger and revulsion at what they considered to be 
the unfair or unmilitary methods of the enemy.  This likely first came about through widely 
reported allegations of atrocities committed by the Soviets; most of these reports were not 
first hand. One soldier claimed that in Lemberg (Lvov) the “Bolsheviks and Jews had killed 
12,000 Germans and Ukrainians in bestial ways.”124  Many of the atrocities, however, were 
closer to home, as soldiers expressed in their letters.  Karl Bühler wrote his parents in March, 
1942, 
Recently we found 4 corpses of our comrades, whose eyes the Russians had 
stabbed out, wearing only their pants, and dowsed with water. They must have 
                                                 
121 Fuchs, Richardson, and Showalter, Sieg Heil! : War Letters of Tank Gunner Karl Fuchs, 1937-1941, 124. 
122 Diewerge, Deutsche Soldaten Sehen Die Sowjet-Union, 17. 
123 Bähr and Bähr, Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten, 1939-1945, 278. 
124 Diewerge, Deutsche Soldaten Sehen Die Sowjet-Union, 45. 
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frozen miserably. How one becomes accustomed to such sights, you can 
imagine.125 
 
Karl Fuchs echoed the Die Wehrmacht article discussed earlier, saying, “yesterday, 
for instance, we saw our first women soldiers—Russian women, their hair shorn, in uniform! 
And these pigs fired on our decent German soldiers from ambush positions.”126  Ernst 
Guicking angrily wrote, “this time no quarter will be given.” 127 Speaking of an encounter 
with Soviet POWs, Guicking stated, “one forgets too quickly the crimes they have committed 
against our comrades.”128  Euphemism supported this as well.  Partisans and the enemy 
became “bandits” or “gangs” instead of soldiers, and, thus, not worthy of being protected by 
the customs of war.  The implication, clearly, was that if these elements refused to “play by 
the rules,” then they could be dealt with in whatever harsh manner the fearful, isolated 
German soldier felt appropriate…as we shall see later. 
 
Dehumanization and “Hardening” 
I have known, up to now, no unspoilt men, but only such who have forgotten 
their natures and those who have won their natures back, or are in the process 
of winning them back. 
- Friedrich von Koch, 15 March 1943129 
 
                                                 
125 Bühler, Spaichingen, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe, 9.2. 1941-6.1. 1943, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte unserer 
Heimat, 58. 
126 Fuchs, Richardson, and Showalter, Sieg Heil! : War Letters of Tank Gunner Karl Fuchs, 1937-1941, 119. 
127 Irene Guicking, Ernst Guicking, and Jürgen Kleindienst, Sei tausendmal gegrüsst : Briefwechsel Irene und 
Ernst Guicking 1937-1945, Reihe Zeitgut. Spezial ; 1. (Berlin: JKL Publikationen, 2001), CD. 
128 Ibid. [Die Grausamkeiten, die vergisst man gar zu schnell, die sie unseren Kameraden angetan haben.] 
129 Bähr and Bähr, Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten, 1939-1945, 244. [Ich kante bisher noch keine ursprünglichen 
Menschen, sondern nur solche, auf der Seite des Bewussteins wieder gewonnen hatten oder im Begriff sind, ihn wieder zu 
gewinnen.] 
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 The combination of brutal combat, ideological indoctrination, and the realization of 
the very life-and-death nature of day to day life on the Eastern Front appear in many soldiers 
to have led to a dangerous numbing of conscience and feeling.  Many letter writers make this 
surprisingly clear.  They speak of the necessity of becoming “hard,” unfeeling, and steeled to 
the task at hand.  Wolfgang Döring, a college student, wrote from Poland that “it is hard to 
extract the correct attitude: not to become too soft and succumb to everything and not to 
become too hard and crude and unfeeling over everything you see. One sees both, above all 
the latter.”130 Döring eerily foreshadowed the evolution of this hardness.  Adelbert Rühle 
demonstrated this process of desensitization in May of 1942, writing that “our minds must 
not harden, they must only become decently callused, to bear each blow without becoming 
wounded.”131   
This hardening must be seen in connection with the increasing difficult and costly 
nature of combat on the Eastern Front.  Certainly, moralistic concerns must have weakened 
when faced with death on a daily basis, and with the “no surrender” nature of the conflict in 
the Soviet Union.132 Harald Bleker describes this warfare as a battle “for life and death.” 133  
A soldier describing the ever brutal anti-partisan war said that “with these swine (Sauvolk) it 
                                                 
130 Ibid., 16. [nicht weich zu werden und allem zu erliegen und nicht verhärten und roh und gefühllos über alles 
hinwegzusehen.] 
131 Adelbert-Ottheinrich Rühle and Brunhild Rühle, Die Feldpostbriefe des Adelbert-Ottheinrich Rühle, 1939-
1942 ; Briefe und Gedichte eines Frühvollendeten (Heusenstamm: Orion-Heimreiter, 1979), 66. [Unsere Seele 
darf nicht verhärten, sie muß nur eine anständige Hornhaut bilden, die manchen Schlag verträgt, ohne wund zu werden] 
132 It must be noted that the Germans were mostly to blame for the violent nature of warfare in the East.  Their 
reluctance to take prisoners, incredibly harsh treatment of those POWs they took, and brutality toward the 
civilian population went a long way both toward steeling enemy resolve against them and toward inspiring 
partisan activity. 
133 Bleker and Spratte, Stalingrad : Feldpostbriefe des Oberleutnants Harald Bleker, 180. 
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is too much to proceed humanely.”134 Simon Krings stated coldly, “if you could only see the 
Russian prisoners of war from Stalingrad. They fall starving on top of each other, because for 
a long time they have been given only water and some grain. They look at us Germans as 
little Fritz looks at his big, strong brother.”135 Ernst Guicking, neither a career officer nor by 
any indication a die hard Nazi, wrote his wife that the Jews “must be exterminated, root and 
branch, or we do not achieve our goal.”136 Disturbingly, after only a year of war in the East, 
many German soldiers appeared highly hardened and willing to ignore suffering around 
them.  Combined with personal loss, this desensitization created a volatile environment. 
 The reactions, feelings, and thoughts expressed by the men in this sample of letters to 
their loved ones back home present a disturbing picture of a group of men being changed by 
their surroundings into “hard” killers.  However, in contravention of Bartov’s explanation, it 
is important to remember that the majority of these letters were written in 1941 and 1942, 
before the Eastern Front became the truly deadly horror that it would become at its height.   
In addition, the level of ideological content appears to decline with time, indicating an 
acceptance of the Nazi explanations for conditions in Russia and perhaps for the atrocities 
committed there.  By 1942, the letters of these soldiers included more and more focus on 
casualties or death.  Sometimes it is a simple mention of a comrade killed or wounded. At 
others, the writer acknowledged the mounting casualties and increasing urgency of the war in 
the East. This phenomenon reflects the reality of an increasingly stagnant and brutal tactical 
situation.  Its effect on the mindsets of the soldiers can be seen as well. Some adopted what 
                                                 
134 Anatoly Golovchansky, "Ich Will Raus Aus Diesem Wahnsinn" : Deutsche Briefe Von Der Ostfront 1941-
1945 : Aus Sowjetischen Archiven (Wuppertal : P. Hammer: [Moskau], 1991), 109. 
135 Ebert, Feldpostbriefe aus Stalingrad, 19. 
136 Guicking, Guicking, and Kleindienst, Sei tausendmal gegrüsst : Briefwechsel Irene und Ernst Guicking 
1937-1945, CD. 
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could be a dangerously fatalistic attitude; as one soldier wrote: “How does one feel strong 
when he thinks that God has decided his fate and not this stupid world.”137 Another had a 
similar response, writing in early 1942, “God will not let this bitter cup of death pass from 
me.”138  These letters begin to give evidence of the mounting casualties that would 
characterize the Eastern Front, though this increase is gradual.  One would surmise that as the 
war goes on, letters would contain more and more mention of the human cost of the war.  It 
is enough for this study to note that already in 1942, soldiers are becoming increasingly 
preoccupied with death. 
Through the examination of letters and propaganda materials, an archetypal “ordinary 
soldier” perhaps emerges.  This German soldier entered the Soviet Union with idealized 
negative images of Bolsheviks, perhaps even a latent anti-Semitism or at least a racial 
“consciousness.” Upon entering the East, he is shocked by the poverty and real primitive 
conditions he experiences.  Perhaps he associates this with the negative images of 
Bolshevism he reads in soldier literature or received in his pre-military experiences.  The 
land itself assaults him.  Our German soldier may find himself crossing plains and grasslands 
that seem endless and isolating.  He may be lost in deep, dark, and overgrown forests and 
swamps, far different from the well-kept lands of Germany.  He swelters and chokes along 
dusty roads in the burning sun and he slogs through icy mud and freezing temperatures. As 
the war progresses, he is shocked by the ferocious Soviet attacks and the brutal, no quarter 
form of warfare that occurs, even in conventional arenas.  He loses friends, often many.  
                                                 
137 Hans Dollinger, Kain, wo ist dein Bruder? : Was der Mensch im Zweiten Weltkrieg erleiden musste, 
dokumentiert in Tagebuchern und Briefen (München: List, 1983), 151. [Gott…entscheidet letzen Endes über 
mich und nicht die blöde Welt]. 
138 Golovchansky, "Ich Will Raus Aus Diesem Wahnsinn" : Deutsche Briefe Von Der Ostfront 1941-1945 : Aus 
Sowjetischen Archiven, 57. [läßte den bitterest Kelch nicht an mir vorübergehen] 
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Perhaps he is wounded and returns to his unit.  He is frustrated by the elusive partisan, with 
his hit-and-run tactics, apparently supported by the local population (who may actually be 
just as victimized by partisan groups as he is).  He perhaps reads the front newspapers and 
magazines in his spare time, such as in winter quarters.  These materials reinforce his hatred 
of the enemy, the land, and its people.  They also reinforce that obedience, loyalty, and 
comradeship are the highest ideals of the soldier and that his homeland will be destroyed and 
defiled unless he fights. However, contrary to some previous scholarship, this transformation 
could have occurred even before war turned against Germany.  Such a characterization is not 
meant to exculpate soldiers who committed atrocities, but instead to briefly summarize a 
process of transformation that certainly contributed greatly to an increased readiness to 
participate in all kinds of killing on the Eastern Front. 
 The preceding section has shed some light on the anatomy of German soldier identity.  
We can see that there is a startling similarity in propaganda messages and ideas expressed by 
letter writers.  Of course, it would be presumptuous to claim a definitive link between 
propaganda and these expressions.  In the end, finding such a link may be unnecessary.  That 
such commonalities exist certainly indicates that the ideas behind them held traction in the 
worldview of the German soldier. Perhaps such an archetypal transformation applies to some 
members of 4th Company as they moved deeper into the Soviet Union.  Next, we will move 
from the realm of thoughts to the realm of deeds and explore how and why one unit killed on 
the Eastern Front. 
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III. East Towards Murder: 4th Company’s Descent into Violence 
 
 In November of 1960, former First Sergeant Heinrich Bollmann received an 
anonymous letter, demanding a bank check and the addresses of the former unit 
commander, then- First Lieutenant Fritz Fischer, and a former platoon leader, First 
Lieutenant Fritz Puls.
139  “Many years have gone by,” wrote the blackmailer, “but all is not forgotten. You took 
part in this thing also…It happened in October 1942 near Aksay, Obgarnarow near 
Stalingrad, in the steppe.  You know better than I what happened in your unit.”140  The writer 
then threatened to turn to other authorities.   Three weeks later, Bollmann received a second 
letter from this anonymous company member.  “Think about the place in Russia where 
Technical Sergeant Dischlan [sic] died.  You hanged a Russian in the barn in Glamandino 
[sic] and subsequently shot him with your pistol.”141  Demanding Bollmann’s state pension 
money, the writer claimed that “since 1945 you have heavily aggrieved our state.”142  
Bollmann neither responded to nor reported this attempted blackmail. 
                                                 
139 Note: All last names which have been replaced by pseudonyms are signified by italics in their first usage. 
140 "Court Judgment in Trial of Fischer Et. Al," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 466. The full 
text of both letters was included in this judgment. [Es sind schon viele Jahre vergangen, aber doch ist nicht alles 
vergessen.  Sie sind an dieser Sache auch beteiligt…Es handelt sich um Oktober 1942 bei Amsay, Obgarnarow bei 
Stalingrad in der Steppe.  Was da in Ihrer Einheit geschehen ist, wissen Sie ja noch besser als ich.] 
141 Ibid., 467. [Denken Sie an den Ort in Russland wo Wm Dischlan umgekommen ist.  Da haben Sie im Schuppen von 
Glamandino einen Russen erhängt, und anschließend haben Sie noch auf ihn mit der Pistole geschossen. ] 
142 Ibid. [Seit 1945 haben Sie unseren Staat schon schwer geschädigt.] 
Six months later, investigators with the Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi 
Crimes received two letters from a Helmut Ortlepp.  The first asked that someone help 
“guarantee the conviction of those responsible for the mass murder of Jews in the Soviet 
Union.”143  In the second letter, Ortlepp claimed to be “in a position to help solve the mass 
murder of Jews.”144 Thus began the investigation into the activities of the 4th Kompanie, 4th 
Panzernachrichtenregiment during Operation Barbarossa in the Soviet Union.  
The 4th Company was born 3rd Company, 62nd Signal Battalion 
(Nachrichtenabteilung—NaAbt).  Mobilized on 25 August 1929, the 62nd Corps Signal 
Battalion (KorpsNachrichtenAbteilung—KnaAbt) was assigned to support the XVI Army 
Corps (Motorized), with an authorized strength of 850 men.145 This unit fought in both the 
Polish and French campaigns.  On 15 February, 1941, the 4th Panzer Group Signal Regiment 
(Panzergruppen-Nachrichtenregiment—PzGrNaAbt) was created, in preparation for the 
German invasion of Russia.146 The 62nd Signal Battalion joined two other signal battalions as 
part of this new unit, and 3rd Company, 62nd Signal Battalion became 4th Company, 2nd 
Battalion, 4th Panzer Group Signal Regiment.   
The Panzer Signal Regiments supported Panzer Groups with communications.  They 
followed combat units, laying wire and connecting various headquarters. The 4th Company 
                                                 
143 "Letter from Helmut Ortlepp to the Special Commission on the Persecution and Destruction of the Jews,5-7-
61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 1. [Wird jemand der mithilft, die Verantwortlichen zur 
Massenvernichtung von Juden um der Sowjetunion zu überführen in irgendeiner Form sichergestellt.] 
144 "Letter from Helmut Ortlepp to the Central Office for Nazi Crimes, 5-22-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv 
Ludwigsburg, Bl. 3. […bin ich in der Lage bei der Aufklärung von Massenvernichtung von Juden zu helfen.  ] 
145 Hans-Georg Kampe, Die Heeres-Nachrichtentruppe der Wehrmacht, 1935-1945 (Wölfersheim-Berstadt: 
Podzun-Pallas, 1994), 98. and Hans-Georg Kampe, Nachrichtentruppe des Heeres und deutsche Reichspost : 
militärisches und staatliches Nachrichtenwesen in Deutschland 1830 bis 1945 (Waldesruh bei Berlin: PV, 
1999), 409. 
146 Kampe, Die Heeres-Nachrichtentruppe der Wehrmacht, 1935-1945, 200. 
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was a Feldfernkabelkompanie (FFK), a wire-laying unit whose responsibility was to lay 
communication wires for combat units.  With approximately 200 soldiers, the company had 
three wire laying platoons with around 40 men each and a headquarters section.147  The unit 
traveled mainly in Opel Blitz 3-ton trucks and staff cars in order to keep up with the units it 
supported.  During the advance into the Soviet Union, these wire companies followed 
immediately behind combat units laying wire, until the distance became too great.  At this 
point, another company would move to the front, leapfrogging the previous unit.148  Once 
these “trunk” lines were laid, lateral lines were laid connecting other headquarters.   
As the advance slowed, these communication lines became more static and were 
handed over to the responsible Army Signal Regiments.  This, Hans-Georg Kampe writes in 
his study of German signal units, resulted in the “regular detachment of Panzer Group Signal 
Regiments for new missions in forward areas.”149 4th Company was likely employed in these 
new tasks.  Throughout the period in question, the unit appears to have been busy repairing 
and maintaining communication lines from the rear to forward units.150 Indeed, in the month 
of November 1943, 2,000 telegraph poles were cut down or destroyed and 200 underground 
lines cut between Army Group Center and its four armies, indicating that there was indeed 
much work to be done.151  While these acts of sabotage occurred outside of the time frame 
investigated, they do give an idea of the vulnerability of these lines.  After the attack on 
Moscow in late 1941, 4th Company was removed from frontline duty and tasked with 
                                                 
147 Ibid., 53. 
148 Ibid., 138. 
149 Ibid., 139. 
150 4th Company’s crimes occurred between June 1941 and November 1942. 
151 Kampe, Die Heeres-Nachrichtentruppe der Wehrmacht, 1935-1945, 162. 
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securing major supply routes between Smolensk and Moscow.152  These security missions 
likely entailed patrolling major roadways and also repairing lines damaged by normal wear 
and tear or by partisan action. In short, 4th Company was not intended to be a killing unit of 
any kind. 
What follows is a description of the crimes of 4th Company, perpetrated between 
September 1941 and November of 1942.  The sources for this narrative were pre-trial 
interviews conducted in preparation of the case against a Captain Fischer and First 
Lieutenant Puls, tried in Düsseldorf between 27 April and 13 May 1964.153  As a source, the 
pre-trial investigation records of this court case offer both insight and challenges to the 
researcher.  At first, the challenges can seem daunting.  By their nature of being conducted in 
an investigatory environment, these interviews automatically place the participants in an 
adversarial relationship: interrogators questioning and witnesses answering (with some 
clearly weighing each answer).  These men clearly worried about self-incrimination and so 
were often careful to remain ambiguous or non-communicative about events that they 
believed might get them into trouble.154  Secondly, though not of lesser importance, these 
men were quite reticent to implicate former comrades and may have neglected to mention 
crimes that were not explicitly investigated. 
 A careful reading of the texts and accepting their limitations can, in fact, yield a large 
amount of valuable information about both the events and the mindsets of those involved.  
                                                 
152 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 264. 
153 Note: At the time that he commanded 4th Company, Captain Fischer held the rank of First Lieutenant 
(Oberleutnant).  For clarity, he will be referred to as First Lieutenant Fischer throughout this study. Lieutenant 
Puls was an officer candidate holding the rank of Technical Sergeant (Wachtmeister) and will be referred to as 
such as well. 
154 For a more detailed explanation of the criminal elements as they appeared in the law, please see section V. 
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Christopher Browning provides the following useful set of tests to assess the validity of 
perpetrator testimony, which he elaborates upon in his discussion of Adolf Eichmann.  
1. The Self Interest Test: When a witness makes statements against his self-
interest or where telling the truth is in his self interest. 
2.  The Vividness Test:  When the witness describes events with “an unusual 
attention to details of visual memory.” 
3. The Possibility Test:  When a witness' claims “are not contradicted or 
proven impossible.” 
4.  The Probability Test:  When the accounts “coincide with or fit a pattern of 
events suggested or established by other documentation.”155 
 
 According to these metrics,  former 4th Company soldiers often do volunteer what are likely 
true statements. Also, the methods and words used to describe a situation are important, 
whether true or not. If one continues to refer to the women and children killed as “partisans,” 
twenty years after the fact, such a word choice is significant. Even those who give the most 
self-serving statements (such as the accused or those who feel threatened by others’ 
statements) give us great insight into their thought process simply by the ways in which they 
obfuscate.  Finally, in some instances, what is not said can be a useful tool in understanding 
responses to atrocities.  While such statements can be contradictory, self-exculpatory, and 
simply false at times, the following narrative of 4th Company’s violence in the Soviet Union 
is confirmed by multiple testimonies and consists of the most corroborated version of events. 
On the 22nd of June, 1941, the 4th Company of the 4th Panzer Group Signal Regiment 
crossed the border between Poland and Lithuania as part of Panzer Group 4, Army Group 
North.156 Having already participated in both the French and Polish campaigns, 4th 
                                                 
155 Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories : Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony, George L. 
Mosse Series in Modern European Cultural and Intellectual History. (Madison, Wis.: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2003), 11-12. 
156 4th Company member Johannes Wechsler provided his Wehrpaß as part of his testimony.  Using this 
document, it is possible to track the movements of 4th Company throughout the period in question. "Statement 
of Johannes Wechsler, 4-13-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 250.  the XVI Corps had also 
by this time been redesignated as the Panzer Group 4.  Georg Tessin and Brün Meyer, Verbände und Truppen 
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Company’s march east into the Soviet Union would be marked by increasing acts of violence 
against the civilian population, culminating in the murder of approximately 40 Jewish men, 
women, children, and elderly in September of 1942.   
Two months after entering the Soviet Union, in September 1941, 4th Company was 
stationed in the vicinity of Roslavl (in modern day Byelorussia).  A German sentry caught a 
Russian civilian among the company’s trucks in the motor pool.  According to Lieutenant 
Fischer, this action violated a standing curfew during hours of darkness that forbade the 
citizens of the town from leaving their houses.157 After questioning the Russian through an 
interpreter, Fischer determined the Russian was guilty of attempted sabotage.  In his 
testimony, he stated that he “saw in [the Russian’s] demeanor a clear violation of the given 
order and made him understand that he was going to be shot.”158  Fischer claimed, without 
any details, that “I saw the Russian as having been caught in the act and felt myself entitled 
by my instructions to have him shot, whereas I had first given him the opportunity to remove 
suspicion, to tell his side of the story, through the questioning by the interpreter.”159 The 
evidence of sabotage here (simply being in the vicinity of the unit’s vehicles) is certainly 
weak and would not have warranted such drastic action. Indeed, it seems that the only “act” 
this civilian was caught in was being near the trucks after curfew, which in no case is 
punishable by death under any law of war.   
                                                                                                                                                       
der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945, 2. verb. Aufl. ed., vol. 1 
(Osnabrück: Biblio, 1979), 15. 
157 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 265.  
158 Ibid. [Auf jeden Fall sah ich in dem Verhalten des Russen einen klaren Verstoß gegen die erlassenen Befehle und habe 
ihm zu verstehen gegeben, dass er nunmehr erschossen werde.] 
159 Ibid., Bl. 266.[Ich sah den Russen als auf frischer Tat betroffen und hielt mich nach den allgemeinen Anweisungen für 
berechtigt, ihn erschießen zu lassen, wobei ich ihm zunächst durch die Frage des Dolmetschers Gelegenheit gab, sich zu 
dem Verdacht zu äußern] 
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However, without further deliberation, Fischer sent for Sergeant Heinrich Pehle, 
whose group had captured the Russian.  Fischer then ordered Pehle to shoot the captive.  
According to Pehle, he at first refused, at which point First Lieutenant Fischer drew his pistol 
and threatened him with it.  After this, Pehle stated that he “felt threatened and shot as 
ordered.”160  The threat of being executed for failing to obey orders is a common trope in 
perpetrator testimony. In this instance, however, it is possible, based on Fischer’s past 
actions, that he did indeed brandish his weapon as a means of intimidation.  In any case, it is 
highly unlikely that Fischer would have actually shot Pehle for refusing such an order. 
Fischer denied forcing Pehle to shoot but freely admitted ordering him to shoot the 
civilian.161 
By the winter of 1941-42, 4th Company was billeted in the town of Klemjatino, 
tasked with securing a portion of the main supply route between Smolensk and Vyasma.162  
Sometime in January or February 1942, Fischer ordered the execution of another civilian.  
This time the civilian was suspected of being a partisan, in part because he had been wearing 
a Russian military uniform coat.163 Fischer ordered Sergeant Justus Huber to carry out this 
execution.  According to Huber, he was told that this Russian had been involved in the 
disappearance of three members of a neighboring unit.164 Again, Fischer’s penchant for 
                                                 
160 "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 1-28-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 371.[Ich kann nur 
sagen, dass ich mich bedroht fühlte und dann befehlsgemäß geschossen] 
161 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 265. 
162 A note on place names.  Whenever possible, the modern place name spelling will be used.  
163 "Antrag Auf Voruntersuchung Gegen Die Beschuldigten, 9-28-62," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv 
Ludwigsburg, Bl. 304. 
164 "Statement of Justus Huber, 3-12-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 419.[Es wurde mir vor 
der Erschießung gesagt es bestände eine Zusammenhang mit dem Verschwinden der 3 Angehörigen der Nachbareinheit und 
dem Partisan.] 
 51 
executions calls into question the validity of this charge.  Unlike the previous instance, 
Fischer cannot even claim that this individual was caught in the act. Sergeant Huber first 
approached enlisted man Wilhelm Orlmann who refused to shoot (or claimed to have done so 
in his testimony).  According to Orlmann, Huber then ordered Bernard Grackel to carry out 
the execution. 165 Sergeant Huber then gave his service pistol to Grackel and the group 
(Grackel, Orlmann, Huber, and the Russian) began walking into the countryside outside the 
village.  After approximately 50-100 meters, Grackel shot the Russian in the back of the 
head, killing him.  The soldiers then returned to their quarters.166  
 Klemjatino bore the burdens of an increasingly violent 4th Company.  February and 
March of 1942 saw two separate hangings of Russian civilians.167  In February, according to 
Fischer, the village elder gave him information regarding a Russian who was supposed to 
have been involved in attacks on the main supply route. The elder continued, further alleging 
that this Russian secretly left the village at night.168  First Sergeant Bollmann, who was 
present at the execution, appears to have concurred with Fischer’s judgment, arguing that the 
Russian who was hanged was “known to us as the chief liaison officer for the local partisan 
group.”169  Fischer himself admitted to having ordered that this Russian be hanged “to warn 
the Russian population, to serve as a deterrent.”170 Though Fischer did not remember whom 
                                                 
165 "Statement of Wilhelm Orlmann, 2-14-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 130-31. 
166 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 4-16-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 256. 
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170 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 267. [Diese Erhängung war von mir befohlen worden, um die russische 
Bevölkerung zu warnen, wobei von mir behängen als Abschreckung dienen sollte.] 
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he ordered to hang this Russian, it is clear that this man was taken to an open barn in the 
town.  Soldier Clemens Hahn was on guard duty 200m from the barn and witnessed the 
hanging, albeit from a distance.  He described how a crowd of the town’s inhabitants 
followed the 4th Company men with the condemned Russian to the barn.  A German soldier 
read something from a document.  A noose was put around the Russian’s neck and he was 
placed on a stool or something similar.  The stool was removed and the Russian hung there 
for approximately ten minutes.  When the victim was motionless, another Company member 
shot him in the heart.171  Sergeant Pehle, Tech Sergeant Fuchs, and MSG Bürger were 
named as possible participants.172 One can confirm at least the identity of the shooter.  First 
Sergeant Bollmann admitted shooting the man in the heart “when he could no longer see his 
death throes.”173 Hahn further stated that this body hung in the open barn for several weeks 
as a deterrent, and Karl Ostermann confirmed that he had to pass this corpse every day on the 
way to guard duty.174 Karl Roth also recalled seeing this Russian hanging “from a beam” 
when he was on guard duty later.175 
 A month later, a second Russian was hanged in the vicinity of Klemjatino.  Soldier 
Wilhelm Kappel reported that in the vicinity of the village “we repeatedly observed blinking 
                                                 
171 "Statement of Clemens Hahn, 1-9-62," in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 104. 
172 Both Heinrich Bollmann (Bürger, Pehle, Fuchs)  and Helmut Ortlepp’s (Bürger, Bollmann)  testimony 
confirm that it is likely that at least Bürger and Bollmann participated. "Statement of Karl Roth, 9-6-61," in B 
162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 65. 
173  "Statement of Heinrich Bollmann, 8-29-61," Bl. 47.[Ich habe diese Aufgehängten dann noch mit meiner 
Dienstpistole ins Herz geschossen, da ich den Anblick des Todeskampfes nicht mehr mit ansehen konnte.] 
174 "Statement of Clemens Hahn, 1-9-62," Bl. 104.[Der Tote wurde zur Abschreckung noch mehrere Wochen hängen 
gelassen. "Statement of Karl Wilhelm Ostermann, 4-9-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 
238.[Dieser Russe hing in einer Scheune, an der ich immer vorbei musste, wenn ich zum Wachestehen zum Schneebunker 
ging.  Meiner Erinnerung nach hat dieser Russe dort mehrere Tage gehangen.  ] 
175 "Statement of Karl Roth, 9-6-61," Bl. 65.[an deren Querbalken ein russischer Zivilist aufgehangen war] 
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light signals.”176 These suspicious lights were reported up the chain of command.  Johann 
Halter explained the interpretation of these lights, saying that “it was suspected that these 
signals would have been seen by partisans.”177 Fischer explained during his interrogation that 
these lights were understood to be “release points for Russian planes dropping supplies to the 
partisans.”178 First Lieutenant Fischer then ordered his 3rd platoon leader, First Lieutenant 
Sauer, to conduct a raid on this town, which was approximately 8km from Klemjatino.  
During this raid, all the inhabitants of the town were rounded up and assembled in the center 
of the village.179 A house to house search was conducted. After the search was completed, 
Fischer arrived in the town. A flashlight (TaschenLohner) had been found in the home of one 
of the inhabitants.  Fischer then ordered that its Russian owner be hanged.  Once again, 4th 
Company used excessive, almost psychotic force.  A flashlight could not be mistaken for the 
type of lights allegedly seen, and, in any case, ownership of a flashlight does not in any way 
indicate partisan activity. Bernhard Olker remembered Fischer as having said, presumably as 
a justification for the hanging, “one must believe.”180  He also remembered hearing that the 
Russian was supposed to have been a soldier in civilian clothing.181  The 3rd Platoon left the 
town after the hanging.  Olker reports ironically that some days later, it was discovered that 
the so-called “blinking signals” were really the headlights of passing trucks on the main 
                                                 
176 "Statement of Wilhelm Kappel, 2-6-62 " in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 82.[In diesem Ort 
wurde von uns des nachts wiederholt beobachtet, das Blinkenzeichen gegeben wurden.] 
177 "Statement of Johann Halter, 2-15-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 133.[dass diese von 
Partisanen gesehen wurden] 
178 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 12-6-62," Bl. 345.[Es war damals üblich, dass durch Blinkzeichen den russischen 
Fliegern dir Abwurfplätze für den für die Partisanen bestimmten Nachschub angezeigt wurde.] 
179 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 10-3-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 83. 
180 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 1-29-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 384. 
181 Ibid. 
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supply route as they went behind a small hill, which caused them to briefly appear and 
disappear, thus, blinking.182 
 While these two Klemjatino hangings were the only ones with which Fischer was 
officially charged, testimony of company members indicates the likelihood of other such 
incidents of which there was insufficient evidence to charge.  One such incident involved an 
apparent ambush that occurred in the town. According to widespread testimony among 
witnesses, two Russian paratroopers (or partisans) jumped from a plane in the vicinity of 
Klemjatino and occupied a house on the edge of town.  From this location, they ambushed 
members of 4th Company before they were killed (or committed suicide).  The two dead 
paratroopers were placed on a sled by the village children and hastily buried in the snow.183 
During this operation, a Technical Sergeant Diehle was killed by an explosive device left 
behind by the partisans, most likely by accident.184 While many company members did not 
recall a hanging associated with this ambush, Wilhelm Maier stated that, in connection with 
this attack, a woman was hanged.  This woman supposedly lived in Fischer’s house and had 
been the school teacher of the village.185 Helmut Ortlepp remembered that the victims had 
been two Russians who were inhabitants of the house used for the ambush and who were 
suspected of having aided the partisans.186  They were hanged on the order of First 
Lieutenant Fischer.  While the facts concerning these alleged hangings are difficult to 
                                                 
182 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 10-3-61," Bl. 83-84. 
183 "Statement of Karl Wilhelm Ostermann, 4-9-62," Bl. 239. 
184 "Statement of Hans Eduard Hartmann, 2-15-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 136. 
185 "Statement of Wilhelm Maier, 4-11-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 242.[In diesem 
Zusammenhang sie eine Frau aufgehängt worden, die im Hause des Fischer gewohnt habe und Einsicht in Unterlagen der 
Komp gehabt hatte.] 
186 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 7-12-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 6-7. 
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determine, some elements of the story are supported by much of the testimony.  First, 
Technical Sergeant Diehle’s accidental death is established by at least six of those company 
members interviewed.187 In a unit that apparently had few casualties, this was a significant 
event.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the “paratrooper” incident is corroborated in 
some form by thirteen former soldiers.188 With these two events established as likely and 
given 4th Company’s past record of executing civilians for far less, it seems exceedingly 
probable that civilians were executed in reprisal for Diehle’s death, the partisan attack, or 
both. 
Having progressed from individual shootings to hangings to mass roundups, 4th 
Company crossed over into the realm of mass murder while stationed in the small town of 
Peregruznoje, approximately 80km southwest of Stalingrad.  According to Fischer and Puls, 
the unit was engaged in anti-partisan operations. One late afternoon in September, Fischer 
ordered that all the Jews in the town be rounded up.  He claimed that the Starost (village 
elder) of the town had pointed out to him a group of people who moved back and forth 
between the German and Russian lines during the night, bringing the Russians reports on 
German positions.189 Therefore, Fischer argued, he had these “unsafe people” rounded up in 
order to be removed from the town and taken to Russian lines.190  This argumentation must 
be taken as patently ridiculous and purely self-serving. The idea that these people, 
                                                 
187 Hartmann, Grackel, Halter, Lohner, Ostermann, Orlmann 
188 Epprick, Dörmann, Grackel, Hartmann, Hessler,  Halter,  Lohner,  Lange, Maier, Möller, Ostermann, 
Ortlepp, Wielert 
189 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 269. [Ich weiß außerdem, dass ich von dem örtlichen Ortsvorsteher 
darauf hingewiesen worden war, dass während der Nacht ein Teil der Bevölkerung zwischen der deutschen und russischen 
Front hin und herwanderte und den Russen Meldungen über unsere Stellungen brachten.] 
190 Ibid.[unsicheren Personen] 
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established to be women, children, and the elderly, were bringing intelligence to the Russians 
is wildly imaginative and implausible.  Why would Jews, having made it to Russian lines, 
return to German occupation? 
This military necessity rationale is brought into question by other testimony.  In 
addition to the fact that clearly the majority of soldiers knew that these were Jews, not just 
Russian civilians, August Möller offers a more damning reason for the roundup. He testified 
that he had “heard later through hearsay that the reason for this round-up was supposed to 
have been that a Jewish woman refused to accept German soldiers [to be lodged in her 
home].191 Günther Lehmann, the company clerk, had heard that, “due to many telephone 
lines being cut in the town, Fischer had ordered all the Jews in the town, from infant to the 
elderly, be rounded up in order to be shot.”192 Company cook, Sergeant Kurt Lange, heard 
rumors that the Russians were accusing the Jews of having “squatted” in the town.193  Karl 
Rothe supported this claim; he stated that Russian refugees had approached Lieutenant 
Fischer “with the request that the people who had settled down in their homes— during their 
absence—be removed.  Thereupon, Fischer ordered, in my presence, that the Jews of the 
village be rounded up.”194 The investigating judge wrote in a letter to a World Jewish 
Congress representative in 1962 that the Jews of Peregruznoje were likely refugees from 
                                                 
191 "Statement of August Georg Mahler, 8-28-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 51. [Wie mir 
weiterhin vom Hörensagen bekannt ist, dürfte der Grund dieses Zusammentreibens darin zu sehen gewesen sein, dass eine 
jüdische Frau die Aufnahme deutscher Soldaten verweigert hatte.] 
192 "Statement of Günther Adolf Wilhelm Lehmann, 8-29-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 
55. [Ich hörte, dass der öfteren Telefonleitungen in unserem Ort zerschnitten waren, sodass Hptm Fischer eines Tages als 
Repressalie anordnete, sämtliche Juden vom Säugling bis zum Greise zusammentreiben, um sie erschießen zu lassen.] 
193 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 231. [die Juden 
hätten sich im Dorf „breit gemacht.“] 
194 "Statement of Karl Roth, 9-6-61," Bl. 65-66.[russische Flüchtlinge mit der Bitte an Fischer herangetreten sind, die 
Leute, die sich in ihre Wohnungen eingenistet hatten—während der Abwesenheit—aus diese zu entfernen.] 
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larger towns west of Stalingrad.195 The witnesses above present a damning set of alternate 
motivations for murdering the Jews of Peregruznoje.  Regardless, the decision to round up 
the Jewish citizens of the town likely had little to do with any threat they may have posed to 
4th Company.  
Regardless of the reason, the Jews of the town were gathered together under guard in 
the vicinity of Lange’s field kitchen.  They were guarded by 3-4 men and stood tightly 
packed in the hot sun in the town square.196 These Jews consisted mainly of women, 
children, and the elderly.  At some point on this afternoon, First Lieutenant Fischer ordered 
Technical Sergeant Puls to arrange an execution detail and kill them. As Puls stated during 
questioning, Fischer told him “you will lead an execution detail in the morning.”197 Perhaps 
owing to the late hour, these 30-40 Jews were loaded onto a company vehicle, with the tarp 
down, and left in the motor pool overnight. Members of 4th company guarded the truck.  
Throughout the night, the men heard the cries and moans of those packed into the truck.  
Sergeant Lange best described the situation that night, saying, “the cries and wails, above all 
those of the children which could not be ignored, generally lasted the entire night.  One could 
not think of sleep in the immediate vicinity.”198  
In collections of testimony such as these, silences often are as important as utterances.  
An important silence exists concerning the Jews of Peregruznoje.  Not a single member of 4th 
                                                 
195 "Photo #13337," Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives. [Es sind 
Anhaltspunkte dafür vorhanden, daß es sich bei den ermordeten Juden nicht um Bewohned des Ortes P. gehandelt hat, 
sondern um Menschen, die wohl auf der Flucht nach P. gekommen warem, möglicherweise also aus grösseren Orten 
westlich des Gebietes von Stalingrad stammten.] 
196 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 231. 
197 "Statement of Fritz Puls, 11-27-62," Bl. 354. 
198 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 232. [Es war aber so, dass das Schreien und Jammern, vor 
allem der Kinder nicht zu überhören war, was im übrigen die ganze Nacht angedauert hat.  An ein Schlafen in der 
unmittelbare Nähe war nicht zu denken.] 
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Company interviewed mentioned attempting to help the Jews or alleviate their suffering, 
even though such a statement would be clearly in their best interests.  That none of the 
soldiers mentions giving the captives water or food, allowing them access to latrines, or even 
opening the flaps on the truck to give them air, gives us great insight into how this action was 
viewed by the members of 4th Company. 
Early the next morning, Sergeant Puls organized a firing squad of approximately 12-
15 men and drove the Jews of Peregruznoje into the steppe a few kilometers outside of 
town.199 Here, the truck pulled off the road and a small group of Jews were forced out and 
made to run into the steppe.  Members of the firing squad walked behind them, shooting.  
Some witnesses stated that an NCO then went among the bodies to ensure that the Jews were 
dead. Then the soldiers drove the truck a short distance and repeated the operation. During 
the shooting, according to numerous accounts from veterans of 4th Company, a Jewish 
woman refused to surrender her infant child and insisted that they both be shot together.  A 
German soldier shot her in the head, killing her but not the child who was left to crawl about 
in the blood and brains of its mother until it, too, was killed.  Alleged perpetrator Technical 
Sergeant Fuchs was described as being appalled that this child had moved its hands through 
the mother’s shattered head; he told Helmut Ortlepp that he supposed he would never forget 
this for the rest of his life.200  According to some testimony, a Russian woman cried out, “I 
no Jew!” and was put back into the truck and returned to the town.  The firing squad returned 
to Peregruznoje, where Sergeant Puls reported the completion of the mission to First 
Lieutenant Fischer.  Later, rumors were heard that a woman had survived and made it back to 
                                                 
199 "Antrag Auf Voruntersuchung Gegen Die Beschuldigten, 9-28-62," Bl. 302. 
200 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 7-12-61," Bl. 8.[Fuchs war entsetzt darüber, dass nun das Kind mit sei en Händen in 
dem zerschossenen Kopf der Mutter herumgewühlt habe.  Er meinte noch, er würde dies in seinem Leben nicht vergessen.] 
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the town.  Puls himself testified that the Starost had approached him saying that a woman 
was still alive at the execution site.  He stated, “the next day a Russian (I believe it was the 
Starost of the village) came to me and told me that they weren’t all dead, that one was found 
in the town,  I remember that I made it clear to him that he should not tell the commander.  I 
gave him cigarettes so that he would stay quiet.”201 The moral value of this action is dubious.  
Based on Puls’ demonstrated loyalty to Fischer, it is more likely that he wished more to hide 
his failure to complete the mission than to save the wounded woman from any further action.  
Sadly, the Jews of Peregruznoje had a decent chance of surviving the war.  Were it not for 
the murderous initiative of Lieutenant Fischer, they would have been liberated by the Red 
Army by mid-December. 
 
Throughout the violence committed by 4th Company during its advance ever deeper 
into Russia, members of the unit participated in a variety of ways.  Some guarded.  Some 
hanged.  Some shot. Some drove.  Some were simply present.  And some refused or evaded 
participation.  The case of 4th Company demonstrates that soldiers responded to atrocities in 
different ways and for different reasons. 
 
Parts in a Machine: The Men of 4th Company 
  
I wouldn’t have been court-martialed but I would have been blacklisted, put 
on KP back at base camp, and labeled a coward.  That I couldn’t take. 
- Vietnam veteran on why he would never disobey an unlawful 
order.202 
 
                                                 
201 "Statement of Fritz Puls, 11-27-62," Bl. 357.[Am nächsten Tage ist ein Russe—ich denke, es war der Starrost des 
Orts—zu mir gekommen und hat mir gesagt, es wären nicht alle tot, einige befänden sich dort im Ort.  Ich erinnere mich 
noch, dass ich ihm klargemacht habe, er sollte ja nichts dem Chef sagen.  Ich habe ihm noch Zigaretten gegeben gesagt, es 
sollte so bleiben.] 
202 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing : Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare ([New 
York, NY]: Basic Books, 1999), 199. 
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The threat of social death, exclusion from the mutual welfare and 
communication network, was the cement of military group culture.203 
 
 What role does the group play in the explanation of the crimes of the Third Reich, 
specifically those of the Wehrmacht?  This question is central to any understanding of the 
commission of atrocities by the German Army, especially to understanding who participated 
and why.  Indeed, theories of socialization and social psychology occupy prominent positions 
in Holocaust historiography, specifically works attempting to explain perpetrator behavior.  
Are individuals more likely to participate in atrocities due to pre-existing notions and 
experience (education, training, propaganda) or because of social pressures and group 
dynamics (peer pressure, authority relationships, social psychological influences)?  This false 
dichotomy is not particularly useful to the historian, as Leonard Newman, professor of 
psychology, observes.204  One might better argue that pressures to commit atrocities are 
situational, but that the situation itself is read by the perpetrators through a certain lens and 
within the context of group norms that are influenced by indoctrination, education, and prior 
life experiences.  That being said, historians and social psychologists have attributed variant 
levels of agency to the individual or the group, respectively.     
Omer Bartov perhaps best represents a school of thinkers prioritizing individual 
conditioning, specifically propaganda.  He writes,  
the average combat soldier and junior officer, in his profound sense of a complete 
lack of choice, drilled into him through years of ideological indoctrination and social-
organizational pressures, in his ability to conceive of any other alternative to the 
values propagated by the regime, and in his dependence on the polarized images of a 
                                                 
203 Thomas Kühne, Kameradschaft : die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert, 
Kritische Studien Zur Geschichtswissenschaft ; Bd. 173. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 273. 
204 See Leonard S. Newman, "What Is A "Social-Psychological" Account of Perpetrator Behavior? The Person 
Versus the Situation in Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners," in Understanding Genocide : The Social 
Psychology of the Holocaust, ed. Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
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deified Führer and a demonized enemy as his motivating engine, was probably closer 
to the National Socialist model of the fanatic, politically committed Kämpfer than the 
generals.205 
 
In his estimation, the most important factor in the behavior of Wehrmacht soldiers was the 
intensive indoctrination effort to which they were subjected.   
In contrast to this interpretation stand the findings of many social psychologists and 
historians.  Christopher Browning, in his study of Police Battalion 101, demonstrates that 
propaganda and indoctrination were not a decisive influence on the murderous behavior of 
the unit.  Indeed, he ends his text with the words, “within virtually every social collective, the 
peer group exerts tremendous pressures on behavior and sets moral norms.  If the men of 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of 
men cannot?”206  In their discussion of group dynamics and the Holocaust, social 
psychologists seem to agree.  They argue that “individual cognitions, identities, and so forth 
depend to a larger degree on the groups within which people affiliate and are determined by 
which group memberships are currently salient.  In other words, individual attitudes, beliefs, 
and so on are social phenomena; they exist in and are produced by social groups.”207 
Yet, not all soldiers killed, and not all soldiers killed in the same ways.  How does 
one account for these variances within what is sometimes thought to be a cohesive group? A 
1951 sociological study found that a Canadian infantry company appeared “not as a 
succession of individuals, but as a set of more or less related clusters of men bound together 
                                                 
205 Bartov, Germany's War and the Holocaust : Disputed Histories, 29. 
206 Browning, Ordinary Men : Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, 189. 
207 R. Scott Tindale, Catherine Munier, Michelle Wassermann, and Christine M. Smith, "Group Processes and 
the Holocaust," in Understanding Genocide : The Social Psychology of the Holocaust, ed. Leonard S. Newman 
and Ralph Erber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 144. 
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by bonds which have little to do with army organization in the formal sense.”208 This 
description of military units can be as easily applied to most Western armies.  Thomas Kühne 
has identified a similar group of clusters in his study of comradeship among Wehrmacht 
soldiers.  He categorizes German soldiers into three groups: 1) the “Unsoldaten”—the 
outsider of military culture, 2) the “Born” soldier—the genuine insider, and 3) the “Draftee” 
soldier—recruited compulsorily but who knew how to adapt.209  However, these categories 
seem far too broad and caricatured to be truly useful as analytic tools.  They do not tell us 
much at all about the responses of men in these groups to atrocities.  For example, 4th 
Company shows that “draftees” could volunteer, participate, and decline to participate in 
atrocities. 
A new theoretical framework is required.  Previous studies of this spectrum of 
“characters” fail to display a sufficiently nuanced approach.  In reality, there seem to be 
many different archetypal personalities within groups of perpetrators.  Any critical study of 
groups responsible for committing atrocities shows that most responses of individuals are 
attempts to negotiate various group pressures, risks, and psychological stressors. Apart from 
those who are intrinsically motivated, individuals must choose a path between administrative 
penalty (or the threat thereof), peer isolation, and cognitive dissonance.  In other words, when 
confronting the choice to participate in atrocities, one must weigh the risk of punishment 
from his superiors, the risk of ridicule or isolation from his fellow group members, the 
rewards to be gained, and the internal pain caused by following or ignoring one’s moral 
inclinations.  The interplay of these forces often results in a wide range of responses, from 
                                                 
208 Anthony Kellett, "Combat Motivation," in Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, ed. Gregory 
Belenky, Contributions in Military Studies (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 207. 
209 Kühne, Kameradschaft : die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert, 23. 
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complete compliance to outright refusal.  Categorizing these responses or archetypal 
characters tells us much about complicity in atrocity and the forces at play behind it.  
Motivated actors are those who willingly or eagerly participated in atrocities.  They 
may have volunteered.  These individuals could be motivated by any number of reasons ( 
ideology, careerism, or self-interest); what is important is that they acted almost entirely of 
their own free will. These motivated actors must be divided further into the true believers and 
the role players, as the reasons for such strong motivation can be markedly different. As the 
name suggests, true believers possess an ideologically driven motivation for participation.  
They truly believe in the goals and doctrine of the regime and, thus, see themselves as 
following the same path.  These individuals need not subscribe entirely to the dominating 
ideology, but need only find enough commonality that they can devote their full allegiance to 
it. Role players on the other hand appear equally motivated in their actions, yet the 
underlying reasons may be more professional than ideological.  Role players are intrinsically 
motivated to fulfill their role to the best of their ability.  There is an element of pride here.  
Role players need not hold any deep-seated agreement with ideological aims (though they 
may exhibit more than a tacit acceptance).  They are committed to executing whatever tasks 
fall to their position and to displaying the characteristics expected of such a position.  It is 
here that organizational culture and individual training can also influence responses to social 
pressures.  
A large percentage of soldiers and perpetrators likely fall into categories of following 
and obedience.  However, not all following can be categorized the same way. There seem to 
be at least two distinct types of following. Dutiful followers exhibit a willingness to fully 
participate when asked or ordered, but do not necessarily possess any intrinsic motivation to 
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do so or act on their own initiative. These men function within a hierarchical and military 
structure, doing what they “must” do. These men can be counted on to execute orders when 
given; not all individuals can.  Nominal compliers will execute orders they are given, but 
require supervision or group social pressures to achieve complete compliance and cease to 
comply when not under supervision. 
Finally, some individuals choose to not comply. It must be stressed that reasons 
behind this non-compliance are many.  Some individuals may fail to comply because of 
moral disagreement: they simply believe the acts to be wrong.  Others may fail to comply 
because the violent, bloody nature of these acts is something they are not capable of 
handling.  While one cannot always determine the reasoning behind non-compliance, the 
forcefulness of the act can allow the historian to infer the depth of belief behind it.  Evaders 
attempt to avoid participation.  They may decline orders, but may also participate against 
their will if pressed. Often they will simply attempt to withdraw from the situation.  These 
individuals may be but an order away from nominal compliance, but they will seek to avoid 
situations where their hand would be forced.   
Finally, active refusal requires a greater commitment.  Such actions do not often 
remain in the shadows; they are not unnoticed measures and they entail the assumption of 
increased risk, of social alienations and military punishment.  But not all active resistance is 
the same either.  These individuals can be divided into two groups as well: individual 
refusers and group resisters.  Active refusers will refuse to comply.  These refusals can be 
both verbal and non-verbal, but in either case they are final.  Individual refusal is 
characterized by a commitment.  These individuals cannot be further coerced.  There are 
those who refuse but then comply.  These are nominal compliers, not failed resisters.  Yet 
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refusal can also be selective.  Men will refuse certain order or certain types of activities and, 
often, accept others. The final category is that of active group resisters. These are individuals 
who not only refuse to participate personally but also attempt to either intervene by 
preventing others from participating or by convincing others they should not comply.  This is 
the rarest form of resistance and carries with it the greatest risk of penalty, for inciting others 
to disobey was a much more punishable offense than refusing to participate in what were still 
viewed legally as acts of questionable or ambiguous legal standing. 
Employing archetypes such as these is useful in understanding the various forces at 
work behind killing.  However, one can be tempted to view them as static or intrinsic to the 
individual.  These groups are neither fixed nor impermeable.  Even within these categories, 
continuums exist.  Moreover, individuals can move between these groups based on the nature 
of the situation.  These groups are defined by behaviors and actions.  Personality plays a role 
insomuch as it, along with other forces, affects this behavior.  Thus, the same individual can 
fall into different categories at different times based on his attitudes at the time and his 
reaction to the specific situation. This distribution of behavior in social groups is not a new 
concept.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the landmark Milgram and Zimbardo experiments 
demonstrated that human behavior relative to authority tends to fall along a spectrum ranging 
from initiative-taking to refusal, with the majority of individuals participating to a large 
extent.210   
                                                 
210 Stanley Milgram conducted a series of experiments in 1961 attempting to examine human reactions to 
authority by having them administer what they thought to be painful shocks to another person.  (For an 
informative short documentary on this important series of experiments, see Stanley Milgram, Obedience 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University,, 1969), videocassette.)  Philip Zimbardo conduced his 
now-famous “Stanford prison experiment” in 1971, creating a mock prison in the basement of the psychology 
building in order to evaluate how socially imposed roles, peer pressure, and environment affected human 
behavior.  (For more, see Philip G. Zimbardo, Ken Musen, and John Polito, Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison 
Study (Stanford, CA: Stanford Instructional Television Network,Stanford University, 1992), videorecording.) 
 66 
 Figure 1. Conceptual View of Responses to Participation in Atrocities 
 
 
“One must believe” 4th Company’s Motivated Actors 
 What allowed a communications company to become such a brutal and violent 
organization may well be tied to a group of like-minded believers within the unit.  First 
among these must be the commander, First Lieutenant Fischer.  He began his service in the 
Wehrmacht in April of 1935 as an officer cadet, eventually attaining the rank of First 
Lieutenant in 1939.211  He took command of  3rd Company (4th Company’s original 
designation) shortly before the French campaign in 1940 and continued to command the unit 
until 1943.212  
                                                 
211 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 263. 
212 Ibid. 
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 By all accounts, Fischer was a dedicated National Socialist.  One company member 
described him as a “staunch Nazi.”213  His company clerk, Günther Lehmann, was in a 
position to know him well, working as he did in the company headquarters. He testified that 
“based on our working relationship over several years, I can say that he was an absolute 
adherent to Nazi ideas.”214 One of Fischer’s platoon leaders, Franz Scherer, called him an 
“über-Nazi” and a “radical Jew hater.”215 Scherer continued, saying that he was familiar with 
“statements by Fischer which made it clear that he wanted most to eliminate all Jews.”216  
The cook, Lange, termed Fischer “the type of Jew-hater who once made the remark that he 
would love to drive out all the Jews and hunt them with bullets.”217 
 Fischer’s anti-Semitism and Nazi ideological attitudes were not simply abstractly held 
beliefs, but were guiding influences on his own decision-making.  Sergeant Lange claimed 
that Fischer had punished him with three days confinement for spending the night in a Jewish 
household and for giving the family food during the advance in Latvia.218  The commander 
had clearly gone from an anti-Semite in theory to an anti-Semite in practice.  Lieutenant 
                                                 
213 "Statement of Paul Krüger, 11-15-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 119.[ dieser ein 
ïberzeugter Nationalsozialist war] 
214 "Statement of Günther Adolf Wilhelm Lehmann, 5-28-63," in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 
29. [Allgemein kann ich über Fischer aufgrund der jahrelangen Zusammenarbeit sagen, dass er ein unbedingter Anhänger 
der nationalsozialistischen Ideen war.] 
215 "Statement of Franz Scherer, 3-23-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 235. [Fischer muss ich 
als einen Übernationalsozialisten bezeichnen, der ein radikaler Judenhasser war.] 
216 Ibid. [Außer dem eben beschriebenen Vorfall sind mir Äußerungen von Fischer geläufig, aus denen klar zu entnehmen 
war, dass er am liebsten alle Juden beseitigen wollte] 
217 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 230. [Überhaupt war Hauptmann Fischer der Typ des 
Judenhassers, der einmal sogar die Bemerkung gemacht hat, am liebsten würden er alle Juden wegjagen und ihnen noch 
Kugeln jagen] 
218 Ibid., Bl. 229. [Dieser war ein sehr gestrenger Offizier, der unter Umständen schon bei kleinen Verstoßen mit harten 
Strafen vorging.  Persönlich habe ich von ihm einmal drei Tage strengen Arrest erhalten, weil ich auf dem Vormarsch 1941 
in Lettland während einer Nacht in einem Hause übernachtet habe, das von Juden bewohnt wurde.  Das hatte er erfahren, 
auch, dass ich den Juden etwas zu essen gegeben hatte.] 
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Scherer offered another, more chilling, example of Fischer’s ideology in practice. In 
describing the execution of a civilian which Sergeant Pehle was ordered to carry out in 
Roslavl in 1941, Scherer described the victim not as a Russian partisan, but as a Jew.219  
Other testimony did not describe the victim as a Jew, but given Fischer’s predilections, it is 
not unreasonable to lend some credence to Scherer’s statements.  Moreover, Fischer never 
once in his multiple statements claimed to have received any order from a higher 
headquarters for the mass murder in Peregruznoje.  Thus, his “military necessity” 
justifications notwithstanding, Fischer’s order to round up and murder the Jews likely 
derived solely from his earnest desire to kill Jews. 
 Even a commander as fanatical as Fischer would have had difficulty enacting his 
plans without a group of other motivated actors to support him.  First among these was 
Technical Sergeant Fritz Puls.  Puls was described by one 4th Company member as a 
“zealous soldier.”220 Another remembered that he was an anti-Semite, “which was clear from 
his words.”221 It is perhaps not coincidental that Puls was later named a 
Nationalsozialistischen Führungs Offizier (NSFO) when he was the legal officer for the 
Regiment.222 He claimed that this was a position “on paper only” and that he was so tasked 
only because he was the youngest officer on staff.223 Given witness characterizations of Puls, 
                                                 
219 "Statement of Franz Scherer, 3-23-62," Bl. 235. [Ich habe mir Pehle sofort vorgenommen und dabei folgendes 
erfahren: Oblt Fischer soll Pehle den Befehl erteilt haben, den Mann, einen Juden, zu erschießen.  ] 
220 "Statement of Heinrich Gasscher, 3-11-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 405. [Er war ein 
eifriger Soldat] 
221 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 11-14-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 116. [Außerdem ist 
mir bekannt, dass er judenfeindlich eingestellt war, was aus seinen Redewendungen eindeutig zu erkennen war] 
222 "Statement of Fritz Puls, 5-29-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 189. 
223 Ibid. 
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it seems very likely that he possessed a high level of ideological dedication and that his 
appointment as an NSFO was no random administrative decision.  Moreover, as a long 
distance runner in Berlin in 1939, Puls was, by his own admission, a member of the SS 
Sports Club (SS-Sportsgemeinschaft).224 He could not explain how his application to join the 
Allgemeine-SS came to be filled out in his own hand in August 1939 or how he came to be 
listed in 1939 SS membership statistics.225 Despite his feeble objections, Puls’ membership 
in the SS and service as an NSFO, in addition to characterizations by his former comrades, 
indicate a high degree of ideological belief or, at the very least, commitment to the regime. 
 Because the post-war investigation was focused primarily on Fischer and Puls, 
identifying other motivated actors becomes more difficult, but not impossible.  One soldier 
remembered that certain individuals were repeatedly chosen to take part in “individual 
actions” and that a Private Heinrich König always “volunteered.”226  After the Peregruznoje 
shooting, one NCO remembered that a nineteen year old Private Keller had “taken a 
particularly active role” in the shooting.227 Others remember Keller as possibly having 
participated.228  
                                                 
224 Ibid., Bl. 187. 
225 Ibid. 
226 "Statement of Wilhelm Orlmann, 2-14-62," Bl. 131. [ Zu den einzelnen Aktionen wurden dann jeweils von 
Unteroffizieren geeignete Leute aufgesucht, die für solche Taten fähig waren.  Ich erinnere mich noch an den damaligen 
Putzer des Oblt Sauer, den jungen Gefr. Heinrich König, der sich immer freiwillig meldete]  Private Klobozinski was not 
interviewed in the course of the investigation. 
227 "Statement of Heinrich Gasscher," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 87.[dass der jüngere Kopm-
Angeh Keller, seinerzeit etwa 19 Jahre alt und von Beruf Bäcker, sich bei dieser Erschießung besonders aktiv verhalten 
hätte] 
228 "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 10-3-61," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 80. Keller is 
mentioned in several court documents.  His testimony is even referenced.  Unfortunately, his testimony is 
missing from the archival files. 
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While names and specifics have faded, it is clear that there existed a group of 
motivated actors in 4th Company who were repeatedly called upon to participate in atrocities. 
One soldier, Herbert Bärmann, clearly identified this group. He said, regarding the shooting 
of the Jews in Peregruznoje, that “these people [shooters] belonged to the circle in the 
company which was always on the spot for special tasks.”229  He is not alone in this 
observation. Cook Lange remembered that the members of the NCO corps that took part in 
the shooting “all had the same attitude as Fischer.”230 In addition, he believed that Puls was 
“always together with the commander and, as a would-be officer, would be given special 
missions as a leader.”231 Puls  “carried out all of Fischer’s orders without contradiction” and 
was characterized as a “good helper” of Fischer” 232  Speaking of the murder of the Jews, 
Alfred Hoffmann remembered that “only volunteers were to be taken.”233 Thus, testimonies 
from the 4th Company case clearly indicate the presence of a group of individuals bound 
together by common ideological belief or motivation to actively participate.  While for some 
it may be difficult to further define this motivation, what is clear is that these individuals took 
                                                 
229 "Statement of Herbert Bärmann, 2-20-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 154. [dass diese 
Personen zu dem Kreis in der Kompanie gehörten, die zu einer solchen Aktion bereit waren. Damit will ich zum Ausdruck 
bringen, dass es diejenigen waren, die für Sonderaufgaben freiwillig zur Stelle waren.] 
230 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 234.[Diese von Hptm Fischer gezeigte Einstellung hatte vor 
allem Unteroffizierkorps, das an der Erschießung teilnehme.] 
231 Ibid., Bl. 233.[ Ich meine auf Grund meiner Erinnerungsbilder, dass es Wachtmeister Puls gewesen ist.  Ich komme zu 
dem Schluss, weil Puls stets mit dem Chef zusammen war und als angehender Offizier bei besonderen Einsätzen als Führer 
eingeteilt wurde] 
232 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 3-8-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 401-02. [Fischer hatte 
einen guten Helfer und zwar war diese der damalige Leutnant Puls.] and "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 11-14-61," 
Bl. 116.[weil ich von Puls weiß, dass er sämtliche Befehle Fischers widerspruchslos ausgeführt hat.] 
233 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 12-5-62," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 336. [dass nur 
Freiwillige genommen werden sollten] 
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the initiative and to a great extent were self-selected. That many of these individuals were in 
leadership positions only enhances the violent potential of such  
groupings. 
 
  “I did not interest myself in this matter” Dutiful Following and Participation in Atrocities 
I cannot say today which members of the company rode out when the Jews were 
shot.  I did not investigate this afterwards.  I wasn’t interested in this matter.  As long 
as they leave me alone. 
 - Statement of Erwin Garner234 
 
 While the existence of a group of motivated participants was important to the 
propensity to kill, the existence of a larger group of soldiers willing to follow orders when 
given, even if distasteful, is perhaps more vital.  Such a lack of concern as that voiced by 
Garner is prevalent throughout the testimonies of 4th Company members.  The number of 
soldiers who appear by these testimonies to have willingly carried out orders dwarfs those 
who gave them or volunteered to carry them out.   
Perhaps we are limited by our sources.  Many of those who appear to be dutiful 
followers do not testify, due to death or absence. Moreover, we do not often hear about these 
individuals’ motivations or attempted non-compliance (if it occurred).  However, there are 
enough examples, both first- and second-hand, that one can reasonably draw the conclusion 
that such a group of dutiful followers existed.   
Maintenance Sergeant Paul Fuchs figures prominently as a member of the firing 
squad which killed the Jews of Peregruznoje.  Four of those interviewed stated that Fuchs 
had participated in the shooting.  Helmut Ortlepp, who claimed to have been a friend of 
                                                 
234 "Statement of Erwin Garner, 6-19-63," in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 9.[Ich kann auch heute 
nicht mehr sagen, welche Komp-Angeh mit herausgefahren sind, als die Juden erschossen worden sind.  Ich habe mich 
hinterher nicht viel nach der Sache erkundigt. Mich interessierte die Sache nicht.  Was andere machen, interessierte mich 
nicht, Hauptsache, mich lassen sie in Ruhe.] 
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Fuchs, encountered him the morning after the execution.  “I saw him sitting on a stump with 
a very downcast expression on his face,” Ortlepp stated. Fuchs went on to admit that he had 
participated in the shooting and had witnessed a mother shot with her baby in her arms; the 
baby had then crawled around in its mother’s blood and brains. Fuchs confessed that he 
would “never forget this image for the rest of his life.”235 What is notable about this story is 
not so much the description of the violent act or of Fuchs’s remorse afterward.  Indeed, his 
remorse is in many ways normal and heartening.  What is interesting is that he failed to relate 
to Ortlepp any attempt to avoid or refuse to shoot.  His story was one of dedication to 
fulfilling one’s duty, regardless of how difficult that duty may be.  This is at the heart of the 
dutiful follower archetype and represents perhaps the clearest example.  The depth of 
commitment to duty, orders, or authority is shown precisely because of Fuchs’s apparently 
troubled conscience rather than in spite of it. 
More mundane examples of this dutiful obedience, neither volunteering nor refusing, 
abound in the testimonies concerning 4th Company.  Sergeant Pehle, who shot 4th Company’s 
first recorded victim in Roslavl, is typical.  He stated that when he was summoned before 
First Lieutenant Fischer (and possibly First Sergeant Bollmann), he felt threatened by 
Fischer’s brandished pistol and complied with the order to shoot.  He never mentioned any 
attempt to evade or refuse this order.  For him, perhaps, the combination of his commander’s 
and first sergeant’s presence, the order, and the brandished pistol were enough to convince 
him to comply.  Fischer claimed never to have used any force on Pehle.236 While this is 
perhaps a dubious claim, Pehle had no real cause to feel physically threatened anyway; the 
                                                 
235 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 3-8-63," Bl. 401-02. [Diesen Anblick vergesse ich in meinem Leben nie.] 
236 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 265. 
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likelihood of Fischer executing one of his soldiers, in the presence of his first sergeant (who 
clearly disliked him), was low indeed. We will return to Pehle later. 
Bernhard Grackel is another example of this willingness to follow orders when given.  
One may recall that, after Oldermanns refused Sergeant Huber’s order to kill a Russian 
civilian, Grackel received the same order and complied.  Grackel made no claim to have 
questioned or attempted to refuse this order, even though it would have been in his best 
interests to do so.  Indeed, he expressed a kind of tragic surprise when told by investigators 
that Orlmann had refused the same order without any negative repercussions.  He said at first 
that had he known about Orlmann’ refusal, he, too, would have refused the order and blames 
his military training which taught him not to disobey orders.237  Yet when pressed, he 
reversed this position, saying that “if I had seen an opportunity to avoid [Sergeant] Huber’s 
order, I would have not done so.  Huber told me that the order to shoot the partisan came 
from the commander.  I could certainly not disobey an order from the commander in the 
field.”238  Such rationalization is typical of the dutiful follower.  Either way, what separates 
Grackel from Orlmann is precisely the fact that they were placed in the same situation, at the 
same time, by the same superior, and chose two separate responses.  Both men were within 
three years of one another (Grackel 27, Orlmann 30) so youth or experience does not seem to 
be a factor.  The simple fact is that one soldier, for whatever reason, saw a choice and 
exercised his ability to make decisions.  Grackel may not have felt he had a choice or he may 
have had no problem with the order; in any case, the result was the same: compliance and 
execution. 
                                                 
237 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 4-16-62," Bl. 256.[Hätte ich dies gewusst, hätte ich mich ebenfalls geweigert, den 
Russen zu erschießen] 
238 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 3-12-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 414-15. 
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 Other types of participation indicate this willingness to follow orders.  Heinrich Klein 
represents another kind of dutiful follower.  On the night before the murders, while the Jews 
were imprisoned in the LKW in the motor pool, Klein had two hours of motor pool guard 
along with another soldier.  Though he claimed to have had “roving guard” (Pendelposten), it 
is highly likely that Klein had received instructions to guard the truck as well.  In any case, 
Klein recalled in his first testimony hearing the moans and cries coming from the vehicle, 
though he claimed that he did not know what kind of people were in the truck.  In his second 
testimony, however, he admitted that he “took the noises from the LKW to be the cries of 
women and children.”239 Klein fulfilled his two hour guard shift and was duly relieved.  He 
made no mention of investigating the source of the noises or of making any attempt 
whatsoever to aid them in even the smallest way.  His chilling explanation is probably 
indicative of the attitude of the dutiful follower: “I was not interested in [the cries from the 
truck].  One was indifferent.  I didn’t do anymore during the war than what was absolutely 
necessary.”240 This episode is even more interesting given that in an average night, from 7pm 
to 4am,  approximately ten soldiers would have had this guard shift, if no one received two 
shifts.  Yet only two of those interviewed admitted guarding the truck.241 In fact, very few of 
the soldiers mentioned the guarding of the truck at all.  This would indicate that many of 
them may have also been ordered to guard the truck.  Either way, the watchful guarding of 
                                                 
239 "Statement of Heinrich Klein, 5-30-63," in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 18. [Ich habe die 
Geräusche, die ich von dem LKW gehört habe, für das Weinen von Frauen und Kindern gehalten.] 
240 Ibid.[Ich habe nicht dafür interessiert.  Man war eben gleichgültig.  Ich habe im Kriege nicht mehr getan, als was 
unbedingt nötig war] 
241 The other was Wilhelm Danner, who was ordered specifically by Puls to guard the truck."Statement of 
Wilhelm Danner, 11-16-62," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 329. [bekam ich von Puls den Befehl, 
einen LKW zu bewachen, der auf dem Parkplatz der Komp stand.] 
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this LKW, packed with the elderly, women, and children overnight certainly demonstrates a 
willingness to comply with orders.  No witness mentions any refusal to participate, 
personally or from hearsay. 
Dutiful following was not limited to enlisted men.  Junior officers, too, fell into this 
category.  The most obvious dutiful follower among them appears to be First Lieutenant 
Sauer, who led the First platoon in 4th Company.  It was Sauer’s platoon that carried out the 
search of the village near Klemjatino, where the suspicious lights had been seen.  It was also 
his men who rounded up the inhabitants of the village and forced them into the town square.  
Finally, it was Sauer’s platoon which hanged the owner of a flashlight in conjunction with 
this raid.  Fischer himself confirms that a Russian was hanged.242 From this point, the details 
seem to be contested.  Fischer claims, not unreasonably, that Lieutenant Sauer was the 
military commander (Ortskommandant) of this town 8km from Klemjatino.  He further 
claims that he did not order this hanging but that Sauer had carried it out of his own accord.  
Yet Bernhard Olker distinctly remembers that Lieutenant Fischer was present in the town 
square.243  Moreover, according to him, Fischer questioned civilians regarding the incident.  
This suggests that Fischer may have taken a more active role in this operation, and even 
possibly have ordered the hanging.  Such behavior would certainly not be out of character for 
him.  Either way, Sauer can be placed clearly in the category of dutiful follower or perhaps 
that of motivated actor.  As an officer, he would have been able to object to orders and 
potential atrocities in a way that an enlisted soldier would not.  Indeed, as we will see, there 
were officers in 4th Company who did confront the commander directly.  Thus, the lack of 
                                                 
242 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 12-6-62," Bl. 345. 
243 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 1-29-63," Bl. 383. [Hptm Fischer war bei diesem Einsatz zugegen, dass weiss 
ich] 
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any testimony indicating hesitation to comply shows that Sauer likely followed orders and 
possibly was of a like mind as Fischer.  It was a former first platoon member, Wilhelm 
Orlmann, who mentioned that the NCOs would seek out a group of “suitable” people for 
individual “actions,” implying that such actions took place more than once.244   
Only two former soldiers admit to having taken part in the mass shootings at 
Peregruznoje: Fritz Puls and Hans-Jürgen Köther.  Puls’ reasons for participation are fairly 
clear; by all accounts, he was a Nazi believer, compatriot of Fischer, and possibly careerist. 
Thus, Köther appears the only link to the worst killers of 4th Company.  Unfortunately, he 
tells us almost nothing about how he became involved.  He claimed even not to remember 
who told him to participate.  He merely stated, “I belonged to the detail that had to drive out 
with the Jews.”245 His motives remain a mystery, yet his failure at least to claim to have been 
ordered or to have refused clearly marks him as a dutiful follower if not more.  Köther 
testified that the detail consisted of approximately 12-15 men.  We are left, in the end, with 
seventeen names: men accused by one witness or another of having taken part in the mass 
shooting.246 Eliminating Köther and Puls, fifteen other individuals are named, some among 
those interviewed, some who died during the war or were otherwise unavailable. None of 
those among the interviewed admitted to having participated in this shooting, likely for self-
serving reasons.  It is impossible to definitively prove their complicity, though based on 
multiple testimonies it is more than likely that Fuchs, Gasscher, Walter, and Keller were 
                                                 
244 "Statement of Wilhelm Orlmann, 2-14-62," Bl. 131. 
245 "Statement of Hans-Jürgen Köther, 11-15-62," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 321. [Ich 
gehörte zu dem Kommando, das mit den Juden herausgefahren musste.] 
246 Fuchs, Puls, Gasscher, Keller, Walter, Sichtig, Erich, Huber, Kircheis, Janot, Bürger, Dörmann, Unger, 
Erhardt, Köther, and Grackel. 
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shooters as well.  In any case, these others, whose voices are lost, probably number among 
dutiful followers and motivated actors. 
 
Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Evasion in 4th Company 
 It is often difficult to identify acts of evasion among groups of potential perpetrators.  
This is due, in part, to the nature of the act itself.  Evasion enables individuals to avoid 
participation without drawing attention to themselves or risking punishment.  These men 
often remain unnoticed by history as a result.  Indeed, it is neither apologetic nor unrealistic 
to assume that many of those categorized as dutiful followers could have perhaps remained 
evaders had they been able to avoid being ordered to participate.  Their agreement to 
participate, however, clearly removes them from the group of evaders.  
 Even with these limitations, at least two examples of evasion appear in the 
testimonies concerning 4th Company.  Of these, Bernhard Olker’s experience was perhaps the 
most telling.  During the search for the “partisan signaler” in the town near Klemjatino,  
Olker was a member of the platoon charged with searching the village and forcing the 
inhabitants into the square.  He stated that he and a comrade entered a house with an elderly 
couple and an infant during this search.  “My comrade and I did not want to force these two 
old people into the town square,” he said.247 The two soldiers stayed in this house for a while 
and then moved to another house, which they found already empty.  They ran into some other 
members of the company here who were drying their socks in front of the stove.  Olker then 
stated that he stayed with this group and then adds that “we couldn’t see what else happened 
                                                 
247 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 1-29-63," Bl. 383. [Mein Kamerad und ich wollten die beiden alten Leute 
nicht auf den Dorfplatz treiben] 
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in the village.”248 As he elaborated further, “up to this point, I had taken part in the action as 
ordered, finally I and 3-4 comrades went inside an empty house, because I did not want to 
have anything to do with it because of my attitude (Catholic) as I mention in subsequent 
interrogations.”249 
Olker’s actions do not strike one as particularly altruistic, but they do indicate intent 
on his part (and those of his unnamed comrades) to avoid participating in whatever the rest of 
the unit was up to in the village.  This form of evasion, simply disappearing during 
potentially criminal activities, was an option that others likely took as well.  It allowed them 
to avoid participating in acts they found objectionable without risking the alienation from the 
group that Kühne terms “social death.” 
Alfred Hoffmann related another form of evasion: the refusal to volunteer.  Before the 
shooting of the Jews, Hoffmann’s superior, Technical Sergeant Walter, asked him if he 
wanted to “take a drive,” meaning drive a vehicle in the convoy taking the Jews to their 
execution site.250 Though Walter didn’t explicitly state it,  Hoffmann immediately 
understood the implications of this request.  “It was clear as a light,” he said.251 Walter 
stressed his participation was fully voluntary and Hoffmann apparently declined.  When 
Hoffmann asked him later what had happened, Walter replied shortly that he had found 
                                                 
248 Ibid. [Was sonst in dem Dorf geschah, konnten wir nicht sehen] 
249 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 10-3-61," Bl. 83. [Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt habe ich befehlsgemäß an der 
Aktion teilgenommen, anschließend bin ich dann mit mehreren (etwa 3 bis 4 Kameraden) Kameraden in ein leerstehendes 
Haus hineingegangen, weil ich aufgrund meiner Einstellung (kath.) mit den nach folgenden Vernehmungen usw.  nichts zu 
tun haben wollte.] 
250 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 12-5-62," Bl. 335. [Walter ist eines Tages zu mir gekommen und hat mich gefragt, 
ob ich noch eine Fahrt machen wollte] 
251 Ibid.  [Da ist mir erst ein Licht aufgegangen] 
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another driver.252 Here, given a non-confrontational opportunity to avoid participation, 
Hoffmann evaded simply by declining to volunteer.  He had been overtly given a choice.  It 
is unclear perhaps what he would have done had he actually been ordered to participate.  It is 
possible that others took similar approaches, and their voices simply are not heard through 
the source material.  Due to the partly adversarial nature of the interrogations, incidences of 
more active resistance are more visible. 
 
The Courage to Refuse: Active Refusal in 4th Company 
 It is unfortunate that the purest act of resistance, that of actively intervening and 
stopping an atrocity from happening, does not appear in the testimonies concerning 4th 
Company.  It is more unfortunate, perhaps, that this form of resistance is exceptionally rare in 
most case studies of perpetrator activity.  However, the 4th Company case does include 
several examples of direct refusal to participate.  These individual refusers were faced with 
an order or suggestion from a superior and refused, often in the face of threats or insults.  
Taking self-exculpatory motivations into account,  these acts of resistance are still important 
and seem actually to have taken place. 
 We have already encountered Orlmann’ refusal to shoot the Russian partisan.  When 
ordered by Sergeant Huber, he simply refused, at which point Huber ordered Grackel to carry 
it out.  Yet, Orlmann’ refusal did not extend to all forms of participation.  Orlmann still 
accompanied Huber, Grackel, and the condemned man to the execution site and witnessed 
                                                 
252 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 7-3-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 285.[Er hat lediglich 
auf meine Frage, ob er einen anderen Fahrer gefunden habe, kurz erwidert: Es habe sich einen Fahrer gefunden.] 
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the murder of the civilian.253  Regardless, he did refuse an order by his immediate superior, 
with all the risks, real or imagined, it entailed. 
 As mentioned earlier, these categories are neither fixed nor impermeable.  Sergeant 
Pehle is an example, albeit perhaps a problematic one.  Earlier, in 1941, he had complied 
with an order by First Lieutenant Fischer to shoot a Russian civilian.  He claimed that Fischer 
told him about the plan to kill the Jews of Peregruznoje and ordered him to participate.  Pehle 
stated that he immediately refused this order, saying that he “could not and would not do 
this.”254 Given his previous guilt in killing, this statement could be seen as an attempt to 
redeem himself in front of the authorities.  Yet his further statements indicate that he may 
have been telling the truth.  He stated that Fischer’s response was to call him a coward and to 
dismiss him.  Further, he said that Fischer did not exert any obvious pressure on him to 
comply after he refused.255  Given his description of Fischer’s threatening mannerisms 
earlier, why not claim now to have refused in the face of similar threats?  It certainly would 
make him appear more resistant.  In truth, it is likely that Fischer realized that this behavior 
was more difficult to compel than the execution of a partisan and thus, was reluctant to press 
his subordinate on it. 
 Pehle was not the only soldier to defy the commander.  Company clerk Günther 
Lehmann related the following episode.  As he was working in his office, First Lieutenant 
Fischer told him that as a result of the cut telephone lines in the town, he had ordered all the 
Jews of Peregruznoje to be rounded up and shot in reprisal. Fischer then told Lehmann 
                                                 
253 "Statement of Wilhelm Orlmann, 2-14-62," Bl. 130-31. 
254 "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 10-3-61," Bl. 79-80.[Befehl widersetzte ich mich sofort mit etwa folgenden Worten, 
dass ich diese nicht könne und auch nicht tun würde] 
255 Ibid. [Einen offensichtlichen Druck hat Fischer nach meiner Befehlsverweigerung auf mich nicht ausgeübt] 
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personally that he could participate.256 According to Lehmann, he told Fischer such things 
were not for him and he should be left alone.257 This is an interesting episode for several 
reasons. First, it  falls in a gray area between evasion and more active direct refusal.  
Lehmann was not ordered to participate, but such a suggestion from his commanding officer 
carried implicit force that Walter’s did not.  Secondly, this exchange seemed to Lehmann to 
be an intentional challenge on Fischer’s part, rather than an off-hand remark.  According to 
Lehmann, Fischer should have known that he would not willingly participate in the shooting. 
“I did not understand this to be an explicit, official order,” he testified, “I knew Captain 
Fischer somewhat better as a result of our association of several years.  He would not have 
seriously expected that I would take part in such a shooting.  Besides, he also knew me too 
well.“258  Why would Fischer invite Lehmann to participate if he already knew that he lacked 
the inclination to do so?  Indeed, after working so closely, he should have known better.  
Perhaps, Fischer was testing his own power and his lukewarm response to Lehmann’s refusal 
represents his acceptance of what he had already correctly guessed to be Lehmann’s 
attitudes. 
 
Killing and its Aftermath: Rationalization and Motivation 
 
I certainly had no concerns then over whether Fischer had been right to shoot 
such people without a legal trial with a death sentence.  
                                                 
256 "Statement of Günther Adolf Wilhelm Lehmann, 8-29-61," Bl. 55. [Hptm Fischer sagte zu mir selbst „ich könne 
mich auch daran beteiligen.“] 
257  Ibid. [Ich entgegnete ihm, dass sei nichts für mich, er solle mich damit in Ruhe lassen.] 
258 "Statement of Günther Adolf Wilhelm Lehmann, 5-28-63," Bl. 24. [Ich habe das nicht als einen ausdrücklichen, 
dienstlichen Befehl aufgefasst…Ich kannte Hptm Fischer durch die jahrlange Zusammenarbeit etwas besser.  Ernsthaft 
hätte er nie von mir erwartet, dass ich mich an einer solchen Erschießung beteiligen würde.  Dazu kannte er auch mich zu 
gut.] 
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- Fritz Puls259 
 
In particular, a small child was spoken of, who had also belonged to one of 
the groups… 
- Sergeant Heinrich Pehle260 
 
 So far, we have seen what the men of 4th Company did and the ways in which they 
negotiated the various pressures (personal, social, and organizational) to participate in 
atrocity.  However, we are still left with the nagging question faced by all those who study 
the Holocaust—namely, why.  The “real” motivations of the perpetrators and the reactions of 
the bystanders and other members of the unit remain the most difficult historical meanings to 
discover.  Yet, for many of us, discovering this meaning is most important.  This case study, 
thus far, has been able to identify and categorize the pressures and forces acting upon these 
men that may have significantly contributed to their participation.  But what did such 
participation mean to them, in their own words?  Why did they believe they were following 
orders?  How did they characterize their actions? 
 Here the sources are both help and hindrance.  On the one hand, we have perpetrators, 
bystanders, and resisters making personal statements attempting to explain their actions.  Yet 
on the other hand, many of these men make these statements in an environment of personal 
legal risk and thus probably at least attempted to formulate explanations which were self-
exculpatory, evasive, or flatly false.  Yet as we have seen, there are ways around such self-
serving testimonies [this is an allusion to the as yet unwritten section on source criticism and 
                                                 
259 "Statement of Fritz Puls, 11-27-62," Bl. 359. [Ich habe mir damals sicher keine Gedanken darüber gemacht, ob 
Fischer berechtigt gewesen ist, solche Leute von sich aus Erschießen zu lassen, ohne dass ein gerichtliches Verfahren mit 
einem Todesurteil vorlag] 
260  "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 1-28-63," Bl. 375.[Insbesondere erinnere mich, dass von einem kleinen 
Jungen gesprochen worden  ist, der auch zu einer Gruppe gehört… ] 
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how we can identify truths from perpetrator testimony]. Even in obfuscation, a careful 
reading of these statements reveals much.   
There are two sides to this coin: motivation and rationalization. Motivation here 
refers to the actual reasons driving one’s decision-making process.  Rationalization is the 
explanation of one’s actions to oneself or others.  This process can occur simultaneously with 
the act or after the act as a self-serving device.  For example, a man may kill a snake because 
he is deathly afraid of them (motivation) but he may say before or after the act that he is 
concerned the snake may bite his children (rationalization). Thus, rationalization may be 
useful in a decision-making role or in a psychological one, to ease what may be cognitively 
dissonant reactions.  One sees in the motivations and rationalizations of these men a 
deliberate operationalization of partisan paranoia and general fear of the civilian population.  
Indeed, higher headquarters encouraged these fears in no small part.  However, the historian 
has a much more difficult time attempting to identify anti-Semitic justifications through the 
statements of the witnesses.  Yet given the prevailing organizational climate and behavior of 
some of these men, such views likely were present, if only on a more muted level than in 
other more highly indoctrinated organizations (such as SS, SD, or party organs.)   
Next to these rationalizations for murder also stand glimpses of conscience.  4th 
Company was neither a specially trained and indoctrinated execution unit like the 
Einsatzgruppen nor a seasoned killing formation like many of the police battalions.  It was a 
unit whose crimes were still fresh, whose mental and emotional wounds perhaps had not yet 
healed.  Evidence of this is apparent in the documents.  At some level, most recognized 
something fundamentally wrong had gone on in Peregruznoje (if not Klemjatino.)  What 
exactly disturbed the men of 4th Company may remain obscured, but that such a sense of 
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unease existed indicates some level of conscience, guilt, shame, or sentimentality remained 
in the unit at that time. 
 
Jews, Partisans, and the Ritterkreuz: Motivation and Rationalization 
 The first (and most logical place) to begin discussing the motivations and 
rationalizations of these individuals is within the military organization itself.  While the 
“obedience to orders” defense was clearly and, perhaps, eternally discredited at Nuremburg, 
it is not fair retroactively to transfer this understanding on the soldiers of 4th Company.  In 
order to understand why some decided to obey and others did not, one must examine the 
concept of orders from their perspective, with an eye to explaining what they believed their 
options were. 
 Clearly, for the enlisted soldier, the first and last explanation for their actions was that 
of obedience to orders.  This was voiced by more than a few members of 4th Company.  Yet, 
there were also clearly “orders” which could  be refused without serious repercussions.  
Thus, understanding the viability of orders as a motivation to kill requires careful 
examination of the facts and personalities involved. Bernhard Grackel, who shot the Russian 
civilian in Klemjatino (after another soldier had refused) epitomizes this dilemma.  Consider 
two of his statements regarding his actions: 
If it was told to me that I did not need to carry out Uffz. Huber’s order to 
shoot someone, which Orlmann declined to do in that way, I must say that it 
was not known to me that the same order had been given to Orlmann.  If I 
would have known that, I would have refused to shoot the Russian. 
 -Second Statement, 16 April 1962261 
                                                 
261 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 4-16-62," Bl. 256.[ Wenn mir hier vorgehalten wird, dass ich den Befehl des Uffz. 
H. nicht auszuführen brauchst, einen Menschen zu erschießen, da Orlmann dies gleichfalls abgelehnt hatte, muss ich dazu 
bemerken, dass mir nicht bekannt war, dass der gleiche Befehl woher an Orlmann gerichtet gewesen war.  Hätte ich dies 
gewusst, hätte ich mich ebenfalls geweigert, den Russen zu erschießen.  Aufgrund meiner militärischen Ausbildung habe ich 
nicht gesagt, einen von meinem Uffz. Erteilten dienstlichen Befehl zu verweigern] 
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If I had seen an opportunity to avoid Uffz. Huber’s order, I would have not 
done so.  Huber told me that the order to shoot the partisan came from the 
commander.  I could certainly not disobey an order from the commander in 
the field. 
 -Third Statement, 12 March 1963262 
 
How do we account for the contradictory nature of Grackel’ statements? One detects almost a 
sense of regret in the first statement followed by an angry rationalization in the second.  Puls, 
too, makes a similar orders-justified statement.  He declared, “in Russia, it was not possible 
to refuse an order.  That was clear to me as a soldier and was a matter of course.”263  For 
younger, less experienced soldiers whose basic training experience was more recent, 
Grackel’ second explanation of the power of orders was perhaps more influential (and more 
plausible). Others may, however, have realized at the time that the draconian discipline of the 
Wehrmacht did not apply to all orders, especially those concerning acts such as the killing of 
civilians.  Clearly, those giving the orders knew this.  Lieutenant Fischer told his company 
clerk that he “could participate” in the shootings, and Sergeant Walter gave Hoffmann the 
opportunity to volunteer to drive the Jews out to the execution site.  Yet, Fischer ordered the 
shootings of Russian civilians while brandishing a pistol and threatening court-martials.  
Shootings of suspected partisans obviously lay much closer to military action against the 
enemy and were justified much more easily.  What of the value of threats of court-martial or 
summary execution?  The statement of Rudolf Dörmann, a man who said  he “could not rule 
                                                 
262 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 3-12-63," Bl. 414-15.[ Wenn ich eine Möglichkeit gesehen hätte, mich dem Befehl 
des Uffz. Huber zu entziehen, hätte ich es auch nicht gemacht. Huber hatte mir gesagt, der Befehl zur Erschießung des 
Partisanen käme vom Kompaniechef.  Ich konnte ja nicht im Felde einen Befehl des Kompaniechefs verweigern.] 
263 "Statement of Fritz Puls, 11-27-62," Bl. 359. [In Russland war es nicht möglich, sich einem Befehl zu widersetzen.  
Das war mir als Soldat damals klar und eine Selbstverständlichkeit.] 
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out” that he had been a member of the execution detail is insightful regarding the plausibility 
of threats from Fischer.  He said: 
Because Captain Fischer was a very forceful officer, he was strongly against 
the refusal of orders.  I would definitely not have disobeyed an order.  I 
cannot today, as a result of the long elapsed time give any example in which 
Captain Fischer took severe, drastic measures against the refusal of orders or 
similar.264 
 
This is especially telling given that Fischer was a man prone to harsh punishment of his 
soldiers for the smallest infractions.265 Thus, while some younger soldiers may truly have 
believed that they could not disobey these orders or that they could be punished or executed, 
it is highly probable that most soldiers knew which orders could be disobeyed and which 
could not. Sergeant Pehle is an excellent example.  Though he attempted to refuse, he 
acquiesced in obeying Fischer’s order to shoot a suspected partisan, but steadfastly refused to 
participation in the execution of the Jews. 
 Yet Fischer (and others) did give orders or make “suggestions” that could be 
considered at least extra-judicial.  The lack of higher orders for Fischer himself is one of the 
most interesting and damning elements of the 4th Company case.  At no time does Fischer 
claim to have received orders from above requiring him to execute (or even deport) the Jews 
of Peregruznoje, even though this was a common and often successful response under 
questioning.266  Thus, for the leadership, the question was not one of obedience to orders but 
                                                 
264 "Statement of Rudolf Dörmann, 1-24-62 " in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 98. 
265 Recall Sergeant Lange’s punishment for lodging with Jews and giving them food.  In addition, Harald Eck 
received three weeks arrest for losing the tarp for his truck ("Statement of Harald Eck, 2-21-62," in B 162/4312 
Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 157.) Erich Franken received 5 days punishment because his replacement 
arrived at guard duty late ("Statement of Erich Franken, 2-14-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, 
Bl. 398.) 
266 None of the men from 4th Company admitting shooting civilians or participating in the execution of the Jews 
were charged with any crimes. 
 87 
of the authority to issue them.  What made Fischer think that he had the “space” ultimately to 
order the deaths of over forty innocent civilians on his own initiative? 
 The command climate of higher headquarters was without a doubt the first indicator 
of what was to be considered acceptable behavior.  Indeed, previous research has shown that 
most of the German generals agreed with some, if not all, Nazi genocidal war aims.  What 
Manfred Messerschmidt termed a “‘partial identity of objectives’ provided a sufficient basis 
for collaboration between the army and National Socialism in the ideological war against the 
Soviet Union.”267  This common vision was further operationalized by a series of orders 
governing the conduct of soldiers in the East, beginning with the infamous “Barbarossa” 
order which freed German soldiers from conventional legal penalties for their actions against 
civilians.  An OKW order prior to the invasion clearly stated the manner in which the 
population of the occupied territories should be treated. 
OKW Order for the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction and Procedure in area 
‘Barbarossa’, and Special Military Measures, 13 May 1941 
[Pacification] is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves 
against any threat from the enemy population.   
1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be 
competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians. 
2. Guerillas will be relentlessly liquidated by the troops, whilst fighting or 
escaping. 
3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its 
members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using 
the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed. 
4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, 
persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an 
officer.  This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.268 
 
                                                 
267 Jürgen Förster, "Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation," in The Attack on the Soviet 
Union, Germany and the Second World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 519. 
268 Matthew Cooper, The Nazi War against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944 (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 167. 
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Further, the Reichenau order on the “Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories,” on 10 
October 1941 calls for the application of the above policies to Jews as well, conflating Jew 
and partisan. 
Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a 
severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry.  The Army has to aim at another 
purpose; i.e. the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience 
proves, have always been caused by Jews.269  
  
 These orders originated from the highest level.  How far down the chain of command 
did these directives reach?  In his important study of the Barbarossa campaign, Jürgen 
Förster shows that at least some of these directives had been distributed to platoon level; in 
fact, Hitler himself was angered because one of these memos regarding the “particular nature 
of Russian warfare” had not included the element of “treachery.”270  In the case of 4th 
Company, elements of these themes were clearly present in its higher headquarters, the 4th 
Panzer Army.  Indeed, as a special unit assigned to Army headquarters, the 4th Panzer Signal 
Regiment was closer than other line units to these directives from headquarters.   The 
security reports of Section Ic on Army staff demonstrate this same fear of partisans and 
instructions for severe treatment of civilians.  In a report dated 8 December 1941, the section 
stated that “Geheim Feldpolizei and Feldgendarmerie have established in almost all towns 
searched that they hold hidden Russian soldiers in civilian clothing. The troops must 
eliminate village outsiders in their quarters and keep the streets free of unauthorized traffic, 
even of women, girls, and children.”271 A further report in March of 1942 (six months before 
                                                 
269 Ibid. 
270 Förster, "Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation," 516. 
271 "Abwehr Nachrichten Nr. 1 (Abt Ic, Kdo Der 4 Pzgruppe)," Roll 348,8 December 1941.National Archives 
and Records Administration, 8632042. [Die Truppe muß in ihren Unterkünften die Ortsfremden ausschalten und die 
Straße vom unbefugten Verkehr, auch der Frauen, Mädchen, und Jugendlichen freihalten] 
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the Peregruznoje massacre) warned: “every civilian person met in the area of the front is 
suspicious and is to be arrested on principle” and “living in close quarters with the civilian 
population requires caution and extreme restraint. In those occupied houses with offices, the 
inhabitants are to be removed on principle.”272  Thus, Fischer likely had access to official 
communications and orders in some form from the 4th Armored Signal Regiment, orders that 
clearly advocated brutal measures against the local population. 
 A second indicator was the tacit permission of immediate superiors.  First Lieutenant 
Fischer claims that the Battalion staff of 2nd Battalion was also garrisoned in Klemjatino 
during the winter of 1941-2.273  Moreover, he claims the Battalion Commander, Major 
Lieber could not have failed to see the body of the civilian Fischer executed because it was 
hanging in the vicinity of the commander’s quarters. Hoffmann also remembered the 
Battalion staff (as well as possibly a greater part of the battalion) as having been quartered in 
Klemjatino.274 Thus, Fischer’s superiors at least tacitly, if not actively, approved of his 
actions.  At the very least, his executions of civilians in Klemjatino did not go unnoticed by 
his superiors.  It is also tantalizing to note that at the time of 4th Company’s Jewish massacre, 
the headquarters of the 48th Panzer Corps was located in the town of Aksaj, barely 5 miles 
from Peregruznoje.275  It is unlikely that Fischer’s execution could have taken place without 
notice. While there is no direct evidence of permission from Major Lieber, obviously he did 
                                                 
272 "Photo #47619."[Jede Zivilperson die im Frontgebiet angetroffen wird, ist verdächtig und grundsätzlich 
festzunehmen…Das enge Zusammenwohnen mit der Zivilbevölkerung erfordert Vorsicht und äußerste Zurückhaltung.  Aus 
mit Geschäftszimmern belegten Häusern, sind die Einwohner grundsätzlich zu entfernen] 
273 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 266. 
274 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 12-5-62," Bl. 338. 
275 "Statement of Hermann Hoth, 1-23-62," in B 162/4313 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 90. 
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not disapprove of the actions of First Lieutenant Fischer in securing the area in which his 
headquarters was located. 
 The above evidence demonstrates that there existed a command climate from higher 
headquarters that certainly permitted or even approved of Fischer’s actions.  This command 
climate would not have been unknown to the soldiers as well.  The fear of the civilian 
population and exhortations to ruthless behavior  could not have failed to permeate the ranks.  
In fact, this partisan paranoia is evident in the members of 4th Company, beginning at the top 
with Fischer.  He made his position clear, even during his interrogation, saying, “one must 
also consider that for us as soldiers, the entire population appeared to be suspicious, where 
the partisans stood amongst them.”276 He continued, “the war in the East was carried out with  
reckless cruelty by the Russian side. My endeavor was always in leading the company, to 
spare their blood.  For this reason, I had to treat the members of the Russian civil population 
harshly. I must presume of them, that they could be dangerous to the unit and especially my 
men.”277  
 This partisan fear was clearly used to convince the soldiers of 4th Company to 
participate or to provide them with rationalizations.  Sergeant Huber explained his 
participation in the Klemjatino shooting by claiming that “there existed a connection between 
the disappearance of three members of a neighboring unit and the partisan.”278  Grackel, the 
shooter, claimed Huber had told him that this civilian had “laid mines and ambushed ‘leave 
                                                 
276 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 266. 
277 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 12-6-62," Bl. 341.[Der Krieg im Osten von Seiten des Russen mit rücksichtlosen 
Grausamkeit geführt.  Mein Bestreben ist es immer bei der Führung der Kompanie gewesen, das Blut meiner Männer zu 
schonen.  Aus dieser Grunde musste ich die Angehörigen der russischen Zivilbevölkerung hart anfassen, von denen ich 
annehmen musste, sie könnten der Truppe und insbesondere meinem Männern gefährlich werden] 
278 "Statement of Justus Huber, 3-12-63," Bl. 419. [Es wurde mir vor der Erschießung gesagt es bestände eine 
Zusammenhang mit dem Verschwinden der 3 Angehörigen der Nachbareinheit und dem Partisan] 
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convoys’…It was always said back then that anyone who was a partisan should be shot.  The 
entire region was under attack by partisans at that time.”279 What could be a more 
treacherous, underhanded crime than attacking convoys of soldiers headed home to their 
families?  It is worth noting as well that throughout these testimonies, the victims were 
almost always still referred to as partisans, even twenty years after the fact. 
 What evidence do we have that these crimes against civilians resulted from paranoia 
rather than from the brutalizing effects of real partisan warfare?  First, subsequent research 
does not seem to support the level of fear seen in 4th Company.  Partisan warfare was hardly 
as widespread or deadly during the period in which the unit committed its atrocities (1941-
1942) as it would be later in the war.  Matthew Cooper notes in his study of the partisan war 
that “by the end of 1941, then, of the seventy million people in the occupied regions of the 
Soviet Union, probably no more than 30,000 were in the partisan movement, scattered, 
uncoordinated and unevenly, over 850,000 square miles; most were poorly equipped and 
many undernourished.”280  Joachim Hoffmann concurs, writing that “largely because of past 
omissions, the development of the partisan movement ran into great difficulties from the 
start….The authorities charged with the conduct of the partisan war had no precise ideas 
either on the tactics to be applied or on the most suitable forms of organization.”281   
 But what of 4th Company?  Consider the timeline of their crimes.  A Russian civilian 
was executed in Roslavl in September of 1941.  Yet Lieutenant Hillermann testified that “I 
                                                 
279 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 3-12-63," Bl. 414.[der Partisan hätte Minen gelegt und Fronturlaubzüge und 
Brücken gesprengt.  Es ist uns damals immer wieder gesagt worden, alles was Partisane sei, würde erschossen. Die ganze 
Gegend war damals von Partisanen angegriffen] 
280 Cooper, The Nazi War against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944, 17. 
281 Joachim Hoffman, "The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes," in The Attack on the Soviet Union, 
Germany and the Second World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 878. 
 92 
can with good conscience say we generally had nothing to do with partisans in Roslavl.”282  
In the town of Klemjatino, in the vicinity of Vyazma, 4th Company executed at least four 
civilians, suspected of partisan activity from January to April 1942.  However, the rear area 
commander (1/593) at Vjazma reported on 1 December 1941 that “There is still no indication 
of the formation of partisan groups or of partisan activity.”283  Even more damning, Section 
Ic of the 4th Panzer Group (4th Panzer Signal Regiment’s higher headquarters) reported that 
“after the shifting of the front, the partisans have recently behaved relatively calmly in the 
area of the support troops.  Large actions and assaults by partisans were not reported.” 284  
Finally, Puls and his execution detail likely murdered the Jews of Peregruznoje in September 
1942.  Only this crime falls into the period of increased partisan activity and effectiveness.  
We cannot say for certain that 4th Company did not experience partisan warfare in 1941 and 
1942.  Yet it does seem unlikely that the level of fear expressed by its members or the 
brutality of its “reactions” to the civilian population were in any way commensurate with the 
threat of partisan warfare. 
 Finally, what role did anti-Semitism play in 4th Company’s actions, specifically its 
mass murder of Jews in Peregruznoje?  The proven Nazi and racist credentials of Fischer and 
Puls demonstrate their motivations for ordering and carrying out orders, respectively.  Yet, 
even this action was couched in terms of the partisan threat.  Though Fischer never admitted 
to ordering the Jews killed (or even that they were Jews), he did claim that the group of 
                                                 
282 "Statement of Heinz Hillermann, 3-21-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 276.[Ich kann mit 
gutem Gewissen sagen, dass wir in Roslawl mit Partisanen überhaupt nichts zu tun gehabt haben] 
283 Cooper, The Nazi War against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944, 23. 
284 "Photo #13356," Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives, 
8623052.[Nach Verlegung der Front verhielten die Partisanen sich in der letzen Zeit im Gebiet derFechtenden Truppe 
verhältnismäßig ruhig.  Großere Aktionen und Überfälle durch Partisanen sind nicht gemeldet worden] 
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people he ordered taken into the steppe were suspected of moving back and forth between the 
Russian and German lines with information about German troops and positions.285  Fischer 
had some very powerful legal reasons to hold to this story.286  Under German law, he could 
not be convicted of first degree murder simply for killing civilians, especially those suspected 
of being partisans, and lesser offenses were beyond the statute of limitations.  He could, 
however, be charged with murder for the wanton execution of Jews because they were Jews. 
Yet many of the soldiers in the company clearly knew these civilians were Jews.  August 
Möller presented an interesting reason for the murder, while clearly recognizing the victims 
as Jews.  “A Jewish woman,” he said, “had allegedly refused to take in the soldiers [for 
quartering]. Thereupon, Captain Fischer met together with the Starost and the Jews were then 
rounded up.”287  Hans-Jürgen Köther, one of the shooters, remembered the morning of the 
execution that “we found out that the Jews were to be in the truck.  It was said that these 
Jews must be shot, they had betrayed us.”288  Here, we also see the dangerous conflation 
between Jew and enemy.  This is certainly how the round-up was portrayed to the soldiers of 
4th Company. 
 As has been stated, none of those who took part in the shooting of Jews in 
Peregruznoje discussed their motivations for so doing.  In addition, none of the men directly 
                                                 
285 "Statement of Fritz Fischer, 5-10-62," Bl. 269. 
286 For a more detailed discussion of the legal considerations of prosecuting suspected Nazi war criminals see 
section V. Also, the following works provide an excellent summary of the relevant issues:Devin O. Pendas, The 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965 : Genocide, History, and the Limits of the Law (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), Rebecca Wittmann, Beyond Justice : The Auschwitz Trial (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).  
287 "Statement of August Georg Mahler, 3-13-63," in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 424. [eine 
Judenfrau hätte sich geweigert die Soldaten auf zunehmen.  Daraufhin hätte sich Hptm Fischer mit dem Starosten in 
Verbindung gesetzt und die Juden seien dann zusammengetrieben worden] 
288 "Statement of Hans-Jürgen Köther, 11-15-62," Bl. 321. [Am nächsten Morgen erfuhren wir, dass Juden auf dem 
Wagen wären.  Es wurde gesagt, diese Juden müssten erschossen werden, sie hätten uns verraten] 
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associated Jews and partisans or expressed anti-Semitic or Nazi ideology.  This, again, is not 
surprising given the situation in which these statements were given. Yet evidence of anti-
Semitism or Nazi ideology is not entirely absent from these testimonies.  Erwin Garner 
described the day the Jews were rounded up.  He knew who the Jews were because, as he 
said, “the Jews were externally recognizable.  The Russian has a differently shaped head than 
the Jew.  Also the skin and hair color are different. The Jews spoke Russian with a different 
accent,  I think that there were Russians and Kalmucks together in the town.  The Kalmucks 
were of Mongol ancestry and appeared again different from the Jews.”289  This description 
cannot be accidental and provides telling glimpse of the Nazi indoctrination and habit of 
racial categorization that thrived in 1942.   
 Unfortunately, the interrogations of 4th Company cannot demonstrate conclusively 
much about the anti-Semitic beliefs of its members, with the obvious exceptions of Fischer 
and Puls.  There are very few open discussions of the issue due, in part, to the legal setting in 
which the testimony took place.  What is clear is that everyone knew that it was the Jews 
who had been rounded up.  It is also clear that these Jews had been equated with the hated 
and feared partisan enemy as justification for their murder.  Finally, this “action” required the 
largest number of participants of all the atrocities 4th Company had committed to date…and 
apparently there was little or no difficulty in assembling 12-15 men willing to carry out this 
task.  Therefore, while a charge of virulent anti-Semitism cannot be supported, the presence 
of what Thomas Kühne calls an  “anti-Semitism of indifference” seems highly 
                                                 
289 "Statement of Erwin Garner, 6-19-63," Bl. 7-8. [Die Juden waren äußerlich erkennbar.  Der Russe hat eine andere 
Kopfform als der Jude.  Auch die Haut und Haarfarbe ist anders. Die Juden sprechen auch das Russische mit anderem 
Akzent.  Ich meine, in dem Dorf waren Russen und Kalmücken zusammen.  Die Kalmücken sind mongolischer Abstammung 
und sehen daher auch wieder anders als die Juden aus] 
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probable.290  In the end, it is likely that the majority of soldiers were willing, at the very least, 
to tolerate the murder of Jews and were willing to believe  the charge of Jewish-partisan 
alliance. 
 
“I can’t get what I saw out of my head:” Conscience, Guilt, and Shame 
 
Frank sat on a tree stump and had his head in his hands.  I approached him 
and asked him what was wrong.  I was close with him.  He told me something 
to the effect of: “This morning I was out where the Jews were executed.  I 
can’t get what I saw out of my head 
 -Witness Helmut Ortlepp describing the reaction of SGT Fuchs291 
 
 It is misleading to characterize all the perpetrators in 4th Company as cold killers or 
all the bystanders as merely indifferent.  Indeed, what makes this an interesting case is that 
the company was not particularly hardened or brutalized by their experiences thus far in the 
war.  Therefore, we are able to observe the responses of a group of soldiers to their first mass 
killings.  These responses demonstrate a certain understanding of the negative implications of 
their acts.  Some of these soldiers exhibited an understanding of conscience and guilt, and the 
psychological trauma which accompanies them.  Such feelings of trauma and guilt do not 
necessarily mean that these men were not anti-Semitic or that they were morally opposed to 
these acts of atrocity.  It does demonstrate that such acts were not accepted without 
reservation or without psychological reaction.  Later discussions of these events among the 
men also show that the experience of atrocities did not end with the event itself, but 
continued in the memory of the unit.   
                                                 
290 Thomas Kühne, "Male Bonding and Genocidal War: Germany, 1918-1945," in Triangle Seminar in the 
History of the Military, War, and Society National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: 
2006, 18. 
291 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 3-8-63," Bl. 401. [Fuchs saß auf einem Baumstumpf und hatte den Kopf in die 
Hände gestützt.  Ich habe ihn angesprochen und gefragt, was er denn hätte.  Ich war „per Du“ mit ihm.  Er sagte mir, etwas 
folgendes: „Ich bin heute morgen mit draußen gewesen wo sie die Juden umgelegt haben.  Was ich da gesehen habe, geht 
mir nicht mehr aus dem Kopf heraus] 
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“A disgusting mess:” Reactions to Mass Murder 
 The word  schweinerei is often used in the testimonies of 4th Company.  It does not 
translate directly into English but its meaning is something like a “disgusting mess” with a 
recognition of impropriety, inappropriateness, and revulsion. What is important is that the 
word connotes an event that should not have taken place (at least in the way that it did) and 
has an element of revulsion attached to it. Thus, while the use of Schweinerei by these men 
does not necessarily indicate a moral judgment (though it certainly could), it does signify 
recognition by some in the company that this action was out of bounds.  The use of this term 
in connection with the murder of the Jews of Peregruznoje indicates that such an action had 
broken a taboo for them.  It was not a subtle, incremental escalation of violence for them, but 
a quantum leap most  were not prepared for. 
For example, Bernhard Grackel said that he considered the shooting of women and 
children to be a “große Schweinerei” or huge mess.292 Alfred Hoffmann stated during 
questioning that he “regarded the shooting of Jews at the time to be a Schweinerei.”293  
Heinrich Seiler, too, used this term.  He remembered that, upon returning from a wire laying 
mission, he was told by his comrades that “a Schweinerei happened at the company.”294 It is 
also worth noting that Lieutenant Puls, too, claims that the execution was a Schweinerei, but 
                                                 
292 "Statement of Bernhard Grackel, 3-12-63," Bl. 414. 
293 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 12-5-62," Bl. 336. [Ich habe die Erschießung von Juden schon damals für eine 
„Schweinerei“ gehalten.] 
294 "Statement of Heinrich Seiler, 12-21-62 " in B 162/4314 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl.348. […dass eine 
Schweinerei bei der Kompanie passiert wäre] 
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his testimony in this regard is clearly suspect.  Bernhard Olker remembered that he and his 
comrades had thought that “it would be a mean thing to simply shoot these people.”295 
How did the men of 4th Company react to the atrocities it committed?  This case study 
offers an instructive glimpse inside a unit relatively unaccustomed to atrocity, after its first 
initiation into mass killing.  The company was neither a highly racially indoctrinated nor 
seasoned killing unit.  The responses of its men, therefore, tell us much about how German 
soldiers initially responded to the commission of atrocity, beyond the decision of whether or 
not to participate.  In other words, what role did atrocity play in the group culture of the 
soldiers involved (directly, indirectly, or by association)? 
Our best example of individual reaction to the killing of the Jews of Peregruznoje 
comes from the testimony of Helmut Ortlepp, who initiated the investigation.  He described 
the reactions of his friend, Sergeant Fuchs.296 Ortlepp stated that Fuchs had participated in 
the execution (as do at least three other witnesses.)  As indicated above, Ortlepp approached 
Fuchs and asked him why he appeared so downfallen.  Fuchs told him that he had been a part 
of the execution squad and was clearly upset over his participation.  Specifically, the memory 
that haunted him was the killing of a mother and her infant.  According to Ortlepp’s 
testimony, the mother wished to die with her infant; apparently, the children and mothers had 
been separated in earlier iterations.297 Fuchs went on to say that, for some reason, this 
woman was allowed to die with her infant.  She was shot in the head and killed, but the infant 
did not die.  Fuchs told Ortlepp that he was “appalled over this, that now the child moved his 
                                                 
295 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 1-29-63," Bl. 381. [es wäre eine Gemeinheit diese Leute einfach zu 
erschießen] 
296 Ortlepp states that he was “per Du” with Fuchs, indicating that they were familiar and likely friends. 
297 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 11-14-61," Bl. 116. [Bemerken möchte ich hier, dass die Kinder vor der 
Erschießungsaktion von ihren Müttern getrennt wurden.] 
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hands through the mother’s shattered head.  He supposed that he would never in his life 
forget this.”298  
Fuchs’s reaction is instructive.  What most disturbed him, according to Ortlepp, was 
the killing of a mother and infant, and the gruesome nature of the killing, not the killing of 
the other Jews.  One must also recognize that Ortlepp clearly wanted Fischer and Puls to be 
punished and would likely choose the most damning anecdotes to relate.  It is possible that 
Frank elaborated on his feelings about the killing in general and that Ortlepp omitted this 
from his testimony.  Fuchs was not a hardened killer, even after having been in a unit that 
had killed civilians before, though in a much different manner.  Yet his lack of condemnation 
of the event in general and his preoccupation with the mother-child incident may also 
indicate the presence of a latent acceptance of the anti-Semitic policy in general. 
Regardless, it is clear that this mass murder and its aftermath had occupied a place in 
the collective memory of the unit because it was an emotional and disturbing event.  One 
indicator of this impact is in the oral “afterlife” of the event.  More than a few soldiers 
remark that this incident was talked about in the company long after it had occurred.  
Company Cook Lange remarked insightfully, 
In my memory, the narratives of the shooting were sorrowful. It is also not 
that this execution had no lasting impact on the company members.  At that 
time and during meetings after the war, the conversation always came back 
to the execution. My comrade Reise with whom I repeatedly spoke about this 
after the war had the same memories of this event as I.299 
 
                                                 
298 "Statement of Helmut Ortlepp, 7-12-61," Bl. 8. [.  Fuchs war entsetzt darüber, dass nun das Kind mit sei en Händen 
in dem zerschossenen Kopf der Mutter herumgewühlt habe.  Er meinte noch, er würde dies in seinem Leben nicht 
vergessen.] 
299 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 233. [In meinem Erinnerungsbild aber ist es so, dass die 
Erzählungen über die Erschießungen traurig waren.  Es ist auch nicht so, dass diese Exekution an den Komp-Angeh spurlos 
vorbeigegangen ist.  Damals und bei Zusammen treffen nach dem Kriege ist das Gespräch immer wieder auf die Exekution 
kommen.  Mein Kamerad Reise, mit dem ich wiederholt nach dem Krieg darüber gesprochen habe, hatte dasselbe 
Erinnerungsbild von dem Vorfall wie ich.] 
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He is not alone.  Heinrich Klein, too, remembered that “it is correct that these events were 
talked about in the company for a long time.”300  Sergeant Pehle remembered that “it was 
long talked about in the company, that Puls was supposed to have led this execution 
squad.”301 He went on to say that, “in particular, a small child was spoken of, who had also 
belonged to one of the groups [that were shot].”302  Hoffmann said that “one also spoke of 
this in soldier circles, that women and children had been shot.”303  Interestingly, he mentions 
this continuing discussion and also says that he “was generally of the impression that it was 
forbidden to speak about the shooting.”304 
 What do these discussions about the killing tell us about the reactions of German 
soldiers to atrocities?  First, it shows that there WAS a reaction.  We do not know the 
contents of these discussions, but it is implied in the testimony of 4th Company veterans that 
they revolved around the appropriateness of the action.  It appears that groups of enlisted 
soldiers especially discussed the killings long after the event.  Moreover, Hoffmann’s 
impression of such discussions as having been forbidden indicates that these discussions may 
have taken place privately among groups of trusted comrades.  Secondly, these discussions 
appear to indicate at least an uneasy relationship of the men to the killing of women and 
children (if not Jewish women and children.)  Clearly, this action was beyond the pale of 
                                                 
300 "Statement of Heinrich Klein, 2-16-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 146. [Es trifft zu, das 
über dieses Ereignis noch längere Zeit in der Komp gesprochen wurde] 
301 "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 10-3-61," Bl. 79-80. [Mit Bestimmtheit wurde lange in der Komp gesprochen, dass 
diese Exekutionskommando unter der Führung des Komp-Angeh Puls gestanden haben soll] 
302 "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 1-28-63," Bl. 375. [Insbesondere erinnere ich mich, dass von einem kleinen Jungen 
gesprochen ist, der auch zu einer Gruppe gehört] 
303 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 12-5-62," Bl. 336.[Man hat im Kameradenkreise auch davon gesprochen, dass 
Frauen und Kinder mit erschossen worden seien] 
304 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 7-3-62," Bl. 285. [Ich hatte überhaupt den Eindruck, dass ein Verbot ergangen 
war, über die Erschießung zu sprechen.] 
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previously accepted behavior.  Soldiers did not have such discussions or even make mild 
condemnations of the killings of “suspected partisans” earlier on in the war.  The continued 
discourse over the incident at Peregruznoje and the important, if shadowy, place it occupied 
in the unit’s collective memory strongly suggests that there were indeed moral boundaries.  
Killings such as Peregruznoje certainly tested these boundaries, at least in units such as 4th 
Company,  and were not easily explained away by the conditions of the war or the 
ideological indoctrination to which the men were exposed. 
 Moreover, at least two soldiers mentioned contemplating the events of September 
1942 even after the war.  Hoffmann, who clearly thought on the event a great deal, describes 
an interesting encounter with his father after the war. 
In 1945, when I came home to my parents…I had reported the shooting of 
the Jews. I had spoken with my father, about what one should do about this 
thing, that is, whether one should somehow report it.  My father was of the 
opinion that one shouldn’t do anything.  One could not make the thing “un-
happen” and the person who was responsible would have to live with his own 
conscience.305 
 
While this vignette may say more about German post-war memory than soldier experience, it 
does imply, if true, that this murder had a long “afterlife” among those who experienced it.  
Such a revelation also indicates an attempt to deal with the aftereffects of the event, whatever 
they may have been.  Wilhelm Danner apparently also continued to think on the events of 
that afternoon.  He told investigators, 
After the war, I spoke about the shooting of the…Jews by Puls with my in-
laws, who were persecuted by the Third Reich.  My mother in law was 1/8th 
Jewish.  When the Eichmann trial began, I thought often of this matter.  
When the Kripo came to me, I even said to myself, it must have to do with 
                                                 
305 "Statement of Alfred Hoffmann, 12-5-62," Bl. 337. [Ich habe 1945, als ich zu meinen Eltern zurückkam…über 
diese Judenerschießung berichtet. Ich habe noch mit meinem Vater gesprochen, ob man aus der Sache was machen sollte, 
d.h. ob man die Sache irgendwie anzeigen sollte.  Mein Vater war damals der Ansicht, man sollte nichts unternehmen.  Man 
könne die Sache nicht ungeschehen machen und der Mann, der verantwortlich dafür sei, müsse das mit seinem Gewisse 
selbst abmachen] 
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what went on with Wm Puls. The officer was thus surprised when I 
immediately began with this.306 
 
That the Eichmann trial would have evoked memories of the event is also perhaps indicative 
of the extent to which it affected the men of the unit. 
 Whether the emotional reaction of the men to the shooting, especially at the time, had 
anything to do with the ethnicity of the victims (as Jews) remains unclear.  Until that point, 
4th Company’s victims had been primarily military-aged men suspected of hostile acts 
against the Wehrmacht, certainly not the elderly or children.  It seems apparent that the 
different nature of this atrocity resonated within the group in a different way.  There seems to 
have been much debate and discussion of it, perhaps in an attempt to determine its legality, or 
perhaps just as a form of “group therapy.”  In either case, it seems that “ordinary” German 
units, even under the conditions of the Eastern Front, maintained some moral awareness.  
Moreover, testimony indicates that moral spheres were not universal and that some atrocities 
were regarded as normal and justified activities while others were still seen as beyond the 
realm of acceptable behavior. In his discussion of Wehrmacht crimes in Greece, Mark Mazower 
found similar reactions.  Soldiers who may have been willing to accept the killing of unarmed male 
civilians still found killing women and children emotionally difficult, if not morally wrong. One 
soldier referred to the shooting of women and children as “a Schweinerei  which had nothing to do 
with fighting a war.”307  
[INSERT MAZOWER COMMENTAR 
 
 
                                                 
306 "Statement of Wilhelm Danner, 11-16-62," Bl. 333. [Über die Erschießung der…Juden durch Puls habe ich nach 
dem Kriege mit meinen früheren Schwiegereltern gesprochen, die zu den Verfolgten des 3 Reiches gehörten.  Meine 
Schwiegermutter war, wir sie sagte, Achteljüdin. Als das Eichmann Verfahren lief, habe ich oft an diese Sache denken 
müssen. Als die Kripo zu mir kam, habe ich mir gleich gesagt, es müsste um die Sache mit Wachtmeister Puls gehen.  Der 
Beamte wart noch erstaunt, als ich gleich davon anfing] 
307 Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece : The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944, 130. 
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Shards of a Mirror: Fault Lines across 4th Company 
 
In Russia, my relationship with Captain Fischer was ultimately strained. I 
had good relations with then Lieutenant Franz Scherer, with whom I had 
gone to Gymnasium in Neheim and had known well from this time.  I think, 
that it was a result of strained relationships that  prevailed between Scherer 
and Fischer. 
- Sergeant Pehle308 
 
To summarize, I must say as a result of that experience, that we as company 
members knew that Captain Fischer had done something illegal whereby a 
portion of the company took part without orders because they were of the 
same attitude as Fischer. 
 - Company Cook Lange309 
 
I assumed, however,  that this shooting was carried out by troops from the 
company trains. 
- Soldier Bernhard Olker310 
 
Regarding Captain Fischer I would like to say that I always respected him as 
a man and took him for 100% a soldier and officer. 
- Soldier Wilhelm Ritter311   
 
 One of the interesting findings in the investigation of 4th Company’s participation in 
atrocities is that the unit itself was riven with cliques, feuds, and other social divisions.  The 
comradeship of the “group” appears much more problematic in this context.  It seems that 
some historians hold a view of German army units as idealized, homogeneous groups of 
“brothers in arms.”  Such an interpretation becomes questionable when it is mobilized to 
                                                 
308 "Statement of Heinrich Pehle, 10-3-61," Bl. 79-80.[In Russland war mein Verhaltnis zu Hptm Fischer zuletzt 
gespannt…Ich hatte einen guten Kontakt mit dem damaligen LT Franz Scherer, mit dem ich zusammen das Gymnasium in 
Neheim besucht hatte und den ich seit dieser Zeit gut kannte…Ich möchte meinen, dass das eine Folge des gespannten 
Verhältnisses war, das zwischen Fischer und Scherer geherrscht hatte] 
309 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 234.[Zusammenfassend  muss ich auf Grund der damaligen 
Erlebnisse sagen, dass uns als Komp-Angeh bewusst war, dass Hptm Fischer hier etwas Unrechtes tat, wobei ein Teil des 
Kommandos nicht befohlen an der Aktion teilnahm, weil sie dieselbe Einstellung wie Fischer hatten] 
310 "Statement of Bernhard Josef Olker, 10-3-61," Bl. 84.[Ich nehme allerdings an, dass diese Erschießung von Angeh 
des Komp-Troßes durchgeführt worden ist.] 
311 "Statement of Wilhelm Ritter, 5-11-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 261. [Bezügl. des 
Hptm Fischer möchte ich noch sagen, dass ich ihn immer als Menschen geachtet habe und ihn für einen 100%igen Soldaten 
und Offizier gehalten habe. ] 
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explain participation in atrocities.  Historian Thomas Kühne has done much work on the role 
of comradeship in the German army.  However, he also appears to have fallen victim to just 
such an overly general interpretation of comradeship.  He writes, for example, “immediately 
becoming ‘the best of friends’ with men one had never known before proved to be a daily 
experience in the German army.”312 In attempting to explain motivations for participation in 
atrocities, Kühne argues “it was not only about group pressure (or any other pressure) but 
about—group pleasure, about togetherness, about belonging.313” Clearly, comradeship was 
important in creating social pressures.  However, the idea of a single “group pressure” can be 
misleading. In fact, there is no one group but rather a shifting conglomeration of peer groups, 
interest groups, and cliques. It is not presumptuous to assume that many conventional army 
units on the Eastern Front possessed a similar structure.  Therefore, an investigation of this 
structure allows us to define the space in which soldiers negotiated participation in atrocities. 
 Why is defining this space so important?  First, it suggests that the somewhat 
monolithic concept of German “comradeship” is not as useful as it may seem.  Soldiers may 
develop cliques within a unit that will sustain them emotionally and physically, even when 
these cliques may be counter to the approved or desired ethos of the unit.  That is to say, for 
example, substandard soldiers can continue to be poor performers without succumbing to 
group pressures if there are other substandard soldiers with whom they can socialize.  This 
concept has important implications for the commission of atrocities.  It suggests that the 
existence of competing cliques within a unit may allow additional space for various forms of 
non-participation or evasion than in units that are more cohesive. 
                                                 
312 Kühne, "Male Bonding and Genocidal War: Germany, 1918-1945," 2. 
313 Ibid., 5. 
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 Secondly, a detailed look at these subgroups reveals that non-participation in different 
forms of atrocities did not coincide cleanly with these fault lines, nor did each group 
influence behavior with equal strength.  For example, dissent regarding Nazi policy against 
Catholics may not equate to opposition toward atrocities directed against Jews. Indeed, as we 
have already seen, at least one soldier was easily coerced into killing a suspected “partisan” 
but steadfastly refused to participate in the killing of Jewish women and children. This 
revelation indicates that the spectrum of responses discussed earlier must also be filtered 
through a variety of social groupings and influences.  Thus, in units with more divisions, 
negotiating participation in atrocities may have been even more chaotic. 
 Finally, how does the presence of such cliques affect a top-down pressure to 
participate in atrocities?  The existence of multiple lines of conflict and the fact that 
responses to atrocity do not break out clearly along them leads to an important conclusion: 
the true believers and role players can, and often did, drive genocidal actions, even when in 
the minority in a group.  Without a fairly homogeneous group culture, perhaps execution of 
unpopular acts is more likely.  Moreover, it seems that the existence of multiple subgroups 
within the unit allows individuals space to evade or resist, knowing that they are still secure 
in that subgroup, if not in the eyes of the leadership or unit at large. 
 
Catholics 
 Testimony from several members of the unit, including two officers, indicates that 
Catholics in 4th Company felt alienated and formed an informal clique based on this.  First 
Lieutenant Fischer as a clear adherent to Nazi ideology had a particular distaste for Catholics.  
A great deal of testimony from the legal investigation confirms this.  Company clerk 
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Lehmann remembered that Fischer “impressed me with his anti-religious views. He had, in a 
general sense, told me that I, too, could leave the church.  I inferred then from the 
conversation that he no longer belonged to the church.”314  Fischer’s anti-Catholic views 
reached the breaking point when he expressed them to two of his Catholic officers, Franz 
Scherer and Heinz Hillermann.  Hillermann recalled that, at an evening meeting between 
Fischer and the two officers, “Fischer presumed to condemn Catholics as being the enemies 
of Germany.  I demanded that he take back this comment by the next morning or I would 
report him.  Fischer apologized the following morning.”315 Scherer remembers a similar 
event.  He stated,  
Here I must unfortunately say that he would sometimes underscore his 
demands or desires with a drawn pistol. He occasionally threatened 
Lieutenant Hillermann and me with his pistol during arguments when we 
were not of the same opinion. Hillermann and I discussed the topic of 
Catholicism, condemning the dominant view in Nazi circles.  Fischer, who 
had secretly eavesdropped on us, reproached us forcefully and called 
Catholics “traitors.” When we, as Catholics, protested these obscenities, the 
aforementioned threat occurred. 316 
 
Such behavior clearly united the Catholic members of the company in opposition to Fischer’s 
leadership.  Indeed, it seems that such a firm response, as that of Hillermann, had an impact 
on Fischer.  Apologizing for his remarks to his own platoon leaders seems out of character 
and demonstrates that Fischer was willing to swallow his pride at least superficially to 
                                                 
314 "Statement of Günther Adolf Wilhelm Lehmann, 5-28-63," Bl. 29. [Speziell kann ich noch angeben, dass er seine 
Kirchenfeindlichkeit mir gegenüber zum Ausdruck gebracht hat.  Er hat mir sinngemäß gesagt, ich könnte doch auch aus 
der Kirche austreten.  Ich habe damals aus dem Gespräch entnommen, dass er der Kirche nicht mehr angehörte] 
315 "Statement of Heinz Hillermann, 3-21-62," Bl. 278. [Dabei verstieg sich  Fischer zu dem Vorwurf, die Katholiken 
seien die Feinde Deutschlands.  Ich habe ihn darauf aufgefordert, bis zum nächsten Morgen diese Äußerung 
zurückzunehmen andernfalls ich Meldung machen würde.  Fischer hat sich am folgenden Morgen entschuldigt] 
316 "Statement of Franz Scherer, 3-23-62," Bl. 235.[Hierzu muss ich bezüglich Fischer leider sagen, dass er seine 
Forderungen oder sein Verlangen manchmal mit der gezogenen Pistole unterstütze.  Selbst mir und Leutnant Holtheide hat 
er mit der Pistole gelegentlich eine Auseinander setzung gedroht, als wir nicht seiner Meinung waren. Holtheide und ich 
hatten uns über Fragen des Katholismus unterhalten, wobei wir die damals herrschende Ansicht in NZ Kreisen verdammten.  
Fischer, der uns heimlich belauscht hatte, machte uns schwere Vorwürfe und bezeichnete die Katholiken als Verräter.  Als 
wir uns als Katholiken diese Beschimpfungen verbaten, kam es zu der vorbeschreibenen Bedrohung.] 
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resolve this particular dispute.  Perhaps more importantly, it seems that the reaction of these 
officers to Fischer’s anti-Catholic rhetoric attracted enlisted men to this group as well.  For 
example, Sergeant Pehle had known Scherer from his hometown and from school and he 
indicates that he and Lieutenant Scherer were close.  While Pehle does not mention religion, 
it is likely that he, too, was Catholic.  That Fischer attempted to convince Lehmann to leave 
the church also suggests that Lehmann was Catholic.  Thus, it appears evident that Catholic 
soldiers within the company knew each other and bonded, at the least as fellow sufferers 
under Fischer’s ideological attacks.  What make this group interesting are its varied 
responses to participation in atrocities.  Both Pehle and Lehmann refused at some point to 
participate in the killing of the Jews of Peregruznoje.  Yet the two officers, who were 
incensed enough to demand an apology from their commander regarding a religious insult, 
failed to voice any real opposition to the killing of civilians or Jews.  A statement made by 
Lieutenant Hillermann is instructive; regarding one of the “partisan” executions, he 
remarked, “I was horrified over this event, and afterward however didn’t speak of it anymore 
with Fischer, particularly because my relationship with him was extremely strained.”317  He 
elaborated later, “I myself was extremely incensed over Fischer’s ‘speedy trial’ and 
exchanged thoughts with Lieutenant Scherer on Fischer’s extreme handling of the situation.  
As I have said, my relationship with Fischer was extremely strained, one could even say 
antagonistic. In spite of this, however, after consultation with Scherer, I did not take it 
further.”318  
                                                 
317 "Statement of Heinz Hillermann, 3-21-62," Bl. 276.[Ich war über diesen Vorfall entsetzt, habe aber wohl bei dem 
Gespräch mit Fischer zunächst nichts weiter gesagt, zumal mein Verhältnis zu ihm äußerst gespannt war] 
318 Ibid., Bl. 277. [Zudem war ich ja selbst über dieses von Fischer geübte „Schnellverfahren“ äußerst erregt und habe 
mit LT Scherer meine Gedanken über diese unremässige Handlung von Fischer ausgetauscht.  Wie gesagt, war mein 
Verhältnis zu Fischer äußerst gespannt, man kann sogar sagen verfeindet.  Trotzdem habe ich aber nach Rücksprachen mit 
Scherer nichts weiter veranlasst] 
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Thus, it seems that Hillermann felt comfortable standing up to the commander over 
his religious views, but not over atrocities.  Neither he nor Scherer expressed opposition or 
condemnation to either the killings of “suspected partisans” or the Jews of Peregruznoje, 
even twenty years after the fact.  This is an interesting observation, given that prior 
discussion indicates opposition to the killing of women and children to be more acceptable, 
as it was farther out of the bounds of normalcy.  It seems that, given their success in 
confronting the commander on his anti-Catholic attitudes, Scherer and Hillermann did not 
want to jeopardize these gains by speaking out against any other atrocities.  As well, it is 
instructive that Lieutenant Fischer felt threatened enough by the reaction of his officers that 
he was willing to apologize.  Perhaps he feared a justified charge that he was undermining 
morale by attacking his soldiers’ religious beliefs.  Fischer clearly felt these expressions of 
displeasure to be far more important than those of men refusing to participate in the killing of 
Jews, likely because he felt far more support and justification from his higher headquarters 
and superiors in anti-partisan and anti-Jewish measures. 
 In any case, the Catholic group indicates that subgroups could provide comradeship 
and serve as loci for opposition of varying kinds and severity.  Yet it also shows that such 
opposition was neither uniform nor did it necessarily cross the bounds of interest which 
created the group in the first place.  Catholics in 4th Company seemed content to advocate for 
their beliefs selectively and remain quiet on other fronts once their anger was assuaged. 
 
Sergeants vs. Officers 
 Conflict between NCOs (non-commissioned officers) and officers exists in every 
unit, up to the present.  In most forms, this conflict/competition is a healthy and natural one, 
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owing to the separation of power and spheres of influence and responsibility between officers 
and NCOs.  Thus, it is perhaps no surprise to see some indication of such conflict in 4th 
Company.  It does appear, however, that such conflict was less than healthy.  Coming mainly 
from the testimony of ex- First Sergeant Heinrich Bollmann, a description emerges of a 
commander disliked intensely by the highest-ranking enlisted soldier in the unit and perhaps 
by other NCOs.  We also see an officer, already described as impetuous and quick to make 
decisions, who refused to listen to the advice of his presumably more experienced NCOs.   
First Lieutenant Fischer also apparently had a Russian “wife” whom he kept in his 
room in the headquarters building.  In Bollmann’s words, “I was especially disgusted that 
Fischer lived together with a Russian woman in his room the whole winter in Clemjatino 
[sic]. This woman was even pregnant by Fischer, which I merely suspected by her 
condition.”319  This relationship was not a secret either.  According to Heinrich Seiler, 
“regarding the ‘womanizing story,’ that Fischer had womanized in the company rear, that I 
knew and this generally was known.  In connection with this, I told the police that the First 
Sergeant did not agree with the behavior of the commander.” He added, “in so far as this, the 
First Sergeant was completely correct.”320  First Sergeant Bollmann could have had multiple 
reasons for disapproving of Fischer’s illicit relationship.  First, it clearly violated existing 
rules about fraternizing with the “enemy” and could have compromised the security of the 
unit by having its commander so intimately involved with a native.  Secondly, for a 
                                                 
319 "Statement of Heinrich Bollmann, 8-29-61," Bl. 48. [Mich hat dann noch ganz besonders abgestoßen, dass Fischer 
den ganzen Winter über in Climatjino mit einer russischen Frau in seiner Stube zusammengelebt hat.  Diese Frau erwartete 
sogar von Fischer ein Kind, welches ich aber nur auf Grund des Zustandes der Frau vermutete] 
320 "Statement of Heinrich Seiler, 12-21-62 ", Bl. 349. […über die Weibergeschichten Dass Hptm Fischer beim 
Kompanietross Frauengeschichten gehabt hat, das wusste ich und das war auch allgemein bekannt.  In diesem 
Zusammenhang habe ich dann dem Kriminalisten gesagt, dass der Spieß mit der Handlungsweise des Chefs nicht 
einverstanden gewesen sei.  Insoweit war der Spieß unbedingt korrekt.] 
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commander as strict as Fischer, to blatantly disobey policy could have introduced a 
poisonous element of hypocrisy into the company’s morale.  Finally, Fischer was setting an 
undisciplined example for the rest of the unit, whom Bollmann was likely also trying to keep 
in line with regards to relationships with the civilian population of occupied towns.  It is 
unclear from his testimony which reasons were most compelling for his condemnation, but, 
as the First Sergeant, it is unlikely that Bollmann was alone among the NCOs in his feelings 
regarding the commander. 
Fischer was described by more than a few veterans as a man who made hasty 
decisions, without much regard for the advice of others.  Lieutenant Hillermann perhaps best 
described this, saying, “as a characterization of Fischer I would like to say that he was an 
extremely ‘bold’ man, who seemed to me insensitive and unscrupulous. If it concerned ideas 
and their implementation, he proceeded recklessly and would have stopped at nothing to 
accomplish his goals.”321  First Sergeant Bollmann claimed that Fischer was “explosive in 
his decision-making…[he was] quick to make a decision.”322  Herbert Bärmann concurred, 
describing Fischer as “a very bold officer, quick to take aggressive actions that were 
sometimes not appropriate.”323 Company cook Kurt Lange noted that Fischer “was a very 
                                                 
321 "Statement of Heinz Hillermann, 3-21-62," Bl. 277. [Zur Charakterisierung von Fischer möchte ich sagen, dass er 
ein äußerst forscher Herr war, der mir gefühl- und skrupellos erschien.  Wenn es sich um Ideen und deren Verwirklichung 
handelte, ging er rücksichtslos vor, wobei er auch über Leichen gegangen wäre.] 
322 "Statement of Heinrich Bollmann, 4-22-62," in B 162/4312 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Bl. 281. [er in seinen 
Entschlüssen explosiv war… dass er schell mit einer Entscheidung zur Hand war] 
323 "Statement of Herbert Bärmann, 2-20-62," Bl. 153. [ein forscher Offizier, der schnell mit energischen Maßnahmen 
zu Hand war, die zuweilen nicht angebracht waren] 
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severe officer, who would often punish the slightest offenses with the hardest 
punishments.”324   
One of the best examples of this rash, unilateral behavior was Fischer’s action against 
his own first sergeant, Heinrich Bollmann.  Bollmann claimed in his statement that Fischer 
attempted to punish him for stealing a cow.  Bollmann contended that he had “organized” a 
total of 6 cows from the “partisan area” in order to improve the rations of the company and 
so they could have something to eat.325  Apparently, a hearing of some kind took place.  
Bollmann claimed that these charges were levied against him because he had opposed 
Fischer’s living with Russian women.”326  As a result of these disputes, Bollmann was 
transferred to 3rd Company in April 1942.327  Bollmann testified that his later company 
commander “who was probably already at Regimental staff, worked it so that I was 
transferred to his company…[and] he must have known why I came to his unit.”328 
This internal conflict between the commander and his highest ranking NCO is 
important.  Officers come and go but NCOs frequently stayed for long periods of time in the 
unit.  It is then likely that the loyalty of the other NCOs and soldiers in the company would 
have been stronger toward Bollmann, even without a martinet of a commander like Fischer.  
Moreover, it seems that Bollmann did have the interests of the company in mind, given his 
                                                 
324  "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 229.[Dieser war ein sehr gestrenger Offizier, der unter 
Umständen schon bei kleinen Verstoßen mit harten Strafen vorging.] 
325 "Statement of Heinrich Bollmann, 4-22-62," Bl. 281. 
326 Ibid.  [Meine Vernehmung Setzung erfolgte ausschließlich deswegen, weil ich dagegen opponiert hatte, dass Fischer mit 
russischen Frauen in seinem Quartier zeitweilig zusammenlebte.] 
327 "Statement of Heinrich Bollmann, 8-29-61," Bl. 47. 
328 "Statement of Heinrich Bollmann, 4-22-62," Bl. 282. [Daraufhin hat mein späterer Kompaniechef, der wohl auch 
zufällig beim Stab war, daraufhin gewirkt, dass ich zu seiner Kompanie versetzt wurde… er müsste ja wissen, warum ich zu 
seiner Einheit gekommen bin.] 
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attempt to supply better meals to the men.  Fischer’s actions against Bollmann would surely 
have created a rift between the NCOs and himself, minus the cadre of sergeants who were of 
a like mind with him.  Indeed, this dispute was serious enough that Bollmann was transferred 
out of the unit, apparently without ill effects.  What is interesting as well is that this dispute 
did not seem to impact the actions of the men in the unit regarding atrocity.  Bollmann had 
left the unit by the time of the Peregruznoje shooting; his response to that event must remain 
conjecture.  But he apparently had no problems with the shootings of civilians that had 
occurred prior.  Indeed, by his own admission, he administered a coup de grace to the 
hanging victim in Klemjatino.  The lasting effects of Bollmann’s feud do not appear to have 
had any effect in opposition to the shootings at Peregruznoje. 
 
Fischer Loyalists 
 What is clearly evident from the testimonies of 4th Company veterans is that a group 
of soldiers and NCOs existed who were of a like mind with the commander, Lieutenant 
Fischer.  These individuals likely belonged to the motivated actor group, and their loyalty to 
Fischer could have several origins.  Regardless, these men allied themselves with Fischer and 
were willing and eager to carry out his orders.  Though cited earlier, the following 
descriptions of this group of “loyalists” bear repeating here: 
I can generally say that these people [shooters] belonged to the circle in the 
company which was always on the spot for special tasks.329  
 
The NCO corps that took part in the shooting above all had the same attitude 
as Fischer.330  
                                                 
329 "Statement of Herbert Bärmann, 2-20-62," Bl. 154.[dass diese Personen zu dem Kreis in der Kompanie gehörten, 
die zu einer solchen Aktion bereit waren. Damit will ich zum Ausdruck bringen, dass es diejenigen waren, die für 
Sonderaufgaben freiwillig zur Stelle waren] 
330 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 234.[Diese von Hptm Fischer gezeigte Einstellung hatte vor 
allem Unteroffizierkorps, das an der Erschießung teilnehme] 
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It was related to me later that the young company member, Keller, 19 at the 
time and a baker, had taken a particularly active role in the shooting.331 
 
For each individual Action, suitable people were sought out by the NCOs 
who would be capable of such acts.  I remember the batman of First 
Lieutenant Sauer, the young lance corporal Heinrich König, who always 
freely volunteered.332 
 
I took him [Puls] as a man who assisted the commander and reported to him 
on the morale of the unit.  Sometimes he had even “told” on people. 
However, it was not that he told on everybody to the commander.333 
 
This clique of soldiers, NCOS, and officers was vital for the perpetration of atrocities.  
Moreover, the existence of this group was clearly apparent to members of the unit at the time.  
Whether this unit gravitated toward Fischer out of ideological agreement, desire for power or 
acceptance, or simple proclivity for violence is not obvious in all cases.  Also unclear are the 
interactions between this group and the other cliques within the company.  How did these 
men interact with other members of the company?  Here, the sources are of little use, as 
clearly no one would include himself in this group voluntarily; thus, all we get are second-
hand descriptions and identifications of this group.  It is, therefore, hard to say if members of 
this clique were looked down upon by other members of the unit for their participation.  
However, it does seem likely, based on the testimony available, that they were disliked, if 
only because they were allied with the unpopular Lieutenant Fischer.  Above all, here is a 
                                                 
331 "Statement of Heinrich Gasscher," Bl. 87.[Weiterhin wurde mir erzählt, dass der jüngere Kopm-Angeh Keller, 
seinerzeit etwa 19 Jahre alt und von Beruf Bäcker, sich bei dieser Erschießung besonders aktiv verhalten hätte.] 
332 "Statement of Wilhelm Orlmann, 2-14-62," Bl. 131. [Zu den einzelnen Aktionen wurden dann jeweils von 
Unteroffizieren geeignete Leute aufgesucht, die für solche Taten fähig waren.  Ich erinnere mich noch an den damaligen 
Putzer des Oblt Sauer, den jungen Gefr. Heinrich König, der sich immer freiwillig meldete] 
333 "Statement of Kurt Siegfried Lange, 3-23-62," Bl. 233. [Ich bezeichne ihn als einen Mann, der dem Chef sehr zur 
hand ging und ihm über die Stimmung in der Einheit berichtete.  Es kam sogar vor, dass er „gepetzt“ hat.  Aber es war das 
nicht so, dass er jedermann beim Chef „anschmierte] 
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group formation most directly linked to participation in atrocities.  The members of this sub-
group were defined in many ways precisely because they were willing to kill. 
 
Picking up the pieces: Making sense of Cliques and Sub-groups 
 What this case study clearly indicates is that there was no such thing as “the group,” 
even in the mythic brotherhood of conventional Wehrmacht units.  Indeed, it is likely that 
most units possessed similar fissures and dividing lines as 4th Company.  Moreover, these 
divisions are complex and do not often allow one to predict their impact upon the 
predisposition to commit atrocities.  For example, though the NCOs of 4th Company may 
have disliked Lieutenant Fischer as a military leader, no evidence suggests that this critique 
led anyone to refuse to participate in killing.  The most central clique to explaining such 
participation is the ideological one, the group of men who believed what Fischer believed or 
who saw it beneficial to ally themselves with him. More research must be done to test the 
wider applicability of these findings within German army units.  Understanding the 
patchwork of groups overlaid upon the military unit will greatly help in understanding why 
men chose to participate in killings and why they refused.  Perhaps more importantly, it will 
perhaps illuminate what issues resisters and killers alike held as important. 
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IV. Conclusion 
When your icon of the enemy is complete 
you will be able to kill without guilt, 
slaughter without shame. 
The thing you destroy will have become 
merely an enemy of God, an impediment 
to the sacred dialectic of history. 
 - Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination
334 
 
 
The jury, as a result of the trial, was not convinced that the foreign civilian 
persons were killed by the members of 4th Company in a malicious manner 
under the law. “Malicious” in this sense is an act which would have been 
committed under the circumstances of great evil and in which the victims 
were defenseless. This trial did not show that the killing of these non-resident 
villagers took place under such circumstances.  All circumstances point to 
the fact that the victims were not innocent at the time of their roundup and 
also as they met their fate.  In particular, there is an absence of any  evidence 
for the assertion that there was anything before or during their evacuation to 
the execution site, that would have aroused or allowed any belief but that 
they should simply be deported, and that they therefore would not have 
reckoned on their execution as the worst possible eventuality… Therefore, 
Fischer’s acts exhibit neither in their motives nor in their execution the 
reprehensible characteristics which distinguish a deliberate and illegal killing 
as murder (in accordance with 211 para. 3 of the Penal Code). 
- Judgment in the Trial of Fischer et. Al., 13 May 1964335 
 
 After an eight day trial in April and May 1964, the district court in Düsseldorf 
dropped all charges against Fritz Fischer due to the above findings, which brought into play 
                                                 
334 Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy : Reflections of the Hostile Imagination, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1986). 
335 "Court Judgment in Trial of Fischer Et. Al," Bl. 504-05.[Es fehlt insbesondere jeglicher Anhaltspunkt für die 
Annahme dass in ihnen irgendwann vor oder bei ihrem Abtransport zur Erschießungstätte, die Meinung hervorgerufen oder 
gewährt worden wäre, sie sollten lediglich aus dem Ort abgeschoben werden, und dass sie deshalb nicht mit ihrer 
Erschießung zumindest als dem schlimmsten der als möglich erachteten Eventualfälle gerechnet hätten… Mithin weist die 
Tat des Angeklagten Fischer weder nach ihren Beweggründen noch nach ihrer Ausführung die besonderes verwerflichen 
Merkmale auf, die nach 211 Abs.3.StGB eine vorsätzlich und rechtswidrige Tötung als Mord kennzeichnen. ] 
the fifteen-year statute of limitations on any “non-heinous” crimes committed under the 
Nazis.  The court found that because Fritz Puls acted “as a subordinate in the execution of 
orders and did not exceed his instructions, he could only be punished if he could have been 
expected to know that the order of his superior Fischer directed a civilian or military crime or 
offense.”336  He was acquitted.  Despite extensive testimony to the contrary, the jury failed to 
accept that the victims were Jews, that they had been killed because they were Jews, or that 
they had been killed in a particularly gruesome manner.   
 In order to understand the “logic” behind the Fischer ruling,   a discussion of West 
German law at the time is a useful digression.337  As the former director of the Central Office 
for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes, Adelbert Rückerl observed, “there was a general 
political climate in the 1950s that viewed the “war criminals” problem as a thing of the past, 
an unfortunate legacy of the occupation period best left behind.”338  Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer was certainly part of the problem in this regard. His “continued focus on the future 
and more immediate concerns…made him a unifying force in an extremely fractured state 
with a “fragile popular psyche.’”339  In essence, he sought to put the crimes of the past 
behind Germany, by punishing a small but highly visible few.  The legal authorities sough
do likewise.  When the Allies relinquished control of the West German courts, the German 
t to 
                                                 
336  Ibid., Bl. 509. [ Da der Angeklagte Puls somit als gehorchender Untergebener in Ausführung eines Befehls in 
Dienstsachen gehandelt, und den ihm erteilten Befehl nicht überschritten hat, wäre er nach 47 Abs.II des 
Militärstrafgesetzbuches nur zu bestrafen, wenn ihm bekannt gewesen wäre, dass der Befehl seines Vorgesetzten Fischer 
eine Handlung betraf, welche eine bürgerliches oder militärisches Verbrechen oder Vergehen bezweckte.] 
337 For three excellent discussions on the problems and limitations of German judicial attempts at accountability 
for the crimes of the Third Reich, see Wittmann, Beyond Justice : The Auschwitz Trial, 47-48, Pendas, The 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965 : Genocide, History, and the Limits of the Law, Adalbert Rückerl, The 
Investigation of Nazi Crimes, 1945-1978 : A Documentation (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1980). 
338 Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965 : Genocide, History, and the Limits of the Law, 15. 
339 Wittmann, Beyond Justice : The Auschwitz Trial, 27. 
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judiciary banned any retroactive prosecution of crimes that fell under the new category of 
genocide, making only future crimes punishable under this statute.  In addition, while 
extending the statute of limitations on murder, the German legislature kept in place the 
fifteen year statute of limitations on manslaughter, meaning that no crimes of this category 
could be prosecuted after 1960.  Finally, two of the elements required to convict someone of 
murder drastically reduced chances for conviction while providing ample pretexts for 
acquittal. 
 First, an actual crime must have been committed.  Central to this idea is the subjective 
category of intent, defined as the “knowledge that the behavior will have a particular result 
and the desire or will that this result should come about.”340  One of three key concepts 
regarding this element must be present to meet its burden of proof: base motives, treacherous 
action, or cruelty.  Such categories did more to provide defenses with loopholes for 
exoneration than they provided arguments for prosecutors. Secondly, the act must be 
unlawful and the perpetrator must know that it was unlawful.  An act that would have been 
legal at the time would be much more difficult to punish. Individual initiative was the 
deciding factor between a charge of murder and that of aiding and abetting.  For example, as 
Rebecca Wittmann succinctly shows, 
…although the “order defense” could not be used on its own, as the Nazi 
state had been ruled illegal, its organizations criminal, and its orders 
therefore invalid, this defense could still be used to demonstrate that the 
defendant had not carried out individual acts of cruelty (to make the cruelty 
clause of paragraph 211 inapplicable), had not demonstrated personal anti-
Semitism (to make the base motives clause inapplicable), and had not acted 
on individual will (to make perpetration inapplicable, although aiding and 
abetting might be.)341 
 
                                                 
340 Ibid., 37. 
341 Ibid., 47-48. 
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Thus, the legal code itself, as well as a German desire to forget the past, especially the 
smaller crimes that were perpetrated by a much larger group of soldiers, provided 
Fischer and Puls an alibi and an almost ready-made defense.  If those killed at 
Peregruznoje were not civilians, let alone Jews, Fischer and Puls could not have had 
base motives.  Because they did not “know” they were going to be killed, they were 
killed neither treacherously nor cruelly.  And because Sergeant Puls could not have 
known it was illegal to kill suspected partisans, he was not guilty of a crime. 
As the World War II generation slowly fades, it may become easier to expose this last 
“uncomfortable” truth, that of the “normal” soldier who, for a variety of reasons, participated 
in atrocities.  Indeed,  these actions may provide us the greatest insight into the Nazi 
perpetrator who participated in “crimes of opportunity,” that is, atrocities that were somewhat 
spontaneous or not within the scope of his wartime mission.   
An analysis of military propaganda materials and letters indicates that, in many 
soldiers,  mental ground had been prepared that would ease the transition into criminal acts.  
First and foremost, fear, disdain, and even hatred of all things Russian and Soviet were 
cultivated amongst the rank and file.  It is this prejudice that created the primary foundation 
for atrocities, even anti-Semitic ones.  The German soldier was taught that his enemy was 
bestial, conniving, subhuman, and bent on wreaking terrible violence against the German 
homeland.  These propaganda messages were echoed and reinforced by the common 
experience of soldiers on the Eastern Front.  German soldiers battled the harsh environment, 
observed what they saw as the backward and subhuman inhabitants and way of life in the 
East, and participated in the bloody, difficult anti-partisan war. 
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Admittedly, much of this work is based upon a case study of one unit’s experience.  
In their discussion of the value of the case study, several social scientists write that “the 
qualitative research exemplified in the case study usually brings us closer to real human 
beings and everyday life.  Rather than assuming a world of simplicity and uniformity, those 
who adopt the qualitative approach generally picture a world of complexity and plurality.”342 
It is this complex world that we see in the experience of 4th Company in 1941-42.  This 
environment bears further investigation.  It reveals that units involved in atrocities likely are 
not as homogeneous as many historians have assumed.  Indeed, it appears that soldiers 
navigated a complicated maze of personal connections, cliques, orders, and senior-
subordinate relationships.  Yet we also see that even within this web,  some soldiers were 
able to chart a course toward various forms of non-participation if they so chose. 
On the other hand, the example of 4th Company demonstrates (as others have) that 
only a few dedicated men or volunteers are necessary to carry out significant atrocities.  A 
relatively small number of the soldiers in the unit ever actively engaged in killing, though 
more were likely involved in any number of supporting actions.  4th Company also 
demonstrates conclusively the power and importance of leadership in the commission of 
atrocities.  A signal company would probably have never killed 30-40 men, women, and 
children without direction from above.  Fischer’s anti-Semitism and rash behavior was 
certainly a driving force behind 4th Company’s crimes.  Without Fischer’s leadership, the 
unit’s killing would have been limited to executing suspected partisans, if that. 
Further research is required to understand the response to atrocities at the unit level.  
One of the challenges to this is first finding as many conventional units as possible with 
                                                 
342 Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg, A Case for the Case Study (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1991), 23. 
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documentation of their crimes.  Thousands of crimes, such as the partisan executions 
described here, likely passed without notice or record by the more “conventional” units on 
the Eastern Front.  Secondly, reliance on interrogation transcripts limits the researcher’s 
ability to plum the depths of the German soldier psyche.  The ideal situation would be a 
collection of letters from a unit investigated for war crimes.  However, in the absence of this, 
further investigation of conventional units that conducted atrocities as well as of letters will 
expand, illuminate, or even challenge some of the conclusions reached in this study. 
What the case of 4th Company shows us is that ideology and social pressures are 
symbiotic.  True believers and fanatics such as Fischer can drive atrocities, even when in the 
minority.   However, it is the presence of a majority of indifferent followers that truly makes 
atrocities possible.  4th Company also demonstrates that in the National Socialist military 
universe neither a specific killing mission nor intensive indoctrination was required for the 
commission of mass murder.  One sees the how the pressures and fears of the partisan war 
was used as a justification for racial killing.  It is likely that the different categories of 
response to atrocities exist in many German military units.  Further research is required to 
confirm such a hypothesis, but in this case, at least, examining the inter-workings of one such 
unit at the lowest level has revealed how Wehrmacht soldiers responded to participation in 
atrocities against both civilians and Jews. 
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Appendix 1:  Organization of a Panzer Signal Regiment343 
Panzer Group 
Signal Regiment
1st Battalion
(Operations)
2nd Battalion
(Construction
1st Company
(Telephone Ops)
2nd Company
(Radio)
3rd Company
(Tele Ops, QM)
4th Company
(Wire Laying)
5th Company
(Wire Laying)
6th Company
(Telephone Ops)
Signal Supply 
Company
(Light)
Signal Supply 
Company
(Light)
3nd Battalion
(Construction
8th Company
(Wire Laying)
9th Company
(Wire Laying)
7th Company
(Wire Laying)
Signal Supply 
Company
(Light)
As of 6-22-1941
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
343 Kampe, Die Heeres-Nachrichtentruppe der Wehrmacht, 1935-1945, 114. 
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Appendix 2:  Organization of a Wire-laying Company (FFK- Feld Fern 
Kabelkompanie)344 
 
 
 
 
4th Company
(Wire laying)
1st Platoon
(Wire)
Motorized
2nd Platoon
(Wire)
Motorized
3rd Platoon
(Wire)
Motorized
Wire Troop
1 NCO
12 Soldiers
2 Drivers
Wire Troop
1 NCO
12 Soldiers
2 Drivers
Wire Troop
1 NCO
12 Soldiers
2 Drivers
2 Radio Troops
2 NCOs
16 Soldiers
2 Drivers
Approximate totals:   4 Officers
14 NCOs
108 Soldiers
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
344 Ibid., 56, 114. 
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Appendix 3: 4th Company Biographical Information 
Avg Age 
(1942) 26.5 
Avg Age 
Interr. 46.5     
Last First DOB Position Rank 
Age 
at 
time 
Interview 
Date 
Age 
at 
Int 
Baumann Wolfgang 9/28/1920     22 2/1/1962 42
Bärmann Herbert 9/20/1910 Soldier   32 2/1/1962 52
Bossmann Heinrich 5/12/1911 First Sergeant 1SG 31 8/29/1961 50
Danner Wilhelm 1/1/1922 Soldier Obgefr 20 11/16/1962 40
Dirkes Heinrich 1/10/1914 Soldier   28 9/27/1961 47
Epprick Walter 4/14/1914
Command Driver 
Maint. Tech SGT 
Tech 
SGT 28 8/15/1961 47
Eck Harald 3/5/1920 Driver   22 2/21/1962 42
Franken Erich 1/1/1921 Medic Obgefr 21 2/14/1963 42
Fischer Fritz 7/3/1915 Company CDR 
Oblt 
CPT 27 5/10/1962 47
Grackel Bernhard 8/22/1915 Soldier   27 7/21/1961 46
Gasscher Heinrich 8/21/1914     28     
Garner Erwin 1/1/1916     26 6/9/1963 47
Hartmann Hans 12/16/1915 Platoon Leader LT 27 2/15/1962 47
Hahn Clemens 7/19/1918     24 1/9/1962 44
Hessler Max 12/17/1911 Soldier   31 4/12/1963 52
Halter Johann 1/30/1911     31 2/15/1962 51
Huber Justus 2/23/1915 Gruppenfuhrer Sgt 27 9/11/1961 46
Hillermann Heinz 1/1/1916 Platoon Leader LT 26 3/21/1962 46
Köther  
Hans-
Jürgen         7/20/1962 62
Klein Heinrich 1/28/1912 Fernsprecher   30 2/16/1962 50
Kürten Wilhelm 8/12/1915 Driver   27 2/6/1962 47
Kürten  Paul 10/29/1915 Soldier   27 11/15/1961 46
Lohner Heinrich 4/14/1915 Driver   27 8/16/1961 46
Lange Kurt 9/15/1917   NCO 25 3/23/1962 45
Lehmann Gunther 4/22/1916 Admin SGT SGT 26 8/29/1961 45
Maier Wilhelm 11/25/1920 Driver   22 4/11/1962 42
Moller Georg 11/28/1915 Driver   27 8/28/1961 46
Nadolny Gottlieb 1/1/1921   Obgefr 21 2/6/1963 42
Neubauer Ludwig 10/18/1920 Fernsprecher   22 4/13/1962 42
Ostermann Karl 2/8/1920 Fernsprecher   22 4/9/1962 42
Oberreuter Gottfried 6/9/1915 Gruppenfuhrer NCO 27 10/5/1961 46
Olker Bernhard 3/8/1914 Soldier   28 10/3/1961 47
Obrikat Helmut 3/31/1911 Soldier   31 2/20/1962 51
Orlmann Wilhem 5/10/1912 Soldier   30 2/14/1962 50
Ortlepp Helmut 1/17/1913 Soldier   29 7/12/1961 48
Pehle Heinrich 2/24/1916   NCO 26 10/3/1961 45
Puls Fritz 4/30/1907
Gruppenfuhrer 
Platoon Leader 
Uffz 
LT 35 5/29/1962 55
Ritter Wilhelm 7/28/1911 Mess Vehicle Dvr    31 5/11/1962 51
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Last First DOB Position Rank 
Age 
at 
time 
Interview 
Date 
Age 
at 
Int 
Rothe Karl 5/1/1913 Soldier   29 9/6/1961 48
Scherer Franz 1/1/1916 Platoon Leader LT 26 3/23/1962 46
Seiler Heinrich 1/1/1919     23 12/21/1962 43
Schwalm Johannes 3/31/1916
Tele. Const. 
Soldier   26 8/17/1961 45
Trubel Rudolf 9/27/1916
Tele SGT 
Mess officer 
Tech 
SGT 26 8/16/1961 45
Unger Walter 8/3/1915 Kradmelder   27 4/13/1962 47
van Lindt Heinz 7/14/1920 Driver   22 2/5/1962 42
Wiegand Karl 5/4/1916 Soldier   26 9/7/1961 45
Wielert Wilhelm 6/12/1916 Soldier   26 9/7/1961 45
Wechsler Johannes 11/23/1917 Soldier Obgefr 25 4/13/1962 45
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